Privacy Tradeoffs in Information Technology Law by Cofone, Ignacio Nicolas
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
 
European Doctorate in Law and Economics 
 
Ciclo 28° 
 
Settore Concorsuale di afferenza: 12/A1 
 
Settore Scientifico disciplinare: IUS/01 (diritto privato) 
 
 
TITOLO TESI 
Privacy Tradeoffs in Information Technology Law 
 
 
 
Presentata da: Ignacio Nicolas Cofone 
 
 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato     Relatore 
 
Prof. dr. Luigi Alberto Franzoni    Prof. dr. Klaus Heine 
_______________________    ___________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Esame finale anno 2015 
 
 
 
 Privacy Tradeoffs in Information
Technology Law
Privacy afwegingen op het gebied van 
informatietechnologie wetgeving
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op gezag van
de rector magnificus
Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op
dinsdag 8 december 2015 om 12.00 uur
door
Ignacio Nicolás Cofone
geboren te Buenos Aires, Argentinië
 
Promotiecommissie
 
Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Heine
 
Overige leden: Mr. C. van Noortwijk
Dr. S.E. Weishaar 
Prof.dr. F. Weber
Co-promotor: Dr. A.M.I.B. Vandenberghe
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as part of the European 
Doctorate in Law and Economics programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A collaboration between  
 
 
 
     
 
 

 
 

 
 
i 
Table of Contents 




 

 


  

  
   

 !
 ! 
	

  !
N@O@N@ ?
	
 NO
N@O@O@ 		

	J

K
 NR
 " 


	

  (
N@P@N@ 


 NV
N@P@O@ 

	 OO
N@P@P@ 

	E

 OQ
 # 
	 !&
! 




 " 
! 


 "!
!! 	

 "#
O@O@N@ 


 PQ
O@O@O@ 
	

 PT
O@O@P@ 	


>	 QM
!" 
	





	 #!
O@P@N@ 


 QO
O@P@O@ 


	 QP
O@P@P@ 

	
 QT
O@P@Q@ 	


 RM
O@P@R@ 

A RP
!# 

	
 $'
 
 
ii 
O@Q@N@ 


	 RU
O@Q@O@  SM
O@Q@P@ 


	J
K


 SP
O@Q@Q@ 	

 SS
!$ 

 %(
O@R@N@ 



 SV
O@R@O@ 
	? TO
O@R@P@ 
	?
 TR
O@R@Q@ 	
	

	 TT
!% 



	
 ' 
" 



	

	
	 '$
"  	
 '%
"! 	
 ''
P@O@N@ 





 UU
P@O@O@ 


 VM
P@O@P@ 


 VN
"" 

 (#
P@P@N@ 	


 VQ
P@P@O@ 



	 VS
P@P@P@ 

	 VU
"# 
	

	

   
P@Q@N@ 


 NMN
P@Q@O@ 
		 NMQ
"$ 



  '
P@R@N@ 	
	 NMU
P@R@O@ 

 NNM
"% 
				
   #
"& 
	"   $
"' 
	"   &
# 	
	  !
#  	
	
	  ! 
#! 	
  !#
 
 
iii 
Q@O@N@ 

	 NOQ
Q@O@O@ 

 NOT
Q@O@P@ 
 NOV
Q@O@Q@ 
 NPO
Q@O@R@ 	
	
 NPQ
#" 
  "$
Q@P@N@ 	 NPR
Q@P@O@ 
 NPU
Q@P@P@ 



	 NQM
Q@P@Q@ 



 NQO
## 		
  ##
Q@Q@N@ 
 NQQ
Q@Q@O@ 

 NQS
Q@Q@P@ 

 NQU
Q@Q@Q@ 

 NRN
#$ 



		
  $$
Q@R@N@ 	
		 NRR
Q@R@O@ 

	
	 NRT
#% 
	
	

  $(
#& 
	#  % 
$ 

  %!
$  



  %"
$!   %$
R@O@N@  NSR
R@O@O@ 

	 NST
R@O@P@ 	
 NTO
$" 
  &#
R@P@N@ 


 NTQ
R@P@O@ 	

 NTR
R@P@P@ 
 NTT
R@P@Q@ 

		 NTU
$# 

	

  '
R@Q@N@ 




	 NUM
 
 
iv 
R@Q@O@ 		
 NUR
R@Q@P@ 



	

	
 NUT
$$ 
		
  ( 
R@R@N@ 




	
 NVN
R@R@O@ 
	
 NVP
$% 

  (&
R@S@N@ 

	 NVT
R@S@O@ 



 OMM
R@S@P@ 
 OMO
R@S@Q@ 	 OMQ
$& 

	

 !%
% 
 !'
%  
 !(
%! 



 !  
%" 	 ! $
%# 
 ! '


	 !!
 !! 


 !$!
 !$#
 !$&

 !$(
 

 
 
 
v 
List of Abbreviations 
 
A29WP Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regards 
to the Processing of Personal Data (Article 29 Working 
Party)  
AEPD Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (Spanish Data 
Protection Authority) 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
Cookie Hypertext Transfer Protocol Cookie 
DNT  Do-not-track 
DPL  Data Protection Law 
EC   European Commission 
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights 
ECJ   European Court of Justice 
EP  European Parliament 
EU   European Union 
FTC United States Federal Trade Commission 
GDRP Proposal for a Regulation on the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Regulation 
Proposal) 
HTTP   Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
ICO   United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office 
IP  Internet Protocol 
MS  Member State of the European Union 
OPTA Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit 
(Netherlands Independent Post and Telecommunications 
Authority) 
 
 
vi 
PECR Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations of the 
United Kingdom 
PET Privacy-enhancing Technology 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UK  United Kingdom 
US   United States of America 
USSC  United States Supreme Court 
 
 
vii 
Tables and Figures 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Choice reversal under a decreasing hazard rate          Section 3.3.2 
Table 2: Right to be forgotten by trigger            Section 4.2.2 
Table 3: Right to be forgotten by basis of processing          Section 4.2.2 
Table 4: Implementations of e-Privacy Directive           Section 5.4.1 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: Relationship between DPL and information          Section 2.3.4 
Figure 2: Commitment vs. flexibility in data subjects  Section 3.8 
 
  

 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
  
 
 
2 
1.1.  Motivation and scope 
A text (text A) states that one should “please be aware that if your spoken 
words include personal or other sensitive information, that information 
will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third party through 
your use of voice recognition.” Another text (text B) states that “any 
sounds... above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it, 
moreover, as long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal 
plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course 
no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.” 
There are several differences between text A and text B, such as the 
dramatic tone and superior pen of the latter. Text B, in fact, seems like a 
dramatic exaggeration of text A, phrasing a story that involves the object 
described in it. It turns out, however, that (as readers of Orwell will have 
anticipated) text B is an extract from 1984, while text A is an extract from 
a Samsung Smart TV privacy policy. 
The aim of this comparison which shows the similarity between the 
texts is not to generate paranoia or to encourage dystopian analogies, but 
to illustrate the motivation for this analysis: a concern for how 
technological changes modify how we deal with personal information, the 
risks that such modifications imply for privacy, and the need for the law to 
be responsive to those changes.  
The central risk that a reduction in privacy due to these 
technologies represents stems from the argument that, when being 
surveilled either by the State or by their peers, people may be deterred 
from any choice that drifts away from social expectations.1 A lack of 
privacy results in this way in a reduction in dissent and in a chilling effect 
on the scope of peoples’ actions.2 In those situations, people express 
themselves guardedly, impairing the social benefits of free 
                                                
1 See Lilian Mitrou, “The Impact of Communications Data Retention on 
2 See Christopher Slobogin, “Transaction Surveillance by the Government,” 
Mississippi Law Journal 75 (2005): 139; Daniel Solove, “The First Amendment as 
Criminal Procedure,” NYU Law Review 82 (2007): 112. 
 
 
3 
communication.3 As a consequence, a society faces a reduction in the scope 
of viewpoints,4 and people face a reduction of their civil liberties, 
particularly regarding freedom of expression.5 Human rights treaties seem 
to have responded to this societal concern. Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union protect privacy as a fundamental right,6 and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in its article 
16 protects privacy and recognizes data protection as a fundamental right, 
providing a basis for action. 
On the other hand, in the same way that societies value privacy, 
they value other goods, and they often face a tradeoff between them.7 In 
particular, an increment in privacy protection seems to reduce the amount 
of available information. There are significant social benefits from 
increasing the amount of available information, since information has 
public good characteristics.8 A larger amount of information publicly 
available in the market generates more trade, faster scientific discoveries 
                                                
3 See Richard Posner, “Privacy, Surveillance, and Law,” The University of Chicago 
Law Review 75, no. 1 (2008): 245. (arguing further that free communications are 
essential to constitute a space to form ideas.) 
4 See Daniel Solove, “‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy,” San Diego Law Review 44 (2007): 745. 
5 See Robert Goodin and Frank Jackson, “Freedom from Fear,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 35 (2007): 249; Neil Richards, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” 
Harvard Law Review 126, no. 1 (2013): 1934; Yoan Hermstruwer and Stephan 
Dickert, “Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on Chilling Effects and 
the Right to Be Forgotten,” Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Collective 
Goods (Bonn, 2013); Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet. And How to 
Stop It (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
Regarding the importance of dissent, see Cass Sunstein, Why Societies Need 
Dissent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
6 The e-Privacy Directive explicitly roots data protection to the right to privacy in 
its Recital 24, by establishing that computers or other devices used by data 
subjects to access the internet belong to the sphere of privacy of those data 
subjects. 
7 See Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 
Chapter 1. 
8 This statement is developed in section 2.3.1 below. 
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and a more substantial democratic empowerment.9 This is done, namely, 
by linking those who need a certain good with those who offer it, by 
increasing available datasets for scientific discoveries, and by providing 
more communication channels to inform oneself and to express one’s 
opinions, respectively.10 Both the risks and the benefits of information flow 
are larger now than they were before; big data (the exponential increment 
in the possibilities to collect, store and disseminate data11) turns the 
balance between them to be both more difficult and more important.12 
Some have even hyperbolically talked about new technologies possibly 
leading to the end of asymmetric information.13 
As this tension between the benefits of protecting privacy and the 
benefits of increasing information illustrates, privacy is largely about 
tradeoffs. For data subjects,14 these are tradeoffs between their privacy 
and the use of products that require the release of information for their 
use; for policymakers, these are tradeoffs between protecting the right to 
privacy and protecting the right to access information. Tradeoffs, in turn, 
are the realm of economics, and in this sense privacy is to a large extent an 
economic problem—even when it does not have a simple monetary 
interpretation and agents are not always aware of the tradeoffs that they 
are making. Economic theory can therefore shed some light on how these 
tradeoffs function, and on what are the optimal choices within them. 
                                                
9 See Jerry Kang, “Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,” Stanford 
Law Review 50, no. 4 (1998): 1193. (emphasizing the availability of relevant 
information, increased economic efficiency, and improved security.) 
10 See Ibid.  
11 See Lokke Moerel, Big Data Protection. How to Make the Draft EU Regulation 
on Data Protection Future Proof (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 2014). See 
also Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
12 See Robert Sloan and Richard Warner, “Big Data and the ‘New’ Privacy 
Tradeoff,” Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper 13-33, 2013. See also 
Robert Sloan and Richard Warner, Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online 
Privacy and Security (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).   
13 See Alex Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen, “The End of Asymmetric Information,” 
Cato Unbound, April 6, 2015. 
14 This is the term used by European DPL for people whom data that is being 
collected or processed is about. The British Data Protection Act, for example, 
states that “data subject means an individual who is the subject of personal data.” 
 
 
5 
The analysis evaluates data protection law (DPL) from a law & 
economics perspective; this branch of law has evolved to cope with new 
interactions involving privacy between private parties, also called the 
horizontal right to privacy, and in this way exists in the intersection 
between privacy law and information technology law.15 Chapters 2 and 3 
perform this economic evaluation of DPL at an abstract level, and chapters 
4 and 5 do so regarding two policy debates that can be called the most 
prominent regarding horizontal privacy in the last years in Europe: the 
right to be forgotten and online tracking. 
The scope of the analysis is, therefore, the way in which European 
DPL deals with new interactions pertaining the right to privacy among 
private parties.16 Within that scope, it seeks to make the existing tradeoffs 
more visible in order to allow for a more informed balance between privacy 
and other countervailing rights. In order to do so, it uses property rights 
theory in a framework of rational choice to explain the recent 
developments of DPL from an economic perspective; this methodology 
presents the advantage of making the costs and benefits of choices 
                                                
15 DPL is, to some extent, the branch of law that deals with the issue of privacy in 
the context of information technology. This differentiates it from other branches of 
law, where two caveats can be made. Firstly, data subjects are, in some sense, 
consumers, but that is not a full description given that not all interactions that 
pertain them are set in a consumer relationship; to the extent that the internet is 
not reducible to electronic commerce, data subjects are not reducible to consumers. 
The analysis, therefore, is not about consumer law. Secondly, the internet can be 
separated in its infrastructure and its content, and two related but separate 
branches of law—telecommunications law and information technology law, deal 
with those two respectively. For this reason, the analysis is not about 
telecommunications law. 
16 The issue of government surveillance, and the problems of privacy between 
private parties and their governments (or other governments) that it introduces, is 
another relevant problem. Although in many ways linked to the issue addressed in 
this analysis, the issue of surveillance has several specific elements that justifies 
its individual study, and although many of the conclusions of this analysis are 
applicable to it, I leave the scope of this for further study. For example, a relevant 
issue of surveillance is the determination of what is legal, and how to make States 
to comply with the law. See, for instance, Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The 
Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (New York: Norton 
& Company, 2015); James Rule, Privacy in Peril: How We Are Sacrificing a 
Fundamental Right in Exchange for Security and Convenience (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).  
 
 
6 
regarding privacy identifiable. In this way, it builds on the traditional law 
& economics literature on privacy to account for more recent technological 
and legal developments. 
The abovementioned concern for how technological changes 
modified how we deal with personal information has largely exceeded the 
intellectual spheres of academia and journalism. In Rotterdam, the 
Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen hosted in 2014 the exhibition 
“Dataism”, exploring the role of the individual in the scenario of big data. 
One of its central pieces, “Mirror Piece”,17 captures the faces of its visitors 
and analyses their biometric features in order to identify them publicly, 
together with their (sometimes controversial) findable characteristics. 
Orwell’s 1984, Samsung TV and the Dataism exhibition are 
examples of the same issue. That a television or a work of art would need a 
privacy policy is a feature that we are not used to as a society. With 
traditional televisions and works of art, the observer remains passive 
while interacting with them: only a consumer of images and sounds. With 
some new objects, however—particularly those that operate through the 
internet—,18 the observer is a subject who engages the device actively, and 
inputs something about himself.19  
In interacting with these devices, subjects face an increment in the 
costs of protecting their personal information, while those who want to 
acquire such information face reduced costs of obtaining it. For example, if 
upon walking into a store, an employee recorded our name, another 
followed us noting how much time we spend in each aisle, and another 
                                                
17 “Mirror Piece” (2010), by Marnix de Nijs. 
18 The internet can be defined as an open network of devices that communicate 
among each other using the same protocol. 
19 Some people consider that the subject who uses this devices turns into an object, 
inverting the relationship between them. See, for example, Stanley Benn, 
“Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons,” in Nomos XIII: Privacy, ed. Ronald 
Pennock and John Chapman, vol. 8 (New York: Atherton Press, 1971). This idea is 
also behind the saying, popular in in Silicon Valley, that if a service seems free 
then one is the product. Conversely, one could also say that the subject who 
interacts with objects instead of being a mere spectator can be seen as less of an 
object (and more of a subject) than the subject who does not. 
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noted which items we bought, we would easily notice.20 Surveillance in 
physical spaces is more evident than in cyberspace.21 In addition, in order 
to perform this real-world surveillance, the store would have to spend a 
significant amount of money, while in cyberspace it can do so with an 
algorithm at a much lower cost. Thus, surveillance in physical spaces is 
more expensive than in cyberspace.22 
While the internet’s technological characteristics, to some extent, 
offer privacy with no precedents,23 they also produce a loss of privacy with 
no precedents: our browsing patterns can be known by internet server 
providers and by content providers, as well as by third parties, with a wide 
array of technological developments such as cookies and fingerprinting. In 
addition, people anywhere in the world can learn personal information 
about us with just a few searches. 
In particular, in the last years two relevant modifications took place 
that affect the incentives in privacy exchanges. The first relates to the 
phenomenon of big data, which makes surveillance significantly easier 
both for public and private parties.24 The second relates to a 
decentralization in how the internet’s content is generated. Both of them 
imply that the context in which privacy interactions take place has 
                                                
20 See Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,” 
Harvard Law Review 113, no. 2 (1999): 501. The USSC has utilized this idea by 
rejecting the analogy between surveillance by a GPS and visual surveillance 
between neighbors. See US v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (DC Cir. 2010). 
21 See Ian Brown and Douwe Korff, “Technology Development and Its Effect on 
Privacy and Law Enforcement. Report for the UK Information Commissioner’s 
Office” (Wilmslow: Information Commissioner’s Office, 2004). 
22 See Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,” 
Harvard Law Review 113, no. 2 (1999): 501. 
23 In social interactions people know our face, gender, general physical 
characteristics, and can have a good guess at our weight and age. On the internet, 
on the other hand, we can access information that we would be embarrassed to 
look for in a library, or shop for any item that we would not like to be seen buying 
in a shopping mall. On the internet, fellow shoppers do not know our particular 
identity and potential members of our community do not know which information 
we are accessing.  
24 See Julie Cohen, “What Privacy Is For,” Harvard Law Review 126 (2013): 1904; 
James Grimmelmann, “Big Data’s Other Privacy Problem,” University of 
Maryland Working Paper 14-7 (College Park, 2014). See also Omer Tene and Jules 
Polonetsky, “Privacy In The Age Of Big Data: A Time For Big Decision,” Stanford 
Law Review Online 64 (2012): 63.   
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changed due to technology and that, consequently, its optimal scope of 
protection might have changed as well. 
Regarding the first change, we have faced a modification in the 
accessibility of information with advances in search algorithms. These 
algorithms reduce the costs of information retrieval. Their development 
has been coupled with an increment in the durability of information, 
produced by increasing storage capacities and a significant reduction in 
storage costs.25 As a result, peoples’ lives can be increasingly recorded and 
stored in an accessible way. This makes personal information more 
vulnerable to third parties—both public and private—increasing the 
repercussions of people’s actions and reducing their well-being by 
producing discomfort, together with potentially creating chilling effects 
that can interfere with personal autonomy.26 Surveys, high profile 
litigations and policy debates show the high levels of concern that people 
have about their informational privacy in this context.27 
Additionally, there has been a modification in the process of 
content-creation, which has become decentralized through technologies 
such as cloud computing and social networking, and the globalization of 
data flows. The internet evolved from the previous linear model in which 
there was a strong separation between content-creators and content-
providers to a system which is characterized by global collaborations—
sometimes called peer-to-peer technology or web 2.0.28 An iconic moment of 
this trend was the apparition of Napster in the 1990s, which was the first 
company to mass-market the idea that files needed not to be obtained from 
their traditional suppliers, but they could be obtained from other users’ 
                                                
25 The cost of storing a gigabyte of data dropped to about 1/100 of its value from 
2000 to 2010. See Lilian Mitrou and Maria Karyda, “EU’s Data Protection Reform 
and the Right to Be Forgotten: A Legal Response to a Technological Challenge?,” 
in Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Information Law and 
Ethics (Corfu, 2012), 29. 
26 See Paul Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” Vanderbilt Law 
Review 52 (1999): 1607. 
27 For a review of different surveys reaching this conclusion, see Jeff Sovern, 
“Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal 
Information,” Washington Law Review 74 (1999): 1033. 
28 See Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
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computers via a system called peer-to-peer.29 The same mechanism was 
taken directly by millions of websites, such as YouTube, Wikipedia, Digg 
and SSRN, and more abstractly by the concept of blogs and social 
networks. It has also been taken by a wide array of products, such as the 
television and work of art used previously as examples. This mechanic of 
content creation, as it will be explained later on, is linked with the 
incentives for the generation of information.30  
Most new technologies carry with them the creation of new risks, 
and one could argue that it is a feature of responsive legal systems to 
address the externalities implied in those risks accordingly. For the case of 
privacy, these technologies reduce the transaction costs of collecting, 
storing and disseminating information. This reduction of transaction costs 
had been done before by the automatic photo camera which motivated the 
famous article by Warren and Brandeis,31 and was done to a more 
profound level by the internet. The internet forced us to rethink existing 
legal concepts and institutions32 and, unlike photo cameras, the internet’s 
architecture does not remain the same over time. This has led scholars to 
consider that the main risks of losing privacy come not from the State, as 
they traditionally did, but from other private parties.33 
These technological changes have made privacy law more 
prominent in the last years.34 In Europe, they have motivated the Data 
                                                
29 This phenomenon has already motivated commentaries assessing its effects in 
copyright law, and evaluating modifications for it. See, for example, Daniel 
Benoliel, “Copyright Distributive Injustice,” Yale Journal of Law & Technology 10 
(2007): 45; Niels Schaumann, “Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer 
Technology,” William Mitchell Law Review 28, no. 3 (2002): 1001; Raymond Ku, 
“The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of 
Digital Technology,” University of Chicago Law Review 69, no. 1 (2002): 263.  
30 This idea is developed in chapter 2. 
31 See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law 
Review 4, no. 5 (1890): 193. 
32 See Andrej Savin, Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2014). Preface. 
33 See Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 
Chapter 1. 
34 See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and George Loewenstein, “What Is 
Privacy Worth?,” Journal of Legal Studies 42, no. 2 (2013): 249. 
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Protection Directive,35 the e-Privacy Directive,36 and the Electronic 
Communications Framework Directive,37 which together form the EU data 
protection framework.38 The EU data protection framework is considered 
by some to be a leading paradigm in data protection,39 having been 
followed by more than 30 countries that issued similar laws since its 
establishment.40 These changes have also changed the legal consequences 
which are derived from existing legislation.41 In Germany, for example, the 
Federal Constitutional Court has protected privacy with the argument 
that the potential storage of personal information can lead to the 
aforementioned conforming behavior.42 
                                                
35 Directive 1995/46/EC. 
36 Directive 2002/58/EC. 
37 Directive 2009/136/EC. 
38 The EC has based its competence to issue these directives on the single market 
provision of article 114 TFEU, referring also to articles 49 and 56 of the treaty 
(free movement of goods and services provisions). In Docmorris and Gambelli, the 
ECJ has accepted the use of article 114 TFEU as a basis of competence for 
regulating the internet. See John Dickie, Producers and Consumers in EU E-
Commerce Law (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005). Chapter 1. See also Deutscher 
Apothekerverband eV v. DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval, ECJ C-322/01 
(2003); Piergiorgio Gambelli and Others, ECJ C-243/01 (2003). 
39 See Paul Schwartz, “The EU-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures,” Harvard Law Review 126 (2013): 1966; Neil Robinson et al., “Review 
of EU Data Protection Directive. Report for the UK Information Commissioner’s 
Office” (London, 2009). 
40 See Anu Bradford, “The Brussels Effect,” Northwestern University Law Review 
107, no. 1 (2012): 1. This is largely driven by the prohibition to companies in the 
EU to send data to companies in countries outside the union without guarantees 
that such data will receive an equivalent protection as it would have in the EU. 
See article 25 of the Data Protection Directive. 
41 In the US, for example, the Supreme Court has overturned a federal conviction 
on the basis that it rested on proof gathered by a GPS device installed in the 
defendant’s car, and such method violated his fourth amendment guarantee to be 
free of unreasonable search and seizure. The USSC, in this way, uses to the fourth 
amendment to protect the right to privacy in the context of the US constitution, 
which does not have a disposition that protects it directly. See US v. Antoine 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). See also Susan Brenner, “The Fourth Amendment in 
an Era of Ubiquitous Technology,” Mississippi Law Journal 75 (2005): 1. 
42 See Hans Peter Bull, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung. Vision Oder Illusion? 
Datenschutz Im Spannungsverhältnis von Freiheit Und Sicherheit (Tubingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2011); Michael Ronellenfitsch, “Bull, Hans Peter, Informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung-Vision Oder Illusion? Datenschutz Im Spannungsverhältnis 
von Freiheit Und Sicherheit,” Die Verwaltung: Zeitschrift Für Verwaltungsrecht 
Und Verwaltungswissenschaften 44, no. 4 (2011): 601. 
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The EU data protection framework, still, was established before 
many of these changes took place, particularly the phenomenon of big data 
and the de-centralized content creation scheme referred to before.43 
Motivated by them, the European Commission (EC) issued a 
communication to the European Parliament (EP) in 2010  stating that, 
maintaining the general principles of the Data Protection Directive,44 new 
regulations are needed to address the impact of new technologies and to 
enhance the protection of personal data.45 This led to the General Data 
Regulation Proposal (GDRP),46 which confirms these concerns stating in its 
recital 5 that “rapid technological developments and globalization have 
brought new challenges for the protection of personal data” and in its 
recital 6 that “these developments require building a strong and more 
coherent data protection framework in the Union.”47 
Hereon, the remaining part of this introduction briefly reviews the 
history of the concept of privacy as it permeated into the law in order to 
see how the right of horizontal privacy emerged, together with the 
different conceptions of the right available in the literature after this 
historical evolution. It then defines which of these will be used for the 
analysis that follows; it argues that a functional concept, seeing privacy as 
an exclusion right of our personal information, can encompass most 
aspects of the reviewed concepts for the topic of this analysis and provide 
more tractable implications. This functional concept also allows for an 
economic analysis, which follows in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                
43 See Lilian Mitrou and Maria Karyda, “EU’s Data Protection Reform and the 
Right to Be Forgotten: A Legal Response to a Technological Challenge?,” in 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Information Law and Ethics 
(Corfu, 2012), 29. 
44 See Directive 95/46/EC. 
45 See European Commission, “A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection in the European Union,” Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, The Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee on the Regions, November 2010. 
46 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data (January 25, 
2012). 
47 GDRP, recitals 5 and 6. 
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1.2.  Background: A Brief History of Privacy 
1.2.1. Early stages: privacy as a sphere of action 
DPL emerges from the interrelation of a phenomenon that is very old and 
one that is new: the concept of privacy and the development of a 
mechanism to ensure privacy with new technologies. Having evaluated the 
latter, it seems fitting for an informed approach to the topic to briefly 
review the former. 
The distinction of what is public and what is private has existed 
since the beginnings of modern legal thought.48 Before that, in ancient 
legal-political thought, the concepts of public and private were intertwined, 
and law was considered to exist to make men virtuous.49 Even after such 
distinction, privacy was seen as a guarantee opposable only to the State (a 
vertical right). It was only later, when privacy moved from a political 
concept to a social concept, that two changes occurred: the horizontal right 
to privacy appeared, allowing privacy to be a right opposable to other 
private parties, and informational privacy appeared, expanding privacy 
from a sphere of liberty of action to a sphere of liberty of thought.  
The engine of the initial lack of a distinction between the private 
and the public is that, in Aristotelian thought, and arguably until Kelsen, 
law and morality share the same object of study. In a passage at the 
beginning of Nicomanean Ethics, for instance, Aristotle states that politics 
is about the study of happiness, and about making citizens both happy and 
obedient to the law, in a context where happiness is intrinsically linked 
with virtue.50 Later in the book, he states that law must direct the young 
into a temperate and firm lifestyle.51 In Politics, he states that the law 
guides citizens’ behavior towards a certain idea of perfection that is 
                                                
48 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). 
49 See Aristotle, “Politics,” n.d. III.9 1280b11. 
50 See Aristotle, “Nicomanean Ethics,” n.d. I.13, 1102a7-9. 
51 See Ibid. X.9 1179b34-35. 
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determined by it, and for such reason legislators must know about virtues 
and vices.52  
As with other constructs of modern legal thought, an embryonic 
version of the distinction between the private and the public is proposed by 
the Sophists. The idea was originally proposed by Lycophron, who argues 
that the reason why the political community (polis) exists is to guarantee 
the enforcement of the rights that men have among each other.53 
Aristotle’s idea, however, predominated, and continued virtually 
unopposed through ancient and medieval thought.54  
This line of thought was set in a context where individuals did not 
see themselves as completely separate from their family and their 
community; they lived closely together and spent little time alone to 
develop thoughts and activities that could arise privacy interests.55 
Speculatively, one could say that there was no need to spend resources in 
protecting privacy in a context where information about one was inevitably 
known by one’s close community, and for outsiders of the community 
accessing that information was very expensive.56 
 Aristotle’s idea perpetuated into modern paternalistic thought,57 
which traditionally formulates an analogy between a ruler and a father 
and argues that, as a father, the State should watch over its citizens to 
ensure their happiness.58 Paternalism, later on, was linked to the concept 
                                                
52 See Aristotle, “Politics,” n.d. III.9 1280b3-5. 
53 See Robert George, Making Men Moral (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 21. See also Aristotle, “Politics,” n.d. iii.5 1280b. 
54 See Robert George, Making Men Moral (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). Most prominently, this idea was taken by Aquinas. See Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, 1917. I-II q.91 a1. 
55 Gini Graham Scott, Mind Your Own Business: The Battle for Personal Privacy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1995). 
56 Technology, as it was seen, reduces this cost of accessing information for 
outsiders. 
57 See generally Santiago Legarre, “The Historical Origins of the Police Power,” 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2006): 745. 
58 See Robert Filmer, Patriarcha, 1680. 
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of police power:59 the State’s legitimacy to engage in an imposition or 
preservation of order that leads to the aforementioned happiness.60 
This concept of police power that was used to justify State 
interventions, in turn, was taken by liberal political theorists as what is 
public. This allowed them to formulate an opposed concept of what is 
private.61 
 By formulating the harm principle, Mill introduced the idea that 
the distinction between the public and the private sphere is the 
delimitation of the scope in which the State can legitimately interfere.62 In 
the public realm, the State can punish its citizens for their deeds because 
it is the realm in which they can hurt others, and consequently social 
responsibilities emerge. In the private realm, on the other hand, acts are 
self-regarding, or they involve others only when their undeceived consent 
is involved—and the State’s interest in such acts can only be indirect.63 
This idea was translated into law with the Hart-Devlin debate. In 
1957, a specialized committee recommended the British Parliament to 
remove criminal sanctions for homosexuality stating that “there must 
remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and 
crude terms, not the law’s business”64. It posed that a conduct is of public 
concern only if it can damage by itself the legitimate interest of other non-
consenting parties.65 
                                                
59 See Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit de Gens, 1758. 
60 See Ibid. See also Santiago Legarre, “The Historical Origins of the Police 
Power,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2006): 745. 
61 Locke, in this line, defines even before Vattel what is private as the opposition 
to what is political. This interpretation of police power as what is public can also 
be found in Smith, who enumerated it as one of the objects of jurisprudence 
relating to the duties of the administration, and in Blackstone, who rejects the 
idea of a ruler as a father to distinguish between the existence of public and 
private spheres. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1689; Adam 
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 1764; William Blackstone, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, 1769. 
62 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859. 
63 See Ibid. 12, 13, 74-75. 
64 John Wolfenden, “Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and 
Prostitution” (London, 1957). Paragraph 61. 
65 See Robert George, Making Men Moral (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 51. 
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Thus far, privacy was not about the tension between individual 
rights and the collective interest, but about the limits of collective interest 
when no rights are involved.66 The report provoked one of the main debates 
in modern jurisprudence, between Devlin67 and Hart,68 which established 
the idea that the State cannot interfere with private acts.69  This debate 
and the piece of legislation that motivated it launched the contemporary 
critique against the State’s intervention in conducts that have no victims,70 
and to that extent it established a vertical right to privacy.  
This definition of the scope of the State’s regulation is equivalent to 
the economic concept of externalities, which traces back to the 
methodology chosen for this analysis. In a more individualistic society than 
Aristotle’s, with communications between private parties that with some 
investment could remain as such, and where individuals did not self-
identify with the community, there was a desire to keep the State away 
from those issues that did not affect the welfare of others. 
1.2.2. The horizontal right to (informational) privacy 
This idea of privacy was transformed by a more modern account that 
parted from the classic liberal distinction between the public and the 
private.71 For this view, the individual is not only threatened by the State 
                                                
66 See Ibid. 19-47 
67 See Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals: Maccabaean Lecture in 
Jurisprudence of the British Academy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). 
See also Ronald Dworkin, “Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals,” Yale Law 
Journal 75, no. 6 (1966): 986. 
68 See Herbert Hart, “Immorality and Treason,” Listener, July 30, 1959. Reprinted 
in Herbert Hart, “Immorality and Treason,” in The Philosophy of Law, ed. Ronald 
Dworkin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). See also Herbert Hart, Law, 
Liberty, and Morality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963). 
69 See Robert George, Making Men Moral (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 48. See also Simon Lee, Law and Morals (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986); Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Society (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
70 See Thomas Grey, The Legal Enforcement of Morality (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1983). 
71 In the modern libertarian tradition of political thought privacy is one of the 
basic freedoms all individuals possess, and its foundation depends on the theory of 
value of liberties adopted within the tradition. 
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but also by social context and social expectations. Therefore, the 
public/private distinction turns insufficient, and the meaning of what is 
private becomes what is personal.72  
The policy debate on postal secrecy, contemporary to the Hart-
Devlin debate, reflects this change in the concept of privacy. In colonial 
times, people had no guarantee that government authorities would not 
read their letters. This led them to develop codes to encrypt 
correspondence, engaging in self-protection.73 Since letters were either 
simply placed inside an envelope or closed with a wax seal that was not 
costly to open, postal offices had no way to credibly commit to the 
confidentiality of communications. This encryption-based self-protection 
mechanism was socially expensive.74 
As from the nineteenth century, post offices started to seriously 
attempt to protect the secrecy of communications.75 However, the main 
protection for the privacy of correspondence was not the laws that were 
issued in this regard, but the invention of adhesive envelopes at the mid-
nineteenth century, replacing wax-sealed envelopes.76 These gave people 
the opportunity to self-protect at lower costs. At the same time, since 
adhesive envelopes were more difficult to open without destroying the 
envelope itself, it gave postal offices a way to signal to the recipient of the 
letter that secrecy was respected. The technological change allowed for the 
                                                
72 See Nancy Rosenblum, Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the 
Reconstruction of Liberal Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1987). 59. See also Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 394. 
73 See Robert Smith, Ben Franklin’s Web Site: Privacy and Curiosity from 
Plymouth Rock to the Internet (Washington, DC: Sheridan Books, 2000). See also 
Susan Brenner, “The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology,” 
Mississippi Law Journal 75 (2005): 1. 
74 An analogy can be made with PETs within DPL, in which data subjects engage 
in self-protection similarly to people who encrypted their letters, engaging in costs 
that could be saved if protection was in place. 
75 See Robert Smith, Ben Franklin’s Web Site: Privacy and Curiosity from 
Plymouth Rock to the Internet (Washington, DC: Sheridan Books, 2000). 
76 See Ibid. 
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implementation of the social idea that communications between private 
parties should be private.77 
Arendt has explained, in this line of thought, that “modern privacy 
to its most relevant functions, to shelter the intimate, was discovered as 
the opposite not of the political sphere but of the social.”78 In ancient times, 
privacy was not a value: it meant the lack of one’s involvement in the 
public sphere.79 Modernity and individualism, however, turned privacy 
into a value, first in the political sphere (against the State) and then in the 
social sphere (between private parties).80 
 This view implied a break between the public/private distinction 
and the government/citizens distinction that was inherent in it. Privacy 
moved to be defined as the opposition between what is personal and what 
is social.81 In this way, a horizontal right to privacy appeared, where 
privacy claims are not only opposable to the government to prevent its 
intervention when one is not harming others, but also to fellow citizens.  
The horizontal right to privacy, moreover, was not only about what 
is confidential anymore. An eighteenth-century citizen of a western 
country was familiar with the concepts of secrecy and confidentiality, and 
would have agreed on the statements that some things are better not 
                                                
77 After the sealed envelope was invented, the USSC, for example, recognized the 
confidentiality of sealed mail based on the 4th amendment, which is the same 
amendment it uses now to protect privacy. In this way it ensured privacy of 
communications. See Ex Parte Jackson, 96 US 727 (1877). British courts did the 
same, even when this liability rule for confidential communications was not 
directly linked with the right to privacy. See Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G, & 
Sm 652 (1859).  See also Roger Toulson and Charles Phipps, Confidentiality 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007); William Cornish, David Llewelyn, and Tanya 
Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013). Chapter 8. 
78 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: Anchor, 1959). 38. See also 
Stanley Benn and Gerald Gaus, Public and Private in Social Life (Kent: Croom 
Helm, 1983). 
79 Not being involved in the public sphere was, in ancient times and particularly in 
Greece, not suited for citizens but for slaves and barbarians, who were not 
considered to be complete because they lacked the public involvement as a realm 
of human development. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: 
Anchor, 1959). 
80 See Ibid. 
81 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 388. 
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disclosed, but he could have had difficulties agreeing with classifying non-
confidential information as private.82 Larger societies with interactions 
that can have a higher level of anonymity allow for this more robust idea of 
privacy. 
This horizontal view of privacy is central for data protection. For 
example, the right to be forgotten and the online tracking regulations, 
which are analyzed below, would not be a topic of discussion under a 
vertical conception of privacy. Moreover, most of the central features of 
DPL in general would not exist under a vertical conception of privacy, 
since the problematic of privacy upon new technologies would be reduced 
to the issue of governmental surveillance. 
In this way, this horizontal aspect of privacy shapes information 
technology law. A purely vertical reading of privacy would restrict it, in 
this domain, to the limits of surveillance and the question of the extent to 
which the State can spy on its citizens—for security purposes or otherwise. 
A horizontal reading of privacy extends it to the relationship between the 
individual and other private parties, opening a variety of issues such as 
the extent to which personal information exchanges between a company 
and a consumer are legitimate, of which are the rights of consumers in 
such context, and of the scope of consent when information is 
automatically gathered.  
At a more general level, this view of privacy is central for 
informational privacy, also outside the scope of DPL. While decisional 
privacy (as in the right to abortion or the right to have consenting adult 
relationships of any kind) remains mainly opposed to governmental power, 
it is an essential characteristic of the right to privacy as a sphere of 
personal information that it can be opposed both to the government and to 
our peers. The following concepts are a reflection of this horizontal idea of 
privacy. 
                                                
82 See Neil Richards and Daniel Solove, “Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law 
of Confidentiality,” Georgetown Law Journal 96 (2007): 124; Daniel Solove, The 
Digital Person (New York: New York University Press, 2004).  
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1.3.  Analytical Underpinnings: Concepts of 
Horizontal Privacy  
1.3.1. Conceptualizing privacy 
According to a well-respected tradition in philosophy,83 a central task of 
philosophical analysis is to clarify what is meant by a certain term for it to 
be used subsequently in other analyses. Following such tradition, this 
section aims to shed light on what does privacy mean.  
A widely accepted classification of the different attempts to 
conceptualize privacy enumerates them as: (i) privacy as the right to be 
left alone, (ii) privacy as autonomy or the limited access to the self, (iii) 
privacy as secrecy or concealment of discreditable information, (iv) privacy 
as control over one’s personal information, (v) privacy as personhood and 
preservation of one’s dignity, and (vi) privacy as intimacy and the 
promotion of relationships.84 
Warren and Brandeis wrote in 1890 the article that is said to set 
the right to (informational) privacy in the common law.85 They showed 
that, in American case law, the right was already recognized without being 
explicitly mentioned; they characterized such right as the right to be left 
alone.86 Unlike previous literature that argued for enhancing privacy, this 
was not a reaction against State intervention, but one against the 
possibilities that other private parties had upon the invention of the 
automatic camera, which reduced the costs of taking an image of someone 
                                                
83 This is, analytical philosophy. 
84 The classification is taken from Daniel Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” 
California Law Review 90, no. 4 (2002): 1087; Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg, and 
Paul Schwartz, Privacy, Information and Technology (New York: Aspen 
Publishers, 2006). The classification seems to be widely accepted. See, for 
example, Richard Bruyer, “Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature,” 
Alberta Law Review 43, no. 3 (2006): 553. Still, it is to note that some authors 
would fit in more than one category, while others, such as Nissenbaum’s privacy 
as context, seem to not completely fit in any. 
85 See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law 
Review 4, no. 5 (1890): 193.  
86 See Ibid.  
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else.87 This was, hence, an early attempt to approach the problem of 
informational privacy between private parties, which led to the 
establishment of the privacy tort in the United States (US).88 
From a different perspective, other scholars have argued that 
privacy is a necessary tool to promote the autonomy of people. The idea 
that one is being watched by others constrains the spectrum of thoughts 
and behaviors that one considers acceptable, and hence limits one’s 
freedom to fully develop as an autonomous person.89 Those who focus on 
this conception consider that privacy interests are centered on limiting 
one’s accessibility, and that this limitation is composed by a combination of 
secrecy, anonymity and solitude.90 None of the three is able to encompass 
privacy interests by itself,91 they argue, since a loss in any of them can be a 
privacy loss without altering the other two.92 
Posner, on the other hand, has famously argued that privacy law is 
mainly about concealing undesirable facts about oneself to others, chiefly 
to deceive them in their opinion of oneself.93 This concealment can take 
place either to hide discreditable information—for instance a previous 
crime or misdemeanor—or to hide information that is not discreditable but 
                                                
87 More specifically, they argued that “the protection afforded to thoughts, 
sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, 
so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the 
enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like 
the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right 
not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed.” Ibid. 205. 
88 Susan Brenner, “The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology,” 
Mississippi Law Journal 75 (2005): 1. 
89 See Julie Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object,” Stanford Law Review 52, no. 5 (2000): 1373. See also Stanley Benn, 
“Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons,” in Nomos XIII: Privacy, ed. Ronald 
Pennock and John Chapman, vol. 8 (New York: Atherton Press, 1971). 
90 Jeffrey Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 6, no. 1 (1976): 26. 
91 See Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the Law,” Yale Law Journal 89, 
no. 3 (1980): 421.   
92 See Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New 
York: Vintage, 1989); David O’Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1979); Edward Shils, “Privacy: Its Constitution and 
Vicissitudes,” Law and Contemporary Problems 31, no. 2 (1966): 281.  
93 This conception, together with its economic consequences, will be developed in 
section 2.2. 
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would correct a misunderstanding that the person would rather 
maintain—for instance a serious health problem that a worker prefers that 
his employer ignores.94 For the second, he adds that people reveal 
information to others selectively without strictly lying to them or deceiving 
(compare for example the image that one’s partner has of one, with the 
image that one’s colleagues have), and that people are always eager to 
disclose facts that portray them in a positive light.95 
On a third conception, some scholars consider privacy is essentially 
control over personal information.96 A refined notion of privacy, they argue, 
shows that privacy is not the absence of information about one in the 
public (like Posner considers), but the control that one has over that 
information. Stating that a man in a desert island is a very private man, 
for example, would be counterintuitive, even if no information about him is 
public.97 Privacy has also been defined along these lines as the absence of 
undocumented personal knowledge about others.98  
In a similar regard to those who view privacy as autonomy, the 
defenders of privacy as personhood argue that privacy is central for 
developing one’s own identity.99 Schwartz criticizes the paradigm of control 
over personal information as a liberal view that mistakenly takes 
autonomy as a given, and he argues that privacy is linked with self-
                                                
94 See Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic 
Review 71, no. 2 (1981): 405; Richard Posner, “An Economic Theory of Privacy,” 
American Enterprise Institute Journal of Government and Society (Regulation) 2 
(1978): 19; Richard Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12, no. 3 
(1978): 393. 
95 See Richard Posner, “An Economic Theory of Privacy,” American Enterprise 
Institute Journal of Government and Society (Regulation) 2 (1978): 19; Richard 
Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic Review 71, no. 2 
(1981): 405; Richard Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12, no. 3 
(1978): 393. 
96 See, for example, Randall Bezanson, “The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, 
News and Social Change,” California Law Review 5, no. 80 (1992): 1133. 
97 See Charles Fried, “Privacy,” Yale Law Journal 77, no. 4 (1968): 475. 
98 See William Parent, “A New Definition of Privacy for the Law,” Law and 
Philosophy 2, no. 1980 (1983): 305; William Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the 
Law,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983): 269. 
99 See Jeffrey Reiman, “Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 6, no. 1 (1976): 26; Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfeld, Between Public 
and Private: The Lost Boundaries of the Self (New York: Free Press, 1979). 
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determination. Agreeing to terms and conditions, for example, might 
technically fall within control over one’s personal information but could 
violate privacy because the terms and conditions can contain boilerplate 
terms that the user does not understand.100 
Finally, the supporters of a conception of privacy as intimacy argue 
that the concept of intimacy encloses all those types of information that 
one would rather keep private.101 The idea is that privacy is a tool to 
protect people from being subject to misrepresentations that could occur 
when others know some pieces of information about them out of context 
that could lead to misunderstandings.102 This concept is more relationship-
oriented than others, aiming to avoid the confrontation between the 
individual and the community.103 The function of the right to privacy is to 
define information territories, where it is socially acceptable to keep or to 
disclose information, defining the boundaries of private life and social 
life.104 
1.3.2. Limits of the concepts 
One must note that these conceptions of privacy are not fully independent. 
Some focus on the means and some on the goals of privacy, and they are 
interrelated at both levels. Control over personal information, for example, 
can be seen as derivative of the limited access to the self. Limited access to 
                                                
100 See Paul Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,” Vanderbilt Law 
Review 52 (1999): 1607. 
101 See Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996); Robert Gerstein, “Intimacy and Privacy,” Ethics 89, no. 1 
(1978): 76; Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 12 (1977): 233; James Rachels, “Why Privacy Is Important,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 323. 
102 See Lawrence Lessig, “Privacy and Attention Span,” Georgetown Law Journal 
89 (2000): 2063; Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in 
America (New York: Vintage Books, 2001).  
103 See Paul Schwartz and William Treanor, “The New Privacy,” Michigan Law 
Review 101 (2003): 2163.  
104 See Robert Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in 
the Common Law Tort,” California Law Review 77 (1989): 957. 
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the self, in turn, presents similarities with the right to be left alone,105 and 
the creation of the self seems to be a combination of the two.  
All of them conceptualize privacy by looking for a necessary and 
sufficient set of elements to define it (per genus et differentiam), and in 
such way find its “essence.”106 This approach generates two difficulties. 
Firstly, the approach fails to capture the fact that what is and what 
is not considered private does not depend on an essential characteristic but 
is dependent on context, and on cultural, historical and technological 
facts.107 It has been argued that it is therefore extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to succeed in this endeavor of defining precisely the essence of 
the right to privacy.108 
In addition, most of the concepts that are equated to privacy have 
in themselves several different meanings, but they are used as 
instruments to link privacy breaches to situations that people intuitively 
consider to be wrong.109 The concepts of autonomy and personhood, for 
example, have many facets, and are not more easily definable than the 
concept of privacy itself. Someone suffering from a privacy violation might 
complain that such violation injures his personhood or his autonomy, but 
such statement does not clarify what privacy in itself means. The problem 
of justifying any aspect of law with our intuitions of what is wrong is that, 
besides the fact that it is to be proved that such intuitions are generally 
shared, law must not necessarily prohibit everything that is morally 
objectionable.110 
From the perspective of these limits of the prevailing 
conceptualizations, one can see that it is reasonable to find disagreement 
among scholars on which of the concepts of privacy which were reviewed is 
                                                
105 See Daniel Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” California Law Review 90, no. 4 
(2002): 1087. 
106 See Ibid. 
107 See Ibid.; Helen Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity,” Washington 
Law Review 19 (2004): 119. 
108 See Robert Post, “Three Concepts of Privacy,” Georgetown Law Journal 89 
(2000): 2087.  
109 See James Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus 
Liberty,” Yale Law Journal 113, no. 6 (2004): 1151.  
110 See Ibid. 
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the most complete, or the most convincing. In turn, the issue is not 
negligible, since the concept of privacy that one has implicitly underpins 
almost any argument that one makes about the functioning of the right to 
privacy.111 
This shortcoming can be seen in the two policy debates that are the 
object of chapters 4 and 5. The right to be left alone concept, for example, 
cannot account for the right to be forgotten, while privacy as personhood 
cannot account for laws preventing online tracking. More generally, 
intimacy cannot account for most of the law regarding informational 
privacy, since most of DPL protects non-intimate information. 
Concealment leaves out the secondary use of information and applications 
of DPL aimed to protect information not considered undesirable. Autonomy 
leaves out any aspect of informational privacy that is not necessary for 
decision-making but is still protected by the law and, consequently, it 
ignores DPL almost as a whole. 
These three difficulties (two conceptual, one explanatory) suggest 
that a different approach to conceptualizing horizontal privacy would be 
preferable as a foundation for this analysis. 
1.3.3. Privacy as excluding others from one’s personal 
information 
A possible way out of the conundrum is to attempt a functional approach to 
privacy that does not attempt to identify the essence of the right, but to 
analyze it functionally, based on the practical implications of privacy law 
rather than on abstract justifications.112  
This is a less ambitious endeavor since such concept can describe 
privacy but cannot, by itself, explain it. However, it allows for a flexible 
concept that can account for a wide array of privacy problems hence taking 
                                                
111 See Daniel Solove, “‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy,” San Diego Law Review 44 (2007): 745. 
112 In support of this conceptual approach over those which were seen, see Ibid.; 
Daniel Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” California Law Review 90, no. 4 (2002): 
1087; Irma Van der Ploeg, “Keys to Privacy,” in The Machine-Readable Body, ed. 
Irma Van der Ploeg (Maastricht: Shaker, 2005), 15.  
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into account the chief concerns of the different conceptions, and in that 
way serve as a useful basis for further explanations. 
The protection of informational privacy can be described, for the 
purposes of this analysis, across the different concepts reviewed as a 
mechanism to exclude others from certain pieces of one’s personal 
information—or, in an extreme case, of one’s personal information as a 
whole.  
Overcoming the explanatory difficulties mentioned, this conceptual 
basis is able to explain the central elements of the EU data protection 
framework, and in particular the rights that data subjects have within it. 
DPL in Europe has evolved by providing data subjects with entitlements 
over their personal information.113 This has led to the argument that the 
general principles of European DPL would be compatible with establishing 
property rights over data,114 that European DPL has a human rights based 
approach which is compatible with the establishment of property interests, 
and that the system is closer to the property-rights paradigm than the 
American system of data protection.115 These entitlements allow data 
subjects to exclude others—both the State and their peers—from their 
personal information. The central rights of European DPL, such as the 
right to object, the right to erasure, the right to refuse and, as it will be 
seen later on, the right to be forgotten,116 fit with this concept inasmuch as 
they signify that data subjects have exclusion rights over their personal 
                                                
113 See Nadezhda Purtova, “Illusion of Personal Data as No One’s Property,” Law, 
Innovation and Technology 7, no. 1 (2015): 83; Corien Prins, “The Propertization of 
Personal Data and Identities,” Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 8, no. 3 
(2004): 1. 
114 See Nadezhda Purtova, “Property in Personal Data: A European Perspective on 
the Instrumentalist Theory of Propertisation,” European Journal of Legal Studies 
2 (2010): 3; Nadezhda Purtova, Property Rights in Personal Data: A European 
Perspective (Tilburg: Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Universiteit van Tilburg, 2011). 
115 See Corien Prins, “When Personal Data, Behavior and Virtual Identities 
Become a Commodity: Would a Property Rights Approach Matter?,” SCRIPT-Ed 3, 
no. 4 (2006): 270; Corien Prins, “Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and 
the Commodification of Our Identity,” in The Future of the Public Domain, ed. 
Lucie Guibault and Bernt Hugenholtz (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2006), 223. 
116 See articles 12 and 14 of the Data Protection Directive. 
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information.117 So do the main duties of data controllers, such as the duty 
to have and to specify a limited and justified purpose for collecting and for 
processing personal data, the general requirement of consent for the 
secondary processing of data, the duty to provide security of processing 
and the duty to maintain confidentiality of communications.118  
Furthermore, this approach presents three analytical advantages 
for the purposes of the analysis that follows. 
First, the concept emphasizes the aspect of privacy that is relevant 
for information technology. New technologies change the way in which we 
acquire, store and disseminate information; information technology law as 
a mechanism to address this does not deal with privacy as the freedom to 
act without coercion but with informational privacy issues. While this 
concept might be weak for the first (decisional privacy), it is robust for the 
second (informational privacy).  
Moreover, this functional characterization, since it abstracts from 
aims, seems to be overarching of the different conceptions of privacy. For 
this reason, using it instead of any of the concepts reviewed does not run 
the risk of excluding aspects of informational privacy that could be 
relevant for the conclusions drawn by other conceptions. By focusing in a 
functional aspect that is common in all conceptions, it can build on what 
has been said for each of them while avoiding contradictions. 
Lastly, seeing informational privacy as an exclusion mechanism 
makes it analogous to an entitlement over a certain piece of personal 
information, in virtue of which the entitlement holder has the right to 
decide who can access it and who cannot (hence excluding others from 
accessing the good). This is a broad definition of entitlement, in the lines of 
the definition used by Calabresi and Melamed; this definition encompasses 
                                                
117 A similar trend, although less systematic, seems to be present in American law. 
An example of this is the Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 12 
January 2015, which mandates companies to notify when data has been breached. 
118 See articles 4 and 5 of the e-Privacy Directive. 
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that the good, in this case personal information, is owned by someone, and 
that such person has some rights over it.119  
This establishment of an entitlement is analytically previous to the 
establishment of a property right, since first one must determine whether 
an entitlement is in place, to then evaluate which is the appropriate 
protection for such entitlement.120 Property, in this sense, is narrower than 
entitlements and, accordingly, it allows to question whether a property 
rule, a liability rule or an inalienability rule is the best way to protect the 
entitlement. 
In such way, this functional approach to the concept is fitting as a 
basis for evaluating DPL from a law & economics perspective. This leads to 
some open questions. Can DPL be justified from an economic perspective 
at a general level? Do we have reasons to believe that agents operating 
under DPL behave rationally? What are the policy implications of this? Do 
the main current policy debates in European DPL fall within this economic 
justification? These questions will be addressed in the following chapters.  
1.4.  Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 will ask to what extent DPL as an exclusion mechanism for 
personal information can be justified in the first place. In order to do so, it 
will explore whether, contrary to the often-depicted tradeoff between 
privacy and information, data protection can lead to more production of 
information and information flow. This counterintuitive result would stem 
from an analysis of ex-ante incentives of creating entitlements to protect 
personal information. Although as long as property right are defined and 
transaction costs are low initial allocations should be irrelevant in 
aggregation (as entitlements will be allocated to its highest valuer ex-post), 
these allocations matter for the generation of goods that are not already 
available. Some aspects of personal information could fit in this category 
                                                
119 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Review 85, no. 6 
(1972): 1089. 
120 See Ibid. 
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since, in order to place information and make it available to others within 
the peer-to-peer system, people face expected costs. When evaluating how 
to protect these entitlements, one can see that property rules increase 
information flow, but they introduce new problems. A liability rule, in 
turn, avoids those problems but it seems difficult to implement. In such 
way, the chapter aims to explain DPL from a law & economics perspective 
and, in doing so, provide a conceptual framework for the evaluation of data 
protection measures. 
Chapter 3 will address the issue that, despite the high value that 
internet users place on privacy, they offer their personal information for 
low compensations. This behavior, known as the privacy paradox, has been 
explained by a stream of literature with different behavioral biases, and in 
particular with hyperbolic discounting. However, economics offers two 
reasons to discount payoffs—costs of waiting and hazard rates—which 
produce two possible reasons for choice reversal. The chapter shows that 
the second can explain the privacy paradox within a rational-choice 
framework in a way that fits more intuitively with consumer claims and 
with contemporary policy debates on privacy. This account would change 
the policy conclusions of the hyperbolic discounting model and would 
account for current trends in DPL. In particular, it would be relevant for 
the right to be forgotten. 
The right to be forgotten, stipulated in the GDRP, is the topic of 
chapter 4. The right establishes that anyone could demand any 
information about himself to be deleted by entities that collect or process 
data. The chapter analyses article 17 of the proposal and explores some 
unintended consequences that have been neglected in the debate. Namely, 
how it strikes a (dis)balance between the right to privacy and the rights to 
freedom of expression and access to information, and what are the 
potential welfare impacts that it creates. Finally, it argues that due to the 
difficulties in its implementation it could introduce a risk compensation 
mechanism according to which a false feeling of safety would lead people to 
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engage in more risky behavior than before (Peltzman effect).121 It also 
shows that the recent decision in Google v. Spain does not rule on the right 
to be forgotten, but rather on the liability of search engines under the 
rights and obligations established in the Data Protection Directive. It then 
makes a brief evaluation on the case arguing that the decision fails to offer 
a consistent balance between the right to privacy and the freedom of 
expression. 
Chapter 5 deals with limitations on online tracking, which are 
object of a regulatory debate that has shifted to the use of default rules to 
enhance privacy. The European Union implemented this idea with the 
Electronic Communications Framework Directive.122 The directive aims to 
change the default system for tracking and move to an opt-in system 
where data subjects must agree to it beforehand. The chapter presents a 
comparative overview of the implementation of the directive across 
member states and evaluates in particular the cases of The Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom (UK). These are representative examples of 
implementations with explicit and implicit consent, and two of the most 
complete regulations on the topic. It then draws from the behavioral 
economics literature on default rules to evaluate these regulations and to 
consider whether it is possible to implement the policy in a way that avoids 
some of the problems that they faced.  
In such way, the analysis that follows addresses the tradeoff 
between privacy and access to information and between privacy and 
freedom of expression. Making the dynamics of such tradeoff more visible 
can be helpful in determining at which point of its sliding scale a society 
might want to stand, and it can also be helpful to answer whether there is 
any point of such sliding scale in which one can reasonably have both.  
 
 
 
                                                
121 See Sam Peltzman, “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation,” Journal of 
Political Economy 83, no. 4 (1975): 677. 
122 Directive 2009/136/EC. 
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2. Privacy Entitlements, Property Rules and 
Liability Rules  
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2.1. Identifying Tradeoffs 
In writings about privacy legislation, both by lawyers and by economists, 
there is often an implicit idea that there is a tradeoff between data 
protection and the amount of information available to reach other social 
goals, such as research that will in turn lead to innovation.123 This idea is 
sometimes depicted as a tradeoff between rights and efficiency,124 
prioritizing one or the other depending on the normative views one could 
have, and it is sometimes left unstated, proposing a balance between the 
right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression or to the access of 
information. This idea determines the extent to which the normative 
arguments that either implicitly or explicitly incorporate it will 
recommend the protection of privacy. 
Contrasting with this idea, there is an argument to be made for a 
certain level of data protection leading to more production of information, 
and hence to more information flow, which would in turn increase the 
scope of the same rights to which privacy is sometimes balanced against. 
To illustrate this point, one must evaluate the ex-ante incentives 
generated by the creation of entitlements to protect, or to abstain from 
protecting, personal information.  
In a low transaction-cost scenario where property rights are clearly 
defined, to whom an entitlement is given should not affect total welfare, 
since costless bargaining will lead to its ex-post allocation to its highest 
valuer. However, there is a caveat to this principle for goods that do not 
exist yet in the market. Some instantiations of personal data are included 
in this caveat since they do not fulfill the characteristics of a good until the 
information is disclosed and it is made available for others to use it. In 
those cases, to whom the entitlement will be given is relevant to determine 
levels of investment, and hence the amount of the good that will be 
                                                
123 See, for example, Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New York: Basic 
Books, 2008). See also World Economic Forum, “Personal Data: The Emergence of 
a New Asset Class. Report for the ‘Rethinking Personal Data’ Project” (Geneva, 
2011). 
124 As a partial disagreement, one should note that rights are important for most 
conceptions of efficiency. 
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available in the future. In order to disclose personal information and make 
it available to others within the peer-to-peer system, people face expected 
costs which, if left uncompensated, would lead to a lower level of 
disclosure. This argument is strengthened further when paired with the 
public good characteristics of information, which provide an additional 
reason for the relevance of these levels of investment; if personal 
information has positive spillovers, that is a further reason why it would 
be underproduced if these are not internalized. 
For these reasons, there is some degree of data protection that, 
from a dynamic point of view, increases the amount of personal 
information available for exchanges. The question would then not be 
whether to grant data protection at all in order to allow for access to 
information, but how much of it to grant. No protection at all, similarly to 
a maximum level of protection, would lead to a low amount of available 
information. 
If this is true for personal data, one should expect the good to either 
not be produced or to be visibly under-produced under a common property 
regime where anyone can access it. However, one can observe that even 
when data protection is low, there is some degree of personal information 
sharing. A possible explanation for this outcome is taking the production of 
such information within a process where personal information is an 
unwilling by-product of another activity, such as browsing websites or 
using a social network. 
In such way, one can explain DPL from a law & economics 
perspective and, in doing so, have a simplified framework for the 
evaluation of data protection measures. 
 Section 2.2 reviews the economic justifications that were made so 
far for privacy law. The following section evaluates the economic 
characteristics that personal information has in the technological context 
described: a public good (section 2.3.1), a good that can be traded in a low 
transaction-cost scenario (section 2.3.2), a good that does not yet exist in 
the market (section 2.3.3), a good whose production can be incentivized 
with data protection (section 2.3.4) and a good that is produced as a by-
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product of an activity (section 2.3.5).  Section 2.4 approaches property rules 
and liability rules as alternatives with which an entitlement over personal 
information can be protected, concluding that the optimal choice would be 
to have a combination of both. Section 2.5 examines DPL as a way to 
design this combination, considering its relevant analogies with copyright 
law. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter 
2.2.  The Economics of Privacy 
2.2.1. Concealment and asymmetric information 
As it was mentioned,125 for Posner, the term “privacy” means concealment 
of information—in particular, concealment of information in an 
instrumental way. For a first economic evaluation of privacy measures, he 
argues, this is the concept that has the most interesting economic 
implications.126 Privacy as concealment has a direct link with the 
economics of information, where a person wants to screen a certain 
characteristic and another would like to conceal it (for example the job 
market, or even the marriage market), impeding efficient allocations.127  
His argument is that many privacy concerns are instrumental: 
hiding information from someone else to obtain something. There are 
individuals with bad traits and individuals with good traits, and the 
individuals with bad traits want to hide them (privacy) while the 
individuals with good traits want to show them. From this point of view, 
privacy is an intermediate good with costs of protection and costs of 
                                                
125 See section 1.3.1. 
126 See Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic 
Review 71, no. 2 (1981): 405; Richard Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law 
Review 12, no. 3 (1978): 393; Richard Posner, “An Economic Theory of Privacy,” 
American Enterprise Institute Journal of Government and Society (Regulation) 2 
(1978): 19; Richard Posner, “Privacy,” ed. Peter Newman, The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law (New York: Macmillan, 1998). 
127 Posner develops here the idea that privacy is a tool of concealment of the 
devious, originally formulated by Arndt. See Heinz Arndt, “The Cult of Privacy,” 
Australian Quarterly 21 (1949): 69.  
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discovery.128 Privacy then creates an information asymmetry regarding 
those traits towards the buyers in the market (for example, employers, or 
potential spouses), therefore distributing wealth and creating 
inefficiencies.129 In this way, privacy in the sense of concealment of 
information reduces the information with which the market allocates 
resources.130 
Stigler continues to develop this concept of privacy by referring to it 
as a restriction on the collection of knowledge or information about 
someone (including both people and corporations). He refers to information 
as the property of someone, but a good with the characteristics of a public 
good: once I tell person A certain information, I cannot know if he will tell 
it to person B, which means that the costs of exclusion of information are 
high. A privacy statute reduces the amount of information about someone 
that is available for everyone else. Then, people who want information 
about someone that is protected by a privacy statue will use other less 
precise (and usually less intrusive and more costly) substitutes, which 
should work as a proxy for the information that they want to acquire. For 
                                                
128 See Richard Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12, no. 3 
(1978): 393. 
129 See Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic 
Review 71, no. 2 (1981): 405. For a different argument, stating that information 
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disseminating false rumors, see Cass Sunstein, “Believing False Rumors,” in The 
Offensive Internet, ed. Saul Levmore and Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), 91.  
130 Still, Posner argues that the US privacy tort is efficient. The tort covers four 
aspects: preventing the use of one’s picture and name without one’s consent for 
advertising purposes, preventing facts about one being portrayed under a “false 
light”, preventing people from obtaining information by intrusive means, and 
preventing the publication of intimate facts about oneself. Posner argues that the 
first three increase the flow of information and that the prevention of publication 
of intimate facts is rarely enforced. See Richard Posner, “The Economics of 
Privacy,” The American Economic Review 71, no. 2 (1981): 405; Richard Posner, 
“The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12, no. 3 (1978): 393.  
In Europe, absent Warren and Brandeis’ influence, there tends to be no 
autonomous privacy tort prior to DPL that is independent from the confidentiality 
of communications. For the UK, which is probably the jurisdiction that is the most 
explicit about this, see Home Office v Wainwright, EWCA Civ. 2081 (2001). 
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example, if an employer cannot access the work history of a potential 
employee, he will establish a trial period in which he will monitor the new 
employee.131 A similar principle can be applicable to the internet: if the 
same employer cannot access criminal records because of a privacy rule, he 
will estimate the likelihood of that employee having a criminal record 
based on the information that he has available. 
The second step in the argument is an application of the Coase 
theorem.132 With clearly defined property rights and low transaction costs, 
goods will end up in the hands of those who value them the most, 
independently of their initial allocation, since under those conditions the 
party that values a good the most can buy it from the other if the initial 
allocation was granted to him. It was argued, in these lines, that if one 
applies this argument to personal information, then as long as transaction 
costs remain low, it is irrelevant for the final allocation of the information 
whether there is a privacy rule that allocates it to the person to whom that 
information refers, or there is no privacy rule, which allocates the 
information to whoever finds it.133  Privacy law would have then a 
distributional effect but would not have a welfare effect. For that reason, it 
is not justifiable to introduce disturbances in the market such as 
information asymmetries, which would be welfare-decreasing. 134  
                                                
131 See George Stigler, “An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics,” 
Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 4 (1980): 623. In these contexts, not disclosing 
information can sometimes also be informative for the other party: if people with 
good traits can reveal them, but people without them cannot do so fraudulently, 
then the lack of disclosure will be informative of the lack of good traits. 
132 See Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 
3, no. 1 (1960): 1. 
133 See Richard Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12, no. 3 
(1978): 393; Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic 
Review 71, no. 2 (1981): 405; George Stigler, “An Introduction to Privacy in 
Economics and Politics,” Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 4 (1980): 623. 981 
134 See Richard Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12, no. 3 
(1978): 393; Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic 
Review 71, no. 2 (1981): 405; George Stigler, “An Introduction to Privacy in 
Economics and Politics,” Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 4 (1980): 623. 981 
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2.2.2. Property rights over personal information 
A property rule over personal information can be portrayed as a non-
disclosure default (unless consent is given). If the individual owns the 
property right, he can control the dissemination of his own personal 
information.  On the other hand, if data collectors own the property right, 
then the default rule is disclosure.135 The non-disclosure default rule (a 
privacy rule) has been argued to be welfare-increasing for three reasons. 
The first reason is that technologies have drastically decreased the 
transaction costs of acquiring people’s personal information.136 These 
transaction costs are not symmetric, and the difference in transaction costs 
for consumers and companies makes property rights over personal 
information efficient. If property rights are given to data collectors, the 
costs for individuals of knowing what personal information about them 
was disseminated or is going to be disseminated in order to engage in 
negotiations is high, while these costs would be low for data collectors.137  
In a scenario where companies have the property rights over 
information, individuals would face a collective action problem.138 
Moreover, under a regime with no privacy companies lack incentives to 
make it easy for internet users to have an augmented control over their 
personal information.139 The presence of property rights over such 
information would force a negotiation that would alter this; for instance, 
by developing more privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs).140 Market-
                                                
135 See Richard Murphy, “Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic 
Defense of Privacy,” Georgetown Law Journal 84, no. 1 (1995): 2381. 
136 This statement is further explored in section 2.3.2 below. 
137 See Jerry Kang, “Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,” Stanford 
Law Review 50, no. 4 (1998): 1193. 
138 See Ibid. 
139 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic 
Books, 1999); Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
140 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic 
Books, 1999); Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Julie 
Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,” 
Stanford Law Review 52, no. 5 (2000): 1373. 
For PETs, see generally GW van Blarkom, John Borking, and Jacobus Olk, 
Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (The Hague: College 
bescherming persoonsgegevens, 2003). Chapter 3. The European Commission has 
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based mechanisms that assure a higher level of control over one’s personal 
information are said to be thus desirable order to ensure a proper 
protection of privacy in the face of new technologies.141 
The second reason is that the concealment approach, which 
considered that privacy is socially welfare-decreasing, did not take into 
account the non-instrumental value of privacy.142 The rule where 
individuals own a property right over information is argued to be welfare-
enhancing because of pure privacy preferences that form part of data 
subjects’ utility functions.143 This preference encompasses the taste for 
privacy in contexts where the individual wants to keep information private 
for reasons that are different from deceiving others.144  
Surveys have shown that people disagree with the view that those 
who are concerned about their privacy have immoral or illegal behaviors 
that are trying to hide,145 idea that is confirmed by psychological literature 
on the topic.146 People seem to have “pure privacy preferences” which are 
independent from considerations of reputation or deceit;147 these are likely 
to be motivated by reasons such as the improvement of the consumption 
experience, the elimination of interference by disapproving peers, and the 
                                                                                                                            
defined them as “a coherent system of ICT measures that protects privacy by 
eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing unnecessary and/or 
undesired processing of personal fata, all without losing the functionality of the 
information system.” See COM(2007) 228 final. Typical PETs include encryption 
tools and IP masks. 
141 See Kenneth Laudon, “Markets and Privacy,” Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery 39, no. 9 (1996): 92. 
142 See Ibid. 
143 Posner also recognizes the relevance of pure privacy preferences in later work 
regarding governmental surveillance. See Richard Posner, “Privacy, Surveillance, 
and Law,” The University of Chicago Law Review 75, no. 1 (2008): 245. 
144 See Kenneth Laudon, “Markets and Privacy,” Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery 39, no. 9 (1996): 92. 
145 See Priscilla Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public 
Policy (University of North Carolina Press, 1995). P. 48.  
146 See Cathy Goodwin, “A Conceptualization of Motives to Seek Privacy for 
Nondeviant Consumption,” Journal of Consumer Psychology 1, no. 3 (1992): 261. 
147 See Sasha Romanosky and Alessandro Acquisti, “Privacy Costs and Personal 
Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives,” Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 24, no. 3 (2009): 1061. 
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relief from self-discrepancies.148 Due to the presence of these preferences, 
there is no evidence to believe that the utility gain for the acquirers of data 
subjects’ information is always larger than their utility loss in the 
interactions that are not mediated by consent. If one establishes a property 
right over personal information, however, those preferences can be 
reflected in the market and balanced with the amount of information 
available.149 
The third reason is that externalities are present in data 
processing. There is a privacy interest implicated every time information 
about someone is collected or used without his consent, potentially 
imposing an externality on him. The private cost of collecting personal 
information is then lower than the social cost. Therefore, there is more 
collection of personal information than what is socially efficient.150 As long 
as ownership of personal information is given to the collector and not to 
the data subject, people do not receive a compensation for the use of their 
personal information and the price of such information is low because it 
fails to reflect the social cost of privacy invasions.151  
The secondary use of information also poses externalities to data 
subjects, which comes in the form of annoyances, such as junk emails, 
which consume their time and attention.152 Defining property rights in 
                                                
148 See Cathy Goodwin, “A Conceptualization of Motives to Seek Privacy for 
Nondeviant Consumption,” Journal of Consumer Psychology 1, no. 3 (1992): 261. 
149 See Richard Murphy, “Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic 
Defense of Privacy,” Georgetown Law Journal 84, no. 1 (1995): 2381; James Rule 
and Lawrence Hunter, “Towards Property Rights in Personal Data,” in Visions of 
Privacy: Policy Choices for the Digital Age, ed. Colin Bennett and Rebecca Grant 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 168. 
150 See Kenneth Laudon, “Markets and Privacy,” Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery 39, no. 9 (1996): 92. 
151 See Kenneth Laudon, “Extensions to the Theory of Markets and Privacy: 
Mechanics of Pricing Information,” Stern School of Business Working Paper 97-04 
(New York, 1997). 
152 If someone gives his telephone number to a company so they can fix his cable, 
and then the company gives it to someone else that calls him at dinnertime to sell 
him an insurance, that is a cost (in the form of attention and time that is taken 
from him) that is externally imposed from the transaction between the cable 
company and the insurance company. See Hal Varian, “Economic Aspects of 
Personal Privacy,” in Cyber Policy and Economics in an Internet Age. Topics in 
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private information in a way that allows consumers to retain control of 
how much information about them is used, since their agreement is needed 
for further trade, would internalize these externalities.153 
The use of encryption has been suggested as a way to approximate 
the property protection standard “from below” in the absence of legislation 
which establishes it.154  Encryption allows excluding others from a certain 
piece of information, and hence should allow for bargaining and 
redistribute wealth to consumers.155 This approach is similar to the one 
taken before the establishment of postal secrecy.156 The inconvenient that 
this approach presents is that it can be costly for data subjects to engage in 
it and, even if they do, the aggregated costs of self-protection would be 
socially wasteful. 
2.2.3. The economic rationale of privacy law, or lack 
thereof 
The literature on the economics of privacy seems to show that there is so 
far little economic justification for the right to privacy. Posner and Stigler’s 
reluctance to protect privacy has been attacked mainly on the basis that it 
departs from (and depends on) the narrow conception of privacy as 
concealment,157 but no alternative economic justifications have been 
offered from more ample concepts, with the exception of the literature 
arguing for propertization.  
In turn, the propertization of personal information that was 
proposed as an alternative presents its own difficulties. For example, it has 
been argued that, given that the good protected is intangible, establishing 
                                                                                                                            
Regulatory Economics and Policy Series., ed. William Lehr and Lorenzo Pupillo 
(Norwell: Springer, 2002), 127. 
153 See Ibid. 
154 See Eli Noam, “Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy,” in 
Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age, ed. Barbara Wellbery 
(Washington, DC: National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
1997), 21. 
155 See Ibid. 
156 See section 1.2.2. 
157 See Edward Bloustein, “Privacy Is Dear at Any Price: A Response to Professor 
Posner’s Economic Theory,” Georgia Law Review 12 (1978): 429. 
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a property right over personal information would mean, in essence, 
creating a new intellectual property right, but this right would generate an 
incompatibility between the reasons to protect information with 
intellectual property law and the reasons to protect personal 
information.158  
Moreover, the strongest defenders of privacy rules who suggest that 
they should be protected by property rights leave a central issue 
unanswered. If it is true that transaction costs are low, then as long as the 
property rights are clearly defined, to whom the property right is allocated 
should be irrelevant in aggregation, as the allocation will not change who 
will be the right holder ex-post. In addition, the reason why each agent 
values the good in which amount, and whether there are any externalities, 
should also be irrelevant, as low transaction costs allow for a bargaining 
process that can lead them to be internalized by the market.159 
Privacy, in fact, is usually justified on deontic grounds, which are 
able to support a wide privacy right as long as one considers that people 
have a fundamental right to privacy. It seems that efficiency, if at all, 
would support a narrower concept of privacy than the one proposed in the 
human rights literature. From this one can take two messages about the 
economics of privacy. First, that efficiency considerations are not the best 
tool to attack privacy in a certain area where it is being debated, since it 
will always be the perspective with the narrowest view about it. Second, 
that when efficiency considerations actually support a defense of privacy in 
a certain domain, they constitute a good argument for its establishment.  
The following sections portray a scenario in which efficiency 
considerations, in fact, can support a defense of privacy within the domain 
of DPL. 
                                                
158 See Pamela Samuelson, “Privacy as Intellectual Property?,” Stanford Law 
Review 52, no. 5 (1999): 1125.  
159 See Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 
3, no. 1 (1960): 1. 
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2.3.  Special Characteristics of Informational 
Privacy in the Web 
2.3.1. Personal information as a public good 
A central characteristic of information is that people can make use of it 
without leaving less for others, and for the case of digitalized information, 
it is very easy to reproduce. Information, for this reason, has public good 
characteristics: once it is released, it can be reproduced at a marginal cost 
close to zero (non-excludability) and the use of information does not reduce 
the amount which is left available for others (non-rivalry).160  
Due its public good characteristics, the generation of information 
produces positive spillovers to others than its creators. These positive 
spillovers, or positive externalities, imply that not all of the social benefits 
from the generation of the information are internalized by the creator, and 
for that reason he might have suboptimal incentives to produce it. As a 
consequence, he might generate less information than what is socially 
desirable. For this reason, it might be socially welfare-increasing in the 
long run to incentivize its production.161  
Classic literature has addressed works of authorship as suffering 
both from the problems of non-excludability and non-rivalry due to the 
characteristics of information162 even before Samuelson’s seminal work on 
public goods.163 Shortly after, information was identified as a quasi-public 
                                                
160 See George Stigler, “An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics,” 
Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 4 (1980): 623; Paul Schwartz, “Property, Privacy, 
and Personal Data,” Harvard Law Review 117, no. 7 (2004): 2056. 
161 For an analysis along these lines in the form of a prisoners’ dilemma where 
agents choose whether to produce or reproduce information in the context of 
intellectual property, see Wendy Gordon, “Asymmetric Market Failure and 
Prisioner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property,” University of Dayton Law Review 
17 (1992): 853. 
162 See Arnold Plant, “The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books,” Economica 1 
(1934): 167; Arnold Plant, The New Commerce in Ideas and Intellectual Property 
(London: Athlone Press, 1953). 
163 See Paul Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 36 (1954): 387. 
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good that suffers both from the problems of non-excludability and non-
rivalry.164 
Personal information as a sub-type of information shares these 
characteristics. As such, given that information has a cumulative nature 
(the uses that are given to it are not independent but they build upon each 
other),165 it behaves as a capital good that can foster innovation.166 As 
innovation presents most of its benefits in the future, it is difficult to grasp 
the effects that different kinds of information, or even information in 
general, will have, unless one takes into account its dynamic aspects. 
Inasmuch as it presents the characteristics of a public good, it could be 
socially desirable to incentivize the generation of new information, as well 
as information flow. The next subsections explore how data protection 
relates to it, and therefore to innovation. 
2.3.2. Low transaction costs of personal information 
exchanges 
Independent of which concept of privacy one finds the most convincing,167 
it was seen that the protection of informational privacy can be described 
across them as a mechanism to exclude others from one’s information.168 
Seeing informational privacy as an exclusion mechanism makes it 
analogous to an entitlement over a certain piece of personal information, in 
virtue of which the entitlement holder has the right to decide who can 
                                                
164 See Robert Hurt and Robert Shuchman, “The Economic Rationale of 
Copyright,” American Economic Review 56, no. 1 (1966): 421; Stephen Breyer, 
“The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and 
Computer Programs,” Harvard Law Review 84, no. 2 (1970): 281. 
165 See William Landes and Richard Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 325. 
166 From this perspective, information is socially valuable in a way that is difficult 
to quantify. Determining how far in the future one wants to look and what 
discount rate one wants to apply are only the first obstacles to specify its social 
benefits. This is also the case, for example, of environmental goods. 
167 See Daniel Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy,” California Law Review 90, no. 4 
(2002): 1087; Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg, and Paul Schwartz, Privacy, 
Information and Technology (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006). See also section 
1.3.2. 
168 See section 1.3.3. 
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access it and who cannot. In particular, it makes it analogous to an 
entitlement of data subjects to exclude anyone from their personal 
information. This is analytically previous to the establishment of a 
property right, since one must first determine whether an entitlement is in 
place, to then evaluate which is the appropriate protection for such 
entitlement.169 But why should one place entitlements over personal 
information at all? 
In an interaction between a data subject (A), an information 
intermediary (B) and a third party interested in the information (C) 
regarding a certain piece of personal information that relates to A, a 
policymaker has three options with respect to the entitlement of such 
information. He could entitle A with a right to exclude the others (B and C) 
from the piece of information, he could entitle B to exclude the others (A 
and C) from that information, or he could grant no one the exclusion right, 
allowing anyone to obtain and use the information.170 
 It was seen above how technological changes have reduced the 
transaction costs for gathering, storing and disseminating information, 
and in addition that in the peer-to-peer system data subjects voluntarily 
give personal information.171 These technological characteristics reduce the 
costs of copying and distributing information, making the marginal cost of 
information gathering close to zero.172 In the context of information 
technology, personal information exchanges have reduced costs of 
communication among parties and, hence, have low transaction costs.173 
                                                
169 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Review 85, no. 6 
(1972): 1089. 
170 Under a property regime, this would be analogous to leaving the information as 
common property, where everyone has a right to access and no one has a right to 
exclude. 
171 See section 1.1. 
172 See Raymond Ku, “The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the 
New Economics of Digital Technology,” University of Chicago Law Review 69, no. 
1 (2002): 263. 
173 See Trotter Hardy, “Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,” University of 
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In the traditional market for personal information, the acquirer 
incurs into certain costs to acquire such information. These are, for 
example, chasing a celebrity in the street to take pictures of him, 
eavesdropping on a conversation behind a door to know about its content, 
or wiretapping a telephone line and listening to what is being said. The 
market for personal information online, on the other hand, does not 
necessarily follow this pattern due to its different technological 
characteristics: reduced costs and the peer-to-peer system. 
Many ways of acquiring information about other people online, such 
as setting up a virus attack or looking for their information in search 
engines, follow a similar structure to the traditional market for personal 
information but present much lower transaction costs. In them, the person 
who desires the information must engage in some degree of search costs in 
order to acquire it, even though the costs of doing so are often much lower 
than those of traditional privacy invasions. Looking for someone’s details 
in a search engine, for example, is easier and less costly than going 
through his correspondence, wiretapping his telephone or asking questions 
to his friends. 
Moreover, in some markets for personal information online, in 
particular in social networks and cloud computing, where online profiling 
is used,174 it is the producer of the personal information (the data subject) 
who directly puts it in the hands of the acquirer, seemingly for free.175 This 
mechanism, described as the peer-to-peer technology or Web 2.0,176 implies 
that the acquisition of such information has not only a reduced marginal 
cost compared to the traditional privacy scenario, but a marginal cost of 
zero. This can take place in two different ways: though the creation of 
active digital footprints and passive digital footprints. 
                                                
174 Profiling is the assembling of personal information from different sources to 
generate a complete database of a data subject. See Roger Clarke, “Profiling: A 
Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data Surveillance,” Journal of Law, 
Information and Science 4 (1993): 403. 
175 Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte, and George Loewenstein, “Privacy 
and Human Behavior in the Age of Information,” Science 347, no. 6221 (2015): 
509. 
176 See Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
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Firstly, social network companies do not need to incur into 
additional costs in order to discover personal information about their users 
because, by utilizing the social network, they provide that information to 
them by themselves.177 Other users of the social networks, similarly, do not 
need to ask their friends and acquaintances for their recent pictures and 
updates because they often send them through the social networks. Cloud 
computing companies, in the same line, do not need to inquire about which 
kind of files their users manage because, by using the cloud computing 
service, they show that information to them voluntarily.  
Secondly, there are technologies in the internet such as http cookies 
that, when used, create data trails without a need for the user to actively 
attempt to do so—and they can do this either with or without his 
knowledge. Even for the cases of these technologies in which—unlike social 
networks—they are not specifically designed to create data trails, they 
generate user-metadata associated with the places where the user places 
his attention, and therefore also encourage the generation of personal 
data. 
The counterpart of this reduction on the costs of collecting and 
disseminating information is that there are increased costs of protecting 
one’s personal information. Surveillance in cyberspace, as it was 
mentioned, is more difficult to detect than in physical spaces,178 which 
means that preventing such surveillance is more costly. 
Protecting one’s privacy on the internet requires technical skills 
that not all data subjects possess, and that for the ones that do possess 
those skills this protection can be costly. The tradeoff between data 
disclosure and expected privacy costs is opposed to another tradeoff 
between privacy and convenience. For example, browsing through 
anonymity networks such as TOR, which is one of the most effective means 
of self-protection, leads to a reduction in usability (by having the need to 
retype all registration data on each access) and to a decrease in browsing 
                                                
177 These companies have to build an infrastructure that represents fixed costs, 
while the marginal costs of acquiring information from data subjects is close to 
zero. 
178 See section 1.1. 
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speed. Moreover, monitoring one’s personal information after disclosure is 
rarely possible and, when so, it is costly. There is yet no equivalent for the 
internet to the sealed envelopes mentioned in the introduction for postal 
secrecy.179 
2.3.3. Personal information as good that does not yet 
exist 
This low-transaction cost scenario implies that, whatever the allocation of 
the entitlement is, as long as this allocation is clear, ex-post bargaining 
can lead to its efficient allocation. For this reason, it would seem that it is 
not interesting for policymaking to determine who is the highest valuer of 
the right over the information or if there are any externalities, as due to 
the low transaction costs described above these can be internalized by the 
market. 
A caveat to this principle is that to whom an entitlement is 
allocated has distributional effects. If the information intermediary B 
values the good more than the data subject A, and an entitlement over the 
information is given to A, then B will obtain the entitlement as a result of 
a bargaining process with A. However, although irrelevant in aggregation, 
it is relevant both for A and for B who had the entitlement initially. The 
information intermediary B had to give something to A to obtain the good 
over which A had the entitlement, which means that if B had been given 
the entitlement in the first place, he would have been wealthier at the end 
of the transaction. 
These distributional effects, in turn, are relevant for goods that do 
not exist in the market at the moment of the definition of the entitlements. 
If data subject A had to produce the good to trade with B, and (in the 
opposite case as the one in the previous paragraph) the entitlement was 
ex-ante given to B, then A would lack incentives to produce it, since the 
                                                
179 See Susan Brenner, “The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous 
Technology,” Mississippi Law Journal 75 (2005): 1. 
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distributional effect of the entitlement would be eliminated.180 The 
allocation of entitlements determines the incentives for ex-ante investment 
in the generation of the good in question because it determines who will 
get paid in the trade that will take it to its highest valuer. Hence, it affects 
the ex-ante production mechanism of the good.181 
The mechanisms for generating information either actively or 
passively that were described in the last subsection (peer-to-peer system or 
surveillance, respectively) illustrate the fact that the amount of personal 
information available is not static. A significant portion of it is produced by 
users of these services depending on how much (and how many) of these 
services they consume. This data, in turn, would not fulfill the 
characteristics of a good until it is disclosed to others, since before the 
disclosure takes place, they are not readily available to be used and 
therefore not able to satisfy other people’s needs.182 For this reason, 
personal information which is handed-in voluntarily is included in the 
caveat regarding the impact of distributional effects. 
In turn, the disclosure of information by data subjects requires 
investment levels in the form of expected privacy costs, which depend on 
the information disclosed. The more personal information that is disclosed 
by a data subjects in the use of these products, the higher the risk that he 
faces harm in the form of a privacy breach. Data subjects face expected 
costs of privacy breach both in their initial production of information, and 
subsequently in the information trade between data collectors, 
                                                
180 This is analogous to the reason why most legal systems establish protections in 
the form of entitlements for intellectual property, as it is evaluated in section 
2.5.2. below. 
181 See Oliver Hart and John Moore, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm” 
98, no. 6 (1990): 1119; Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, “What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics,” Yale Law Journal 111, no. 2 (2001): 357; Thomas 
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intermediaries and advertisers.183 Data processing poses the problem that 
the company that carries it out obtains the full benefits of the processing, 
via marketing gains or fee gains with the sale of such information, while it 
does not suffer the expected losses produced by such disclosure of personal 
information, hence having incentives to overuse personal information.184 In 
other words, data trades imply externalities for data subjects.185 
This often leads data subjects, in the absence of regulatory 
protection, to engage in socially costly self-protection. The failure of 
engaging in it can lead, in the worse cases, to identity fraud or identity 
theft. An example of these materializing that became famous due to its 
magnitude is the Sony scandal of 2011, where data from 100 million users 
were stolen from the Sony Online Entertainment databases. Many of those 
data subjects had not used the device that uploaded information to the 
database but their information was nonetheless in it because it had been 
replicated or moved. The stolen information included names, addresses, 
birth dates, and debit and credit card information, which were later used 
for a wide array of frauds.186  
A relevant factor to take into account when establishing data 
protection rules, for these reasons, is that one is not simply defining an 
entitlement over an already available good over which there could be a 
dispute. When establishing data protection rules one is also defining 
entitlements over goods that do not yet exist, and whose generation 
implies expected costs for the data subjects that must generate them.  
                                                
183 See John Hagel and Jeffrey Rayport, “The Coming Battle for Consumer 
Information,” Harvard Business Review 75, no. 1 (1997): 53. See also section 3.4.2 
below. 
184 See Peter Swire and Robert Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, 
Electronic Commerce and the European Privacy Directive (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1998)., p. 8. 
185 See Kenneth Laudon, “Markets and Privacy,” Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery 39, no. 9 (1996): 92; Hal Varian, “Economic 
Aspects of Personal Privacy,” in Cyber Policy and Economics in an Internet Age. 
Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series., ed. William Lehr and Lorenzo 
Pupillo (Norwell: Springer, 2002), 127. For a development of this argument, see 
section 3.4.2 below. 
186 See Sony Online Entretainment Press Release, “Sony Online Entretainment 
Announces Theft of Data from Its Systems,” 2011. 
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2.3.4. The effects of data protection over information 
flow 
From a static point of view, information flow is a counteracting value to 
privacy: the less data protection, the fewer rights of exclusion that people 
will have over different pieces of information, and the more personal 
information that will be available on the market. This has been, as it was 
explained, the underlying idea in the first-generation economics of privacy 
literature.187  
From a dynamic point of view, however, based on the 
characteristics of being a good that is costly to produce and does not exist 
yet, the allocation of the entitlement through data protection becomes 
relevant. The reason is that the disclosure of personal information largely 
depends on the allocation of the entitlement. In this way, some degree of 
data protection incentivizes the generation of information and, 
consequently, an increment in information flow, since data protection 
allows for exchanges over pieces of information that would have not been 
generated had it not been in place.188  
An example of this effect is the number of people that, under the 
current data protection regime, abstain from using social networks 
because of privacy concerns. If a higher level of data protection was in 
place, these concerns would not rise and those users would not need to 
abstain from using the social network because of them. This means that 
they would produce, in their use, information that under the current 
regime is not being generated. 
While the static and the dynamic effect work in opposite directions, 
it is possible that, up to a certain level of protection, the second overcomes 
                                                
187 See section 2.2. 
188 There is some tension between an increment in data protection, which 
generates more personal information, and the innovations that this increase in the 
amount of personal information can produce, which translated into the 
incentive/access tradeoff. Personal information tends to induce innovation when 
innovators can access and use it—particularly when they can do so for free. This 
means that personal information especially leads to innovation where it is not 
protected. This tension reflects the differences between information production 
and information flow. 
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the first in the long run. This would be a similar mechanism to the 
exclusion of some people for the use of products protected under copyright 
law, which is compensated in the long run by the amount of people that 
can access those creations which take place due to the incentives set by 
these laws.189  
Under an extreme regime with no data protection at all, there 
would be a low level of information production (long-term effect) but a high 
level of information flow of the data that is produced (short-term effect). 
Under a regime on the other end of the scale, where disclosure of 
information would be directly forbidden, personal information as a good 
would have a system analogous to public ownership; although people 
would have the right (and obligation) to exclude others, they would not 
have the right to exchange.190 This would produce the opposite result, of a 
high level of information production (long-term effect) but a low level of 
information flow (short-term effect). In the middle of both regimes there 
are several options. A property rule, as proposed by a section of the 
literature,191 and a liability rule, would be two possibilities within that 
scope.  
Due to the static effect, an extremely high data protection regime 
would lead to little information flow because nothing would be able to be 
disclosed.192 Due to the dynamic effect, on the other hand, a very low data 
protection would lead to a low level of information production because data 
subjects would be under-incentivized to place such information in the 
market.  
Due to this interrelation between the short-term effects of 
information flow and the long-term effects of generation of information, it 
                                                
189 A closer evaluation of the common elements between DPL and copyright is 
done in section 2.5.2 below. 
190 Regarding the characteristics of public ownership, see Armen Alchian, “Some 
Economics of Property Rights,” Il Politico 30 (1965): 816. 
191 See section 2.2.2. 
192 This would be a more extreme system than that of PETs, which seek to allow 
for a high privacy preservation while allowing the sharing of high-value data for 
socially valuable aims such as research. A PET-based system, in the ideal types 
identified here, also lies in the middle of both extreme regimes. 
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seems that the relationship between data protection and the amount of 
personal information presents a concave function (     ). In order 
to maximize the amount of personal information in the market, a 
policymaker would have to set a level of exclusion high enough to 
incentivize information production, but not too high as to stop information 
flow. This dynamic is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Illustrates the relationship between levels of data
protection and amount of information available. 
 
In sum, the traditional arguments of the economics of privacy 
supporting full disclosure have limitations in the context of DPL and 
online privacy due to the technological characteristics that underpin these. 
These arguments are applicable to this context from a static point of view. 
However, from a dynamic point of view, a certain level of data protection 
increases the supply of information. It could still be reasonable to not 
establish such exclusion rights when transaction costs are high; 
independently of the effects on production, such allocation might impair 
the entitlement to end in the hands of the highest valuer under high 
transaction costs. However, as it was stated by the literature surveyed, 
and again due to the technological characteristics which are involved in 
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DPL, transaction costs are low in this context on average.193 As transaction 
costs are low, the right is likely to go to the higher valuer in any case, 
especially when the acquirers of such data (data collection companies) are 
likely to have less liquidity constrains than the other party (data subjects). 
However, to whom one allocates the entitlement is still relevant for the 
production of information. 
2.3.5. Personal information as a by-product 
A possible concern to the argument presented is that personal information 
was still produced to some degree before the apparition of DPL, and it is 
likely that some degree of personal information production would take 
place even in the absence of DPL. This concern was reflected in figure 1, 
where the curve intersects with the y axis above zero. This section 
addresses this issue by explaining that personal information, besides being 
a public good, is produced as a by-product of an activity.194 
Mill had already noticed that “it sometimes happens that two 
different commodities have what may be termed a joint cost of production 
(…) both produced from the same material, and by the same operation.”195 
Unlike standard goods such as bread, beer or cereal, no one decides to 
produce personal information and does so deliberately in order to sell it to 
others. For example, companies do not ask people directly where they are 
at each moment of the day, but offer them a product to check their daily 
distances and calorie expenditure, which records their location data.  
The process in which personal information is produced, therefore, is 
analogous the processes of other products, such as gas (by-product of coal) 
or manure (by-product of animal breeding). This is, a process in which two 
goods are produced simultaneously by a certain production process using a 
common input where (i) both products are desirable goods, such as gasoline 
                                                
193 See section 2.3.2. 
194 On by-products in joint production, see generally Richard Cornes and Todd 
Sandler, “Easy Riders, Joint Production and Public Goods,” Economic Journal 94, 
no. 375 (1984): 580. 
195 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their 
Applications to Social Philosophy (Longmans, Green, 1865). 
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and kerosene, or (ii) one of them is a desirable good while the other is an 
undesirable good, such as the different cases of pollution.  
Data subjects consume a certain good deliberately; this good can be, 
for instance, interaction or time spent at a certain website. They trade 
their time at the website to someone who desires it because he can profit 
from that time or attention span—for example, to sell advertisements. This 
exchange is how ad-supported websites are traditionally financed.196 Blogs 
and news websites, for example, compete for data subjects’ attention 
because it allows them to have more expensive advertisements that 
provide them with revenue.  
In cases of online profiling, such as in social networks and in cloud 
computing, the consumption of the good (for example, time at the website) 
produces simultaneously another good (personal information): the more 
one does on Facebook the more Facebook knows about one, and the more 
files one uploads to Dropbox the more Dropbox knows about one. This 
personal information is useful to the producers of the web service. Now 
they not only can show advertisements to the user, but they can also 
personalize their content, increasing relevance and sales. 
From this perspective, personal information can be seen as 
produced in a process of joint production, where it is a by-product of the 
activity of using a product. Unlike gasoline and kerosene, personal 
information is a by-product not of the production of another good but of the 
consumption of other goods. Under this framework, consumption of the 
social network, which is desirable for the data subject, is tied to production 
of his private information. This functions differently than traditional 
exchanges. People do not say “I need to generate more personal 
information in order to buy more time at Facebook” but just know that the 
more they use the product the more personal information about them that 
will be in the market. The production of personal information and its 
                                                
196 See Lokke Moerel, Big Data Protection. How to Make the Draft EU Regulation 
on Data Protection Future Proof (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 2014). 
Chapter 1. See also Alexander Furnas, “It’s Not All about You: What Privacy 
Advocates Don't Get about Data Tracking on the Web,” The Atlantic, March 15, 
2012. 
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placement in the market is, from this point of view, unintended, even if it 
can be conscious. 
In standard joint production, there is one marginal cost curve and 
two demand curves for the different products. If the proportions of the 
products are fixed, then one of them will be produced in an amount that is 
different from the efficient amount.197 Another type of joint production is 
the scenario where the good is a by-product of an activity, which is 
prominent in environmental issues. In environmental economics there is 
often a different case of joint production, where the production of a good 
also gives as an outcome a by-product that is (collectively) harmful.198 
While in the first case the agent in the market produces two “sellable” 
goods and optimizes the production of one, either overproducing or 
underproducing the other, in the second case the agent focuses on the 
production of one particular good that he can sell, and the other is a by-
product that does not alter his utility function.199  
The production of personal information by social network users 
seems to resemble more the second case. When users generate personal 
information with the use of the product, they do not deliberately produce 
an extra good to sell—such as with the case of oil and wood processing. 
While they are consuming the web service, they unwillingly produce 
personal information, which is a good for the service provider. Instead, the 
generation of this product has an expected (private) cost, which is the 
increased risk of a privacy breach together with the disutility of sharing 
personal information from pure privacy preferences. These users—unlike 
the case of environmental production—do not directly impose negative 
externalities on others with their by-product. The dissemination of 
                                                
197 Unless the unlikely case takes place where the ratio between the two demand 
curves is equal to the ratio of the production quantities. 
198 See Heinz Kurz, “Goods and Bads: Sundry Observations on Joint Production, 
Waste Disposal, and Renewable and Exhaustible Resources,” Progress in 
Industrial Ecology 3, no. 4 (2006): 280. 
199 See Heinz Kurz, “Classical and Early Neoclassical Economists on Joint 
Production,” Metroeconomica 38 (1986): 1; David Bradford, “Joint Products, 
Collective Goods, and External Effects: Comment,” Journal of Political Economy 
79, no. 5 (1971): 1119. 
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personal information, as it increases the probabilities of a privacy breach, 
should create in rational users an expected cost function for the production 
of personal information which, when it gets too high, should stop them 
from continuing to use the product. 
What differences does this present with a standard buy and sell 
scenario where the user sells his personal information in exchange for a 
product? The main difference is that, due to the reasons explained 
before,200 a data protection statute in this context does not have the same 
effects as those produced in the context of traditional privacy exchanges 
which were described by the first-generation economics of privacy. This by-
product characteristic is able to explain why personal information is 
produced even in the absence of exclusion rights, and at the same time 
why there are limits posed on its production. 
Picture an agent that consumes a website where his consumption is 
measured by x (extent of the use of the service). While the agent consumes 
x he produces y as a by-product, where y is the personal information 
shared. The good x cannot be consumed separately from y, since 
information is a by-product of consuming the website: if the internet user 
spends time in the network, personal information about him will be 
available to the service providers.  
Suppose the ratio between the consumption and the production of 
the by-product is   , where  is constant and   . The production of 
y, in turn, has the costs to the agent C(y) of expected privacy breach and 
disutility from sharing, where the more information shared, the higher the 
risk of a privacy breach (  ). The data subject’s utility from 
consuming of the web service is v(x), where    and   . Hence, 
his expected utility function is        . 
Maximizing the data subject’s utility function,     results in 
  . This means that he will limit x (his consumption of the 
website) to the point where his marginal benefit of consuming the website 
intersects with his marginal cost of producing information ( 
                                                
200 See sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.4. 
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).201 After this point, the cost of producing y is too high for him. Since 
x cannot be consumed without producing y, the data subject stops 
consuming x. Thus, the consumption of the website is determined by the 
production costs of personal information.202 
This mechanism is seen, for example, with people that do not have a 
social network account because of privacy concerns (while they otherwise 
would like to have one), while the social network could profit from them, 
and they could profit from using the social network if there was a way for 
them to use the product without revealing personal information—and 
receiving non-personalized advertisements.  
This scenario is the result of an asymmetric information problem 
which prevents these users from accessing the product because the service 
provider does not know the exact privacy sensitivity of its consumers. This 
problem prevents them from perfectly discriminating their users based on 
how privacy sensitive they are: they cannot discriminate between 
consumers based on the shape of their   , allowing only some of them to 
consume the product while producing a smaller amount of personal 
information   .  
However, social networks are able to partially discriminate data 
subjects according to their sensitivity by offering them different menus to 
choose from, which can function as a signaling device. These are different 
combinations of privacy settings   and functionality of the website 
 . This choice allows data subjects to have different degrees of 
privacy preferences in the product, choosing from the available 
combinations the one that best satisfies their preferences: 
                                                
201 A special case would be one in which the marginal cost curve always lays above 
the marginal utility curve, and hence the two curves do not intersect. This would 
be the case of people with high pure privacy preferences, who do not share 
personal information. 
202 This is often the case with environmental economics, with the difference that, 
in such cases, the by-product is often a bad instead of a good. See Heinz Kurz, 
“Goods and Bads: Sundry Observations on Joint Production, Waste Disposal, and 
Renewable and Exhaustible Resources,” Progress in Industrial Ecology 3, no. 4 
(2006): 280. 
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  .203 Hence, data subjects can choose the combination that 
gives them the highest utility, creating a separating equilibrium based on 
their privacy sensitivity.204 
A very high level of data protection would disallow data subjects to 
produce some levels of y and, in such way, would restrict the scope of 
choices of the menu. This would thereby restrict the business model of the 
web service and reduce data subjects’ utility.205 From this perspective, it is 
welfare-enhancing for DPL to adopt an approach closer to contract law and 
focus in enforcing the voluntary choices of the users and the network. An 
entitlement-based DPL that allows data subjects to trade and in such way 
gives them freedom of choice regarding privacy preferences, such as the 
one in place in the EU, accomplishes this task. 
2.4.  Alternatives for Protecting the Entitlement 
2.4.1. Protecting privacy with property 
Calabresi and Melamed explain that, if law is analyzed from the point of 
view of efficiency,206 one can distinguish between three types of protection 
over entitlements: property, liability, and inalienability.207 One can ask, 
under this framework, which of these three is at an abstract level an 
                                                
203 For example, Google and Microsoft do this for their email services, and 
Facebook does so for its social network. 
204 If personal information is not seen as a by-product, then services such as social 
networks would only have incentives to offer this kind of product differentiation 
due to the pressure of competition. See Ruben Rodrigues, “Privacy on Social 
Networks,” in The Offensive Internet, ed. Saul Levmore and Martha Nussbaum 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 237. 
205 This high level of protection can be identified with an inalienability rule. This 
presents another reason to consider that, as it was seen in the last subsection, 
such a high level of protection reduces the amount of available information. 
206 Although efficiency can only portray one side of law, in the same way that 
Monet, as excellent as a painter as he was, could only portray one side of the 
Rouen cathedral. See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law 
Review 85, no. 6 (1972): 1089. 
207 See Ibid. 
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efficient mechanism to protect the privacy entitlement in favor of which 
the previous section argued.  
Entitlements protected by a property rule are transmitted only with 
the consent of the title-holder and in exchange of a price to be determined 
at the time of bargaining. Those protected by a liability rule, on the other 
hand, are transmitted without the will of the title-holder and in exchange 
of a collectively determined price, mainly due to high transaction costs or 
an actual impossibility of ex-ante bargaining. Entitlements protected by an 
inalienability rule are not subject to transfer, and if the transfer takes 
place then it should be set back (nullified) if it can, while there should be 
compensation to the title-holder if it cannot.208 
The possibility to establish the first of these mechanisms, a 
property rule, takes us back to the debate described where property was 
proposed as a protection mechanism that could forbid extracting 
information from data subjects without their consent,209 hence protecting 
their privacy.210  
In addition, according to what was seen in the last section, this rule 
would incentivize information production since it would internalize ex-ante 
the externalities of data processing. A property system would allow for a 
market for personal information in which each data subject can negotiate 
with firms regarding what uses they are willing to submit their personal 
information for and for which compensations.211 By being owners of their 
                                                
208 See Ibid. 
209 The Data Protection Directive defines consent of a data subject as “any freely 
given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject 
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.” See 
Directive 1995/46/EC, article 2(h). 
210 See section 2.2.2. 
211 See Kenneth Laudon, “Markets and Privacy,” Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery 39, no. 9 (1996): 92; Richard Murphy, 
“Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy,” 
Georgetown Law Journal 84, no. 1 (1995): 2381; Lawrence Lessig, “The 
Architecture of Privacy,” Vanderbilt Journal of Entretainment Law and Practice 1 
(1999): 56; Patricia Mell, “Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy 
as Property in the Electronic Wilderness,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 11, 
no. 1 (1996): 26; Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: 
Basic Books, 1999). pp. 85-90,  
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personal information, data subjects would be able to extract a larger pay 
for its release, and would have a larger compensation for the expected 
privacy costs faced by each information release.  
Moreover, the rule would allow for subsequent sells once 
information is acquired—as with any product where when one buys an 
item then one can sell it.212 In such way, it would keep transaction costs 
low.213 If companies would have to ask data subjects for permission each 
time that such information is traded, as an inalienability rule would do, 
transactions costs would be too high, which would decrease information 
flow. The ability to protect privacy while not interfering with subsequent 
sells is therefore a desirable attribute of the property rule. 
2.4.2. Problems of a pure property rule for DPL 
However, a pure property rule could also generate new problems in the 
interaction between data subjects and data collectors and processors: 
ineffectiveness due to bargaining positions, under-protection of 
information obtained through data mining, and a moral hazard problem.  
First, due to the type of interactions in which privacy policies are 
typically involved, where data subjects have a take-it-or-leave-it option, it 
is not clear to what extent a property rule would improve their situation.214 
Under the new regime, they could as well face a take-it-or-leave-it option of 
using the product and giving their personal information (for which they 
have a property right) for free, or not using the product at all. In addition, 
it might be difficult for the average data subject to properly assess the 
                                                
212 Pamela Samuelson, “Privacy as Intellectual Property?,” Stanford Law Review 
52, no. 5 (1999): 1125. 
213 On the importance of keeping these transaction costs low, see Eli Noam, 
“Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy,” in Privacy and Self-
Regulation in the Information Age, ed. Barbara Wellbery (Washington, DC: 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 1997), 21. 
214 In the US, it must be clarified, privacy policies have generally been held not to 
be contracts in the formal sense. Still, the interaction with privacy policies 
presents analogies to that of standard form contracts, to the extent that companies 
present to consumers a take-it-or-leave-it option that is not subject to negotiations. 
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risks of selling the property right over his personal data.215 Data subjects 
generally face difficulties to assess the risks of disclosing, while the need to 
assess the risks of selling such property rights over information altogether 
would be even higher.216  
For these reasons, even if property rules are in abstract a strong 
protection, they might after all not change the situation for data subjects 
in a significant way. This derives from the fact that a property rule is a 
static concept; unlike liability rules, which can impose costs at all moments 
of the decision-making process, a property rule is satisfied only at the 
start, allowing the acquirer to forget about potential externalities later 
on.217 
Second, information gathered by data mining, which compiles 
different types of information provided by the data subject to different 
companies at different times, would not be protected under a property rule. 
The data subject would have, in the best case, an ex-ante compensation for 
each piece of information released to each data collector, but he would not 
have an ex-ante compensation for the aggregation of the information, 
which is more valuable and, more importantly for the incentives to 
generate information, is more potentially harmful. 
Taken individually, these pieces of data might not be valuable 
enough to induce companies and data subjects to bargain over them. For 
instance, it is possible to buy marketing lists of about a thousand data 
subjects with information such as their email and whether they are 
interested in a particular sport, for values around fifty dollars. At the same 
time, the net worth of Europeans’ aggregated personal data has been 
estimated at 315 billion euros.218 Data subjects would not incur in risks to 
                                                
215 See Pamela Samuelson, “Privacy as Intellectual Property?,” Stanford Law 
Review 52, no. 5 (1999): 1125. 
216 See Ibid. (adding that. while most objects that are sold can be replaced, one 
cannot replace personal information once it is disclosed.) 
217 This element has been considered a drawback of property rules, for example, in 
environmental law for the calculations of carbon dioxide emissions. 
218 See Viviane Reding, “Data Protection Reform: Restoring Trust and Building the 
Digital Age Single Market,” Speech 13/720 at the Fourth Annual European Data 
Protection Conference (Brussels, September 17, 2013).  
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disclose pieces of their personal data if they are paid very little for each of 
them while they face a high expected cost for them in aggregate.219 
Lastly, property rights over personal data could introduce a moral 
hazard problem. If a data collector gives a data subject a price for his 
personal information, and that data subject is therefore already 
compensated, then the data collecting company would have no incentives 
to incur in costs of care or to moderate levels of activity (data processing) 
in order to avoid data breaches. Given the externalities of data processing, 
the data collector would act as an agent of the data subject, with full 
control over the management of the information—which affects the welfare 
of the data subject—and incentives to over-process information and under-
invest in care, increasing the risk of data breaches ex-post. 
Moreover, if data subjects are rational, they would anticipate this 
increase in risk and, consequently, increase the price that they would 
demand for their personal information in accordance to those increased 
risks provoked by the moral hazard problem. Even if the market does not 
unravel, this increment in the value of information produced by the 
property rule would not necessarily be desirable for the aim of 
incentivizing it: the increment in price would, in turn, reduce the demand 
for such information in equilibrium, which would reduce the supply of 
information to meet that demand. The property rule as a protection 
mechanism, in this way, would be rendered useless.  
If property rules are traditionally suggested for scenarios with low 
transaction costs, and cyberspace reduces the costs of communications 
(and therefore the costs of transacting), one could ask why a property rule 
does not accomplish its goals in this context.  
The answer lies in recalling that, for the case of disclosure of 
personal information, the costs of generating the good are not, as with 
most goods, material costs of production. Data subjects produce personal 
information as a by-product, often unwillingly so.220 The costs of 
                                                
219 See Amy Kapczynski, “The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond 
Intellectual Property Internalism,” UCLA Law Review 59, no. 4 (2012): 970.  
220 See section 2.3.5. 
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generating personal information in this context represent the expected cost 
of a data breach that can derive from such disclosure: the more personal 
information released, the higher the expected cost of a privacy breach. 
From this perspective, a strict liability rule makes it easier to define 
expectations than a property rule.221 A property rule implies that the data 
subject has to know the expected value of the data breach in order to ask 
for an equivalent price and find himself compensated ex-ante. On the other 
hand, under a strict liability rule, in case of a breach the data subject 
would be compensated ex-post with an amount that is able to place him 
back on his indifference curve.  
Privacy breaches, like automobile accidents, involve several 
potential parties who are unidentifiable ahead of time, often also ex-post. 
For this reason, the costs of protecting one’s data are high, even when 
those of communications are low.222 In turn, as stated previously, the 
disincentives for investment in the generation of personal information are 
dependent on the expected costs of breach—not material costs of the 
production process itself.223 For this reason, the transaction costs of 
protection are more relevant than the transaction costs of communications 
to set a rule to protect the entitlement. This leads one to consider the 
possibility to protect data with a liability rule instead. 
2.4.3. Protecting privacy with (strict) liability 
A liability rule for personal information, similar to the US privacy tort, 
would represent a lower level of exclusion than a property rule. Under this 
rule, consent would not be a previous requirement for the transfer and 
data subjects would be unable to prevent a company from selling their 
                                                
221 It has been argued that liability rules are more efficient than property rules, 
even without prohibitively high transaction costs, when those transactions costs 
stem mainly from imperfect information. See Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, 
“Distinguishing between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability 
Rules,” Yale Law Journal 105, no. 1 (1995): 235; Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, 
“Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean 
Trade,” Yale Law Journal 104, no. 5 (1995): 1027. 
222 See section 2.3.3. 
223 See section 2.3.3. 
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personal information to others, or even to collect their personal 
information. Still, they would be compensated if any collection or 
processing results in harm, for example by leading to identity theft or to 
the dissemination of embarrassing information. Although this differs from 
the type of rules that most privacy advocates defend, it is a rule that, if 
effective, could leave data subjects equally well-off in the event of a privacy 
breach and in the event of no privacy breach; this is a relevant fact to take 
into account if one wants to preserve their welfare, and if one wants to 
establish incentives for them to disclose information. 
A liability rule would, first of all, maintain the freedom for 
subsequent sales which the pure property rule features, thus keeping 
transaction costs low—this was one of the main attractive features of the 
property rule. The rule would also avoid the main problems identified for 
pure property: the ineffectiveness of the rule due to bargaining positions 
would be solved by the fact that prices in liability rules are defined 
collectively, the under-protection of information obtained through data 
mining would be solved by fixing damages in accordance to harm, and the 
moral hazard problem would be solved by featuring a lower level of 
exclusion than the property rule. Finally, the rule would present two 
additional advantages. 
One additional advantage is that, in privacy issues, one often has 
no disutility unless one is aware of the information leak. In those cases in 
which people consider privacy as a valuable in itself rather than to deceive 
others (when they have a “pure privacy preference”), then their utility is 
not reduced until they are aware of the knowledge of such information by 
other people. Two examples might clarify this point.  
On the one hand, one might not want one’s insurance company to 
learn information about one, such as a disease that one might have, 
because that could raise the premium, and one might not want one’s 
employer to learn about one’s traits that make one a less desirable 
employee, such as a preference for mid-afternoon naps. In those cases one 
would suffer harm when the insurance company and the employer learn 
about the information even if one does not know that they learned it. On 
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the other hand, one might not want one’s friends to know about the 
romantic comedy that one saw last evening, or about role-playing games 
forums that one frequents online, because one considers these to be 
embarrassing. In those cases one would not suffer harm if one’s friends 
find out about these activities and one does not know that they did. The 
reason for this is that harm based on a pure privacy preferences is 
subjective harm: it refers to a psychological state rather than to factual 
circumstances that inconvenience. Although this harm should also be 
taken into account, it does not materialize unless the data subjects is 
aware of the breach. 
This characteristic of privacy disutilities points to liability rules as 
a well-suited compensation mechanism, as in these cases there would be 
no cases in which there is a welfare reduction without the knowledge of the 
entitlement holder that would justify the need for an ex-ante compensation 
mechanism.  
The second additional advantage is that, if data subjects are more 
risk averse than data trading companies—which is likely to happen—then 
liability rules could be in the interest of both players in the interaction 
even abstracting from their ability to solve the moral hazard problem.  
For data subjects, an ex-ante compensation such as the one 
featured by a property rule would in principle be composed solely by the 
expected value of the damage, and would not take into account the 
disutility that a risk-averse data subject would face for the risk. Therefore, 
a full ex-post compensation taking place in the occurrence of an 
eventuality that leads to damage would be more valuable for them than an 
ex-ante compensation for the expected damage. 
In turn, if the compensation is higher than the expected damage to 
account for the disutility of risk—leaving data subjects indifferent between 
ex-ante and an ex-post compensation—then a liability rule would be 
cheaper for data collectors than a property rule, since the expected cost of 
the liability rule would equal the expected cost of harm under the most-
expensive case of strict liability. This principle would be maintained even 
if the liability rule leads to levels of overcompensation, as long as such 
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compensation is, in expectation, lower than the equilibrium price of the 
property rule determined by the data collector’s willingness to pay for the 
information and the data subjects’ willingness to accept—which is likely to 
happen as long as data subjects are risk averse. 
Lastly, one can ask which type of liability rule is the most 
appropriate for cases of data protection. These cases represent unilateral 
accidents, where the potential tortfeasors (data collectors and data 
processors) have an incidence over the probability of an accident (data 
breach) almost exclusively. The protection mechanisms in which data 
subjects can engage after the information is disclosed have a negligible 
influence on the probability of data breaches compared to the security 
measures which data processors can implement. After the information is 
disclosed, it leaves the sphere of control of the data subject, rendering him 
unable to control it. In addition, in these cases both the care and activity 
levels of the potential tortfeasors are relevant for the probability of the 
accident. The level of database security (care level) and the number of data 
transfers performed by data collectors and data processors (activity levels) 
directly affect the probability of data breaches. Therefore, it seems that, 
among the different possible liability rules, a strict liability rule would 
induce most efficiently appropriate levels of care and activity.224  
2.4.4. Approaching causal uncertainty 
The central drawback of this liability rule is the high level of information 
costs that it would present, which might turn it inapplicable independently 
                                                
224 For a proposal along these lines suggesting strict liability for identity theft, see 
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, “Internalizing Identity Theft,” UCLA Journal of Law and 
Technology 13 (2009): 1. Similarly, the application of a negligence rule to 
databases for personal information leakage has been attacked on the basis that 
there would be uncertainty surrounding the level of due care, leading databases to 
overinvest in care. See Danielle Citron, “Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of 
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age,” Southern California 
Law Review 80 (2007): 241. However, it should be noted that a negligence rule 
with an ambiguous standard would lead potential plaintiffs to overinvest in care 
only up to the investment level that they would have under a strict liability rule. 
This is a socially efficient level of care, particularly for unilateral accidents, since 
it fully internalizes the externalities imposed. 
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of its theoretical desirability. If a data subject faces harm due to a privacy 
breach (for example, his identity is stolen by someone else) it might not be 
clear which company or which group of companies that held his personal 
information suffered a data breach which, in turn, led to such outcome. 
Causality could be costly, if not impossible, to prove. This leads to the 
question of whether this difficulty could be solved by using a model of 
causal uncertainty with multiple tortfeasors, as it is sometimes done with 
cases of environmental harm where responsibility is apportioned inversely 
to levels of caution.  
Causal uncertainty is a challenge for the inclusion of several new 
types of responsibility within tort law in which it is difficult to determine 
the source of damage, such as environmental harm and medical 
malpractice.225 To some degree, one could find data protection to be 
analogous to these categories. In this context, there are two types of causal 
uncertainty problems. The first is whether any of the defendants was the 
cause of the plaintiff’s harm, and the second (conditional on the first) is 
who among them hurt the plaintiff and by how much.226 
When the first question is solved, and the causal uncertainty 
present appears for the second, then the uncertainty is reduced to 
matching each victim with his tortfeasor.227 In these cases, market-share 
liability serves as a solution under the assumption that the marginal 
increase in the risk of harm created by each defendant is proportional to 
its presence in the market. Under this assumption, the marginal increase 
of risk received by the potential victims will be equal to the market share 
of the firm. For the assumption to be verified, it will be necessary that 
potential tortfeasors have similar care levels and that they have levels of 
activity proportional to their market share—or that these variables 
compensate each other.  
                                                
225 See Marcel Kahan, “Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the 
Negligence Rule,” Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 427. 
226 See David Rosenberg, “The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 
‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System,” Harvard Law Review 97, no. 4 (1984): 
849. 
227 See Saul Levmore, “Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring 
Wrongs,” Journal of Legal Studies 19, no. 2 (1990): 691. 
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This assumption seems to have underlied the leading case Sindell v. 
Abbott Laboratories, which established market share liability.228 In the 
case, market share liability alleviated the victims from the burden of 
proving who among the producers of the drug (who harmed them in 
aggregation) harmed each of them individually. This also seems to be an 
underlying assumption in cases of recurring harms between parties.229 
Even though these cases present some degree of uncertainty on the 
identity of the tortfeasor for each victim, the uncertainty of tortfeasors in 
aggregation is low since the marginal increase on the risk of damage on 
the entire set of plaintiffs is considered to be proportional to market-
share:230 the more DES a company sells, the more women it harms with it. 
This assumption, however, is not always valid for companies 
collecting and processing personal data. We know that consuming DES has 
a negative impact on women’s health, and that this effect does not present 
a large variance. On the other hand, it is not always the case that the 
trade of personal data has a negative impact on data subjects’ well-being. 
The trade of information is sometimes harmless and, when it is not, the 
possibility that it presents of creating harm largely depends on care levels.  
This illustrates that the type of uncertainty problem which often 
appears in the context of information technology is not the second but the 
first. The problem has been addresses by laws requiring companies to 
notify data subjects in cases of data breach, such as the one recently 
passed in the US,231 which marginally reduce the information problem. 
Still, it is sometimes the case that upon fraud or identity theft the victims 
                                                
228 In the case, pregnant mothers used a diethylstilbestrol-based drug (DES) to 
prevent miscarriage, which caused their daughters (later on known as “the DES 
daughters”) to develop cancer twenty years later. In the DES cases this 
assumption is reasonable because all defendants engaged in an identical activity. 
See Glen Robinson, “Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES 
Cases,” Virginia Law Review 68, no. 4 (1982): 713. 
229 See Saul Levmore, “Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring 
Wrongs,” Journal of Legal Studies 19, no. 2 (1990): 691. 
230 See William Landes and Richard Posner, “Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic 
Analysis,” Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 3 (1980): 517; William Kruskal, “Terms 
of Reference: Singular Confusion about Multiple Causation,” Journal of Legal 
Studies 15, no. 2 (1986): 427. 
231 See Personal Data Notification and Protection Act, passed on 12 January 2015. 
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cannot know how their data were leaked, and by whom. What is more, it 
can be that the set of necessary data were not leaked from one single place 
but that elements of that set were mined from different sources, making an 
efficient apportioning of responsibility increasingly difficult.232 
Additionally, in the context of information technology there are 
several companies that have sizeable datasets and few assets. This 
obstacle could point to the inapplicability of market share liability while 
potentially leaving some scope for another proxy to be used for 
apportionment, such as the amount of data collected or data traded. This 
alternative, however, would lead to frequent solvency problems: there are 
several websites that have an extremely small market share compared to 
data giants, but they still process personal data and would be unable to 
fully compensate people for their losses absent insurance. These companies 
could be judgment-proof. 
From a legal point of view, there is also the obstacle that one is 
generally not considered responsible for the criminal actions of third 
parties. If the problem was caused by a criminal who stole data from a 
data collector, or a criminal who tricked a data processor (such as a credit 
card company) into obtaining a victim’s personal information (such as his 
credit card details), the company would argue that data collection, even if 
it eventually resulted in identity theft, did not cause that identity theft—
the thief did. For these reasons, it seems that a pure liability rule is also 
not the optimal solution to protect the entitlement. 
2.5.  A Proposal for Explaining DPL 
2.5.1. Setting an intermediate level of protection 
The central lesson that one can draw from the previous section is that DPL 
should set a level of exclusion larger than a liability rule, but lower than a 
property rule—and that an inalienability rule. The three traditional rules 
                                                
232 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, “Internalizing Identity Theft,” UCLA Journal of Law 
and Technology 13 (2009): 1.  
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in their pure forms would present either theoretical or practical problems 
that could render them useless as a protection mechanism. This leads to 
the discussion of which aspects of these rules to maintain in DPL. 
The rationale of incentivizing disclosure is used canonically in areas 
of law such as professional secrecy. Most societies want to ensure that 
people are able to convey as much information as possible to their lawyers, 
psychologists and priests in order to allow them to perform their jobs 
appropriately. For that reason, they enact rules stating that the members 
of these professions cannot share with others the information that is 
shared to them in such context, thus guaranteeing trust.233 A rule 
analogous to absolute data protection, for example stating that the 
members of these professions cannot learn the information in the first 
place, would be too protective and would impair the aim that the rule has. 
In turn, a rule that allows them to disclose everything their clients say, 
analogous to no data protection, would make their clients disclose less, if 
anything at all. 
This has been the justification behind the attorney-client privilege, 
particularly in the US.234 The privilege is not considered to be a right of the 
attorney but one of the client, who can decide whether to raise it or waive 
it, and it has been explicitly called in occasions a rule of privacy.235 The 
extent of the privilege is that attorneys cannot disclose without the 
permission of their client, in a narrow interpretation,236 any information 
that a client conveyed in confidence with the purpose of seeking legal 
advice and, in a broad interpretation,237 any communication between them 
and their clients. Its justification is that an attorney can only give 
adequate legal advice if he has learned of all relevant information, and the 
                                                
233 See Ronald Allen et al., “A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and 
the Work Product Doctrine,” Journal of Legal Studies 19, no. 2 (1990): 359. 
234 The original justification appears in Wigmore’s leading book on evidence. See 
John Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, 1940. §2292, and cited case law. 
235 See Geoffrey Hazard, “A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege,” California Law Review 66, no. 5 (1978): 1061. 
236 See US Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 501. 
237 See American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Chicago: 
American Bar Association, 2006). Rule 1.6. 
 
 
71 
client might withheld that information if the privilege did not exist.238 
Although without a direct instrumental justification, the privilege exists 
with equal prevalence in Europe, having a particularly wide scope in 
Germany and France.239 
The attorney-client privilege, although analogous in the sense that 
it aims to stimulate disclosure, might not be tailored enough to apply 
directly to DPL. It does not present the problematic of the future use of the 
information, and particularly of the secondary use of information and of 
data transfers, which are essential to the public good characteristic of 
personal information. 
More prominently, one of the main branches of law that displays 
this kind of combination between property rules and liability rules is 
copyright.240 Copyright law, simultaneously, tackles the public good 
characteristics of information and its secondary use; it responds to the 
non-excludability characteristic of information and to the need to foster it 
with the creation of an entitlement to exclude others from certain uses, 
while at the same time it attempts to maintain low transaction costs for 
the transfer and future use of the information.241  
Concretely, copyright law reserves for authors some rights of the 
bundle of rights which full property represent, mainly the right to copy.242 
DPL, from the economic perspective in which it was presented, has 
                                                
238 See Ronald Allen et al., “A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and 
the Work Product Doctrine,” Journal of Legal Studies 19, no. 2 (1990): 359. See 
also Edna Epstein, The Attorney Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine 
(Chicago: American Bar Association, 2001). 
239 See Edward Imwinkelried, “The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the 
Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges,” Boston University Law Review 83 (2003): 
315. 
240 See Trotter Hardy, “Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,” University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 1 (1996): 217.  
241 See Stanley Besen and Leo Raskind, “An Introduction to the Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 
(1991): 3.  
242 See Ibid. As manifestations of copying, copyright law traditionally grants five 
rights: (i) the right to reproduce, (ii) the right to prepare derivative works, (iii) the 
right to distribute copies, (iv) the right to perform, and (v) the right to display it 
publicly. For example, in the US this is contemplated in title 17, section 106 of the 
US Code. 
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relevant analogies with copyright inasmuch as they both present some 
level of exclusion but not a pure property rule.243 
2.5.2. DPL and Copyright: common grounds 
Copyright traditionally serves two interests: creation and dissemination of 
content; the tradeoff between these two has been called the incentive-
access paradigm.244 Establishing a price which is higher than the marginal 
cost of distribution (which in case of digitalized information is zero) 
generates the static effect of suboptimal dissemination; this, as it was 
seen, is also the case for DPL.245 The static effect is weighted, in turn, 
against the dynamic effect of incentivizing the generation of new 
products.246 The protection for authors is mainly given by the property 
characteristics of copyright, which imply a compensation, while the 
attempt to maintain dissemination leads to the (scarce) liability 
characteristics of copyright. It seems possible, from this perspective, to 
take applicable lessons from copyright to DPL. 
From the perspective proposed in the previous section where DPL is 
an instrument for incentivizing the creation of information, copyright law 
and DPL have a similar justification. Moreover, both branches of law have 
a similar system of combining elements from property rules and liability 
rules. Neither copyright law nor DPL traditionally include inalienability 
rules.247 Evaluating the common aspects with copyright law can aid, from 
                                                
243 See Trotter Hardy, “Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,” University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 1 (1996): 217. 
244 See Joseph Liu, “Copyright and Time: A Proposal,” Michigan Law Review 101, 
no. 2 (2002): 409; Alireza Naghavi and Günther Schulze, “Bootlegging in the Music 
Industry: A Note,” European Journal of Law and Economics 12, no. 1 (2001): 57; 
Glynn Lunney, “Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm,” 
Vanderbilt Law Review 49 (1996): 483.  
245 See section 2.3.4. 
246 See Stanley Besen and Leo Raskind, “An Introduction to the Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 
(1991): 3. 
247 The only provision of the Data Protection Directive that allows for an 
inalienability rule its article 8(2)(a), which states that MS can forbid the 
processing of sensitive data even if the data subject gave his consent. 
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this perspective, in understanding how DPL sets its intermediate level of 
exclusion. 
Regarding the property characteristics of copyright law, authors 
holding copyrighted work are entitled to exclude others from copying their 
work. Simultaneously, they are able to issue licenses for the use of their 
work, partially alienating their exclusion right, or to request injunctions 
for the breach of such exclusion.248  
Copyright holders can either transfer copyright in its entirety or, 
more frequently, grant a license for any of these rights in exchange for a 
royalty. Under full property, when an entitlement is transferred the new 
owner can do with it what he desires; under copyright, on the other hand, 
one usually gives permission for a particular use. 
In this regard, licenses under copyright law are analogous to the 
purpose limitation principle under DPL. Both of them specify the objective 
for which the information can be used, and forbid its use for other 
purposes; they are an element of a property rule within the system, where 
the owner of the entitlement has the right to exclude others from uses 
different than the one specified. 
A second common ground is that both under copyright (or, more 
generally, in intellectual property law) and DPL, each generation of 
information should ideally have a different protection in order to 
incentivize it without overprotecting it, but it is not possible for the law to 
account for all the nuances. An ideal intellectual property law in a world 
with perfect information would feature a different scope and breath for 
each creation, but as this is not possible, the law has only some categories 
that aim to be functional on average. Namely, a standard protection for 
patents and a standard protection for copyrighted works.  
DPL, in this regard, faces the same issue, where the externalities 
for data subjects are different in each case, and therefore the expected cost 
of disclosing information is different for each case. Although it would be 
                                                
248 See William Cornish, David Llewelyn, and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: 
Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2013). Chapter 9. 
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desirable to completely de-homogenize information and issue individual 
rules, this is not possible, so DPL features few distinctions that aim to 
work on average, such as the distinction between sensitive and non-
sensitive information. 
Regarding the liability characteristics, authors sometimes face 
compulsory licenses, and have to accept fair use.249 While compulsory 
licenses tend to be specific and limited, fair use is a central trait of 
copyright law.250 As such, while it could marginally reduce the number of 
inventions being made, it represents an advantage for the dissemination of 
copyrighted works, balancing the incentive objective and the access 
objective mentioned.251 
Like liability rules under the Calabresi-Melamed framework, fair 
use is traditionally justified based on high transaction costs. Specifically, 
fair use is motivated by the high transaction costs which would be 
otherwise implied in negotiating and monitoring the uses that it 
protects.252 For example, one can quote a scientific work literally without 
asking the author for permission, because doing so each time that one 
wants to quote a published work would produce high transaction costs, and 
such citation does not harm the economic interest of the author since it 
does not reduce the expected amount of copies sold. If the quotation is 
large enough to cover the whole work, on the other hand, it would harm his 
economic interest, and the law requires permission to do so.253 It would be 
                                                
249 See Trotter Hardy, “Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,” University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 1 (1996): 217.  
250 This is particularly so in the United States. See title 17, section 107 of the 
United States Code. 
251 See Pierre Leval, “Toward a Fair Use Standard,” Harvard Law Review 103, no. 
5 (1990): 1105; Glynn Lunney, “Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited,” 
Boston University Law Review 82 (2002): 975. 
252 See Wendy Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the‘ Betamax’ Case and Its Predecessors,” Columbia Law Review 82, 
no. 8 (1982): 1600.   
253 Fair use finds its scope defined in the uses of the product that do not 
significantly affect the economic interests of the owner, in order to not deter 
creation exceedingly. See Leo Raskind, “A Functional Interpretation of Fair Use: 
The Fourteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture,” Journal of the Copyright 
Society 31 (1983): 601; Richard Posner, “When Is Parody Fair Use?,” Journal of 
Legal Studies 21, no. 1 (1992): 67. 
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unjustified from an economic perspective to ban the use of the product in 
those contexts where such ban would not induce a negotiation, and so the 
ban would generate a loss by leaving the author uncompensated and the 
user without using the good. Fair use, in this sense, is a tool for enhancing 
the diffusion aspect of copyright law.254 
The mirror argument can be made for DPL. Demanding individual 
authorizations from the data subject for each secondary use of the 
information would significantly elevate transaction costs, especially given 
that personal information is valuable in aggregate and that there is a high 
number of data subjects that are involved in most cases of data processing. 
In order to avoid this consequence, DPL presents some features of a 
liability rule within the scope of the purpose limitation principle, by not 
requiring consent for every interaction.255 
2.5.3. DPL and Copyright: structural differences 
Simultaneously, there are structural differences between copyright law 
and DPL that justify differences in their regulatory approaches from an 
economic perspective.  
One of these differences is that the cost of creating a copyrighted 
product does not depend on its use ex-post, while the cost of disclosing 
personal information fully depends on the use that it is given after the 
exchange, since this use changes the expected costs of harm from 
disclosure. For most—although not all—copyrighted works, there are two 
costs involved in the artistic creation: the cost of creating the work and the 
cost of creating copies.256 For disclosing personal information under DPL, 
however, the only cost is the expected cost of harm that people have when 
releasing information (instrumental value of privacy), together with the 
disutility of the information release in itself (pure privacy preference). 
                                                
254 See Wendy Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the‘ Betamax’ Case and Its Predecessors,” Columbia Law Review 82, 
no. 8 (1982): 1600.   
255 See article 7(b) to 7(f) of Directive 1995/46/EC. 
256 See William Landes and Richard Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 325. 
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While for both cases, for the good to be produced the expected return must 
exceed the expected cost, only for one of them (DPL) such cost is dependent 
on the ex-post incentives to adjust levels of care and levels of activity. This 
justifies a stronger incidence of liability rules in DPL than in copyright, 
since these rules maintain ex-post incentives better than property rules.  
A second relevant difference between copyright and DPL from this 
perspective is the difference on how the value of the information changes 
over time. The limited duration of copyright responds to its decreasing 
marginal utility (prospective authors who the law wants to incentivize will 
discount payoffs to present value) paired to its increasing marginal cost 
(mainly due to tracing the origins of old copyrighted works).257 Since old 
information under DPL tends to be less harmful for data subjects than new 
information, DPL seems to present the characteristic of decreasing 
marginal utility of information for the creator. However, regarding 
marginal costs, unlike copyrighted work personal information would turn 
less valuable over time also for others. In the case of DPL, the value of 
personal information decreases at a slow rate for data subjects, while it 
quickly decreases in value its commercial uses as it becomes outdated.258 
Moreover, due to the higher incidence of liability rules in DPL compared to 
copyright, there is no need to trace the information to allow for secondary 
use once it is transferred. 
This can explain the different extension of the time limit under both 
branches of law. Policy debates in DPL have gone in the opposite direction 
of suggesting time limits for rights, proposing increased rights for old 
information.259 However, although not explicitly, DPL also contains a time 
limit for its entitlements: the death of the data subject, since data 
protection rights, unlike copyright, are not inheritable.260 After the death 
                                                
257 See Ibid. 
258 For an example of this, see Costeja’s claim in Google v. Spain, in section 4.3.1 
below. 
259 An example of this is the right to forget, described in section 4.1 below. 
260 See Edina Harbinja, “Does the EU Data Protection Regime Protect Post-
Mortem Privacy and What Could Be the Potential Alternatives?,” SCRIPT-Ed 10, 
no. 1 (2013): 19. (arguing that establishing a post-mortem protection would be 
compatible with the current system.) 
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of the data subject, personal information has little value for his inheritors 
on average, which justifies its non-inheritability even within the tendency 
of giving further protection to older information. 
Based on these considerations, it seems that the objection that 
protecting personal information with an analogous system to copyright 
would ignore that both fields are based on different justifications is, to 
some extent, unjustified.261 Simultaneously, the branches of law do present 
some structural differences from an economic perspective that can explain 
why DPL is not directly subsumed under copyright law.  
These considerations point to an economic justification of having 
within DPL a similar system to copyright with a weakened property rule, 
where not all rights from the bundle (as property is often characterized) 
are reserved, but only some of them are. In the same direction as creative 
commons, which has proposed a successful model of protecting information 
in the form of creative inventions with a lower level of exclusion than 
traditional copyright law, one can discuss which rights from the bundle are 
worth keeping to protect information in the form of personal data. 
2.5.4. Relevant technological characteristics to shape 
DPL  
The technological characteristics of data exchanges have elements that, if 
taken into account, can inform policymakers into designing better 
regulations from an economic perspective. From them, one can draw 
additional considerations to aid in determining such intermediate level of 
exclusion. The elements for these purposes are three: on the supply side, 
the generation of the information, and on the demand side, its use and the 
externalities that can derive from it. 
On the supply side, in order to incentivize information one should 
distinguish how it is created. Copyright’s property characteristics, it was 
seen, attempt to prevent free-riding of the authors’ expression, hence 
                                                
261 For a representative version of the claim, see Pamela Samuelson, “Privacy as 
Intellectual Property?,” Stanford Law Review 52, no. 5 (1999): 1125. 
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internalizing the positive spillovers.262 If the same rationale is applied to 
DPL, then some types of data need to be protected more than others. 
Concretely, a higher level of protection is justifiable, from this 
perspective, for information that had consent as a basis for processing.263 
This is analogous to the economic rationale of copyright law of protecting 
expression but not ideas, because (i) ideas expressed by others is 
information which had a high input from someone else and (ii) protection 
of ideas would be too wide, and it would likely compensate creators beyond 
their costs and (iii) this would elevate transaction costs.264 Only 
information which had consent as a basis for processing fits within the 
peer-to-peer system under which data subjects produce it according to the 
degree in which their expected costs of doing so are compensated; 
therefore, only this type of information falls under the argument that it 
should be given a higher level of protection in order to incentivize its 
generation.265 
For example, Google Earth has significant marginal costs of 
gathering information—by taking pictures across the planet—while 
Google+ and other social networks do not, since they form part of the peer-
to-peer system where people surrender information voluntarily. Both 
products fall within the same rules under European DPL, but Google 
Earth’s methods of gathering information are more analogous of those that 
are dealt with in traditional privacy law; they are closer to the automatic 
photo camera that motivated Warren and Brandeis’ article than to those of 
the Web 2.0 that motivated the GDRP. Then, if one wants to incentivize 
information generation, data subjects’ privacy should have a higher level of 
protection for Google+ than for Google Earth.  
From this perspective, the under-protection of privacy issues 
related to data mining which was mentioned as a drawback of the property 
rule could, after all, have welfare-enhancing elements. Data mining 
                                                
262 See William Landes and Richard Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 325. 
263 See article 7(a) of Directive 1995/46/EC. 
264 See Ibid. 
265 See sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. 
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implies costs of assembly for the data miner, who after such process 
generates new information through the synergies of the pieces of 
information used. If personal information obtained with data mining was 
granted a lower level of protection than personal information acquired in 
its entirety, then DPL would be incentivizing the generation of new 
information via data mining as well. 
This leads to the more general question of who owns, under the 
property elements of DPL, information that was generated by someone but 
refers to someone else. Under current DPL, to the extent that it features 
property characteristics, the initial owner of the information is always the 
data subject: the person whom the information is about. In order to 
generate incentives for the creation of information, however, some 
property interests should be granted to the creator of the information also 
under the scenarios where that person is not the same as the person to 
whom the information refers. This person would have a different cost 
function than data subjects who disclose information (for him, personal 
information would not be a by-product, and the costs associated with it 
would not be related to expected privacy breach) but, inasmuch as DPL 
serves the interest of incentivizing information, the costs of generating 
such information should be compensated in order to incentivize its 
disclosure as well.266 
Parallels could be made in this regard to how intellectual property 
assigns interests. For instance, rights over photographs are assigned to the 
author (the collector of information) as opposed to the person 
photographed, and he is entitled to make use of it within the limits of fair 
use (in civil law countries, within the exceptions and limitations of 
copyright) without the consent of the person who was photographed. This 
rule incentivizes the generation of photographs (which are one kind of 
information) because it allocates the entitlement to he who needs to make 
the larger marginal investments for the photograph to be generated. 
                                                
266 This property interests would be relevant, for example, for journalism. At a 
more general level, this principle would play a role in maintaining freedom of 
expression within DPL. 
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From the demand side, one should distinguish what uses can be 
made with the information, since not all types information have equal 
social weight. There are differences in the social utility which is derived 
from information than can be solely used for marketing (and might 
represent, individually, a low benefit for the company) and information 
that can be used for research regarding public health or the prevention of 
crime.  
Clearly, it would be impossible for DPL to individually assess each 
unit of information to provide a tailored level of protection. However, a 
plausible heuristic to approximate the social value of the use of each unit 
of information could be whether its use is for a public good or for a private 
interest. A centralized rule such as a liability rule might perform poorly at 
making these distinctions, while a property rule might be able to do so 
since it determines the price in a decentralized manner. European DPL, in 
turn, takes this distinction into account to some degree, incorporating 
exceptions for freedom of expression,267 research,268 and healthcare,269 
where the data subject has a lower level of protection. 
Regarding externalities, the basis of disclosure turns again 
relevant; from the point of view of revealed preferences, it is arguably the 
case that information that is not revealed by data subjects is likely to 
present larger externalities for them. There could be, from this 
perspective, a self-selection of information where information that is not 
disclosed when it could have presents higher risks due to pure privacy 
preferences. However, given that personal information is a by-product it 
seems that this is not always the case: there could also be pieces of 
information that a data subject did not have incentives to disclose, but that 
do not imply for him particularly high externalities. In the example given 
before, maybe he does not care about disclosing his location data, but he 
takes no utility from fitness applications. 
                                                
267 See article 9 of Directive 1995/46/EC. 
268 See articles 6(1)(b), 6(1)(e), 11(2), 13(2), and 32(3) of Directive 1995/46/EC. 
269 See article 8(3) of Directive 1995/46/EC. 
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A better indicator than the basis for processing to determine the 
level of externalities is the type of information disclosed. There are 
differences in terms of privacy risks between sensitive information and 
non-sensitive information, and between online information and offline 
information. From this perspective, it would be reasonable to set a 
presumption that non-disclosed sensitive information belongs to the self-
selection mechanism and is therefore potentially harmful, while non-
disclosed non-sensitive information could not have been disclosed yet for 
lack of incentives to do so. 
Both of these elements, and to some extent the final presumption 
regarding the differences between undisclosed sensitive and non-sensitive 
information, are present in the European data protection framework. DPL 
gives a special protection to sensitive information, which mainly consists 
in the rule that, unlike other kinds of information, it can only be processed 
with the basis of consent.270 Non-disclosed sensitive information, in this 
way, has a protection which is closer to a property rule. 
2.6.  Fostering Information with Data Protection 
This chapter has shown that, as with professional secrecy for lawyers, 
psychologists and clerics, and as the case of copyright law, a certain level 
of data protection can induce more disclosure, meaning more generation of 
information. More concretely, the relationship between data protection and 
amount of information available seems to form a concave function, where 
either no data protection at all or maximum data protection reduce the 
amount of information available. Hence, from a total-welfare perspective, 
irrespective of human rights considerations, a right to privacy within 
information technology law can be seen as desirable inasmuch as it 
increases information disclosure. 
Given the argument of the chapter, one might ask why one sees 
information exchanges also without the proposed protection. The answer to 
that doubt lies in seeing personal information traded in the context of data 
                                                
270 See article 8 of Directive 1995/46/EC. 
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mining and social networks as a good which is a by-product of a 
consumption activity, hence having a certain level of production also 
absent direct incentives to produce. 
This leads to the question of which rule can protect this entitlement 
an efficient way. The article has argued that an efficient data protection 
system should present a higher level of exclusion than a liability rule and a 
lower level of exclusion than a property rule. Moreover, evaluating the 
similarities and differences between DPL and copyright, it becomes 
apparent that the level of exclusion or propertization for DPL should be 
lower than for copyright law. 
The exact level of exclusion desirable is, ultimately, a value 
judgment.271 However, some precisions can be made. From an economic 
perspective, DPL should take into account (i) who incurred in costs to 
generate the information, (ii) the social benefits that can derive from the 
use of such information, and (iii) the size of the expected externalities of its 
use for data subjects due to the type of information involved.  
This considerations allow to evaluate whether DPL, at a general 
level, is efficient. The rationale of European DPL, in accordance with the 
considerations made, gives data subjects a certain level of exclusion, but it 
is not based on an idea of full property, and it would be problematic to 
assert that these rights constitute a full property right.272 DPL creates 
segments of proprietary legal entitlements without creating a full property 
right. DPL seems to have evolved by enhancing data subjects’ entitlements 
over their personal information, it presents large similarities with the 
protection system for copyrighted works, and where it presents a difference 
                                                
271 Similarly, it has been said for copyright that, due to the social values that are 
involved, “economic analysis can tell us what would happen if we make certain 
policy decisions. It cannot tell us what policy decisions we should make.” Stan 
Liebowitz, “Is Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal?,” George Washington Law 
Review 79, no. 6 (2011): 1692. 
272 See Vera Bergelson, “It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in 
Personal Information,” UC Davis Law Review 37 (2003): 379; Randolph Sergent, 
“A Fourth Amendment Model for Data Networks and Computer Privacy,” 
Vanderbilt Law Review 81 (1995): 1181. See also Pamela Samuelson, “Privacy as 
Intellectual Property?,” Stanford Law Review 52, no. 5 (1999): 1125. 1131 
(together with cited case law). 
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it finds an explanation either in the different incentives or due to the 
technological imperative of DPL. In this way, European DPL seems 
justifiable from an economic perspective. 
In addition, these considerations allow to formulate general policy 
suggestions to shape this branch of law. Current European DPL seems to 
incorporate the considerations made regarding the social use and the 
expected externalities of information, while it does not incorporate 
differences regarding the source of information. If it did, one should expect 
from the arguments exposed here that it would generate a higher degree of 
information flow. 
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3.1.  The Value of Privacy 
In agreements that internet users conclude with some websites and service 
providers—normally called “privacy agreements” or “privacy policies”—, 
they are allowed to use a certain product and, as a side-product,273 they 
allow the company in exchange to profit from the personal information 
collected through the use of that product, which is utilized for targeted 
advertising. While technically the use of the product is free, from an 
economic perspective the price they pay for it is the aspect of their privacy 
they relinquish. 
Social networks are a good example of this. Facebook users, for 
instance, receive a free account that they use to communicate with their 
peers or for leisure, and while doing so they reveal personal information 
about themselves. This information ranges from basic information such as 
their gender and age up to very personal information such as whom they 
are currently dating, where they travel and what movies they like to 
watch. With 850 million users that provide this information periodically 
the company is worth around 100 billion dollars because of the possibilities 
it presents for behavioral advertisers.  
 A first approximation to this interaction would suggest that these 
consumers (hereafter data subjects) will disclose the amount of 
information for which their marginal cost of disclosure equals their 
marginal benefit for the use of the product. In such way—one could 
conclude by applying the first stream of literature in the economics of 
privacy—the market would allocate data subjects’ personal information to 
their highest valuer.274 
 With the rise of these products, however, a series of complaints 
have been made both by consumers and consumer associations that state 
                                                
273 See section 2.3.5. 
274 See Richard Posner, “The Right of Privacy,” Georgia Law Review 12, no. 3 
(1978): 393; Richard Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic 
Review 71, no. 2 (1981): 405; George Stigler, “An Introduction to Privacy in 
Economics and Politics,” Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 4 (1980): 623; Jack 
Hirshleifer, “Privacy. Its Origin, Function and Future,” Journal of Legal Studies 9, 
no. 4 (1980): 649. 
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that their privacy is not being properly protected in the online domain.275 
Similarly, people have declared in surveys that they place a very high 
value on their privacy, while in incentivized experiments they disclose 
their personal information for little compensation. This behavior is known 
as the “privacy paradox.”  
 The privacy paradox is a phenomenon that indicates that there is in 
fact a different incentive structure between internet data collection and 
processing and the traditional privacy problems long addressed by law. 
This new incentive structure could justify a different regulation for the 
former.276 As it is clear, however, an answer on which type of regulation is 
appropriate stems not from the paradox itself but from the explanation of 
its incentive structure. 
The main explanation provided so far for the privacy paradox is 
that data subjects have cognitive biases,277 and in particular they display 
self-control problems and thus they hyperbolically discount.278 This 
chapter argues that the privacy paradox, when examined closely, might 
after all be not an amalgam of behavioral biases but instead an 
uncertainty problem. The question it asks is then: is it possible to provide 
an explanation for the privacy paradox within a rational-choice 
framework? 
The next section reviews the experimental findings that confirm the 
existence of a paradox in data subject’s behavior. Section 3.3 then provides 
the standard explanation for this paradox together with an alternative 
explanation. Section 3.4 discusses their robustness to explain the paradox. 
                                                
275 See Patricia Norberg, Daniel Horne, and David Horne, “The Privacy Paradox: 
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions versus Behaviors,” Journal of 
Consumer Affairs 41, no. 1 (2007): 100. 
276 For example, the much-debated right to be forgotten. It will be seen in section 
3.4 that the privacy paradox is mainly a flexibility problem, and section 3.5.1 will 
explain that the right to be forgotten increases flexibility for data subjects. 
277 See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and George Loewenstein, “What Is 
Privacy Worth?,” Journal of Legal Studies 42, no. 2 (2013): 249. 
278 See Alessandro Acquisti, “Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics 
of Immediate Gratification,” in Proceedings of the Fifth Association for Computing 
Machinery Conference on Electronic Commerce, ed. Jack Breese, Joan 
Feigenbaum, and Margo Seltzer (New York: Association for Computing Machinery 
Press, 2004), 21. 
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Section 3.5 introduces the normative implications of this argument. 
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2.  The Privacy Paradox 
3.2.1. Inconsistencies in privacy valuations 
Part of the experimental literature on the topic addresses the question of 
how much data subjects really value their privacy in view of the mentioned 
paradox. 
 The earliest studies in the topic show the inconsistency between 
data subjects’ declared concern for privacy and their actual behavior 
online.279 The study grouped participants according to their own declared 
privacy concern and discovered that, when participating in an online 
shopping simulation, there was no significant difference between the 
groups regarding the amount of personal information revealed.280  
The same finding can be found in other experiments, which show 
that privacy concerns announced by subjects prior to the experiment are 
inconsistent with shopping behavior during the experiment.281 It was also 
shown that privacy concerns of experimental subjects are a weak predictor 
of membership and of the amount of information disclosed through social 
networks.282 In an experiment where almost 90% of respondents of a 
survey declared that they have a high concern about their own privacy, 
                                                
279 See Sarah Spiekermann, Jens Grossklags, and Bettina Berendt, “E-Privacy in 
2nd Generation E-Commerce: Privacy Preferences versus Actual Behavior,” in 
Proceedings of the Third Association for Computing Machinery Conference on 
Electronic Commerce, ed. Michael Wellman and Yoav Shoham (New York: 
Association for Computing Machinery Press, 2001), 38. 
280 This included information such as: in which occasions the subject takes photos, 
what he does with his pictures, what are his motivations for taking pictures, how 
photogenic he is, and how conceited he is. See Ibid. 
281 See Bettina Berendt, Oliver Günther, and Sarah Spiekermann, “Privacy in E-
Commerce,” Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 48, no. 
4 (2005): 101. 
282 See Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross, “Imagined Communities: Awareness, 
Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook,” in Proceedings of the Sixth 
Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (Cambridge: Robinson College of 
Cambridge University, 2006), 1. 
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again almost 90% of these respondents accepted to put full name and home 
address under risk of disclosure in exchange for a loyalty card.283 
Still, data subjects have been shown to respond to monetary 
incentives regarding privacy, and particularly regarding the avoidance of 
secondary use, improper access, and error, even if the willingness to pay 
was low.284 In addition to their willingness to pay, data subjects have been 
shown to respond to privacy concerns by avoiding behaviors that deviate 
from social norms, which have been shown to be more privacy-sensitive.285 
In more recent studies, data subjects’ valuations also display a gap 
between willingness to pay to protect information and willingness to accept 
a certain proposal to sell information.286 In a survey, most participants 
under a first treatment were not willing to pay one dollar to prevent 
behavioral advertising, while under a second treatment most participants 
were not willing to accept one dollar to allow for behavioral advertising.287 
In an experiment, subjects were either asked how much money they were 
willing to pay to protect their otherwise public personal information, or 
how much they would be willing to accept to allow that information to 
become public. The average willingness to accept was five times higher 
                                                
283 See Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in 
Individual Decision Making,” Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Security and Privacy Magazine 3, no. 1 (2005): 26. 
284 See Il-Horn Hann et al., “Overcoming Online Information Privacy Concerns: An 
Information-Processing Theory Approach,” Journal of Management Information 
Systems 24, no. 2 (2007): 13. Willingness to pay was shown to vary between $30.49 
and $44.62 for US subjects. 
285 See Yoan Hermstruwer and Stephan Dickert, “Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: 
An Experiment on Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten,” Preprints of 
the Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods (Bonn, 2013). 
286 Some studies suggest that, counter intuitively, the offer of a reward for the 
information actually reduces self-disclosure, intensifying concern against rational-
choice based predictions. See Eduardo Andrade, Velitchka Kaltcheva, and Barton 
Weitz, “Self-Disclosure on the Web: The Impact of Privacy Policy, Reward, and 
Company Reputation,” Advances in Consumer Research 29 (2002): 350. Other 
research, however, contradicts those findings. See Kai-Lung Hui, Hock Hai Teo, 
and Sang-Yong Lee, “The Value of Privacy Assurance: An Exploratory Field 
Experiment,” Management Information Systems Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2007): 19. 
287 See Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, “Beliefs and Behaviors: 
Internet Users’ Understanding of Behavioral Advertising,” in Proceedings of the 
38th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy 
(Arlington, 2010). 
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than the willingness to pay (WTA:WTP ratio of 5.47) which almost doubles 
average ratio for other goods (2.92).288 
Other related research has explored the impact —or lack thereof— 
of privacy policies in websites,289 together with other elements such as the 
mention of a protecting regulation,290 privacy seals,291 the way in which 
information requests are presented,292 how much other data subjects 
disclose,293 and promises of data breach notifications.294 
3.2.2. Differing valuations 
Other research focuses on whether these valuations vary and whether 
certain types of personal information are valued more or less than others. 
 Data subjects value their offline information, which is composed by 
facts related directly to their person that enters the online domain such as 
their birth date or health status, differently than their online information, 
composed by their browsing patterns. In average, they seem to value 
offline information three times as much as their browsing behavior.295  
                                                
288 See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and George Loewenstein, “What Is 
Privacy Worth?,” Journal of Legal Studies 42, no. 2 (2013): 249. 
289 See Eduardo Andrade, Velitchka Kaltcheva, and Barton Weitz, “Self-Disclosure 
on the Web: The Impact of Privacy Policy, Reward, and Company Reputation,” 
Advances in Consumer Research 29 (2002): 350; Kai-Lung Hui, Hock Hai Teo, and 
Sang-Yong Lee, “The Value of Privacy Assurance: An Exploratory Field 
Experiment,” Management Information Systems Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2007): 19. 
290 See Sarah Spiekermann, Jens Grossklags, and Bettina Berendt, “E-Privacy in 
2nd Generation E-Commerce: Privacy Preferences versus Actual Behavior,” in 
Proceedings of the Third Association for Computing Machinery Conference on 
Electronic Commerce, ed. Michael Wellman and Yoav Shoham (New York: 
Association for Computing Machinery Press, 2001), 38. 
291 See Kai-Lung Hui, Hock Hai Teo, and Sang-Yong Lee, “The Value of Privacy 
Assurance: An Exploratory Field Experiment,” Management Information Systems 
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2007): 19. 
292 See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and George Loewenstein, “The Impact of 
Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose,” Journal of Marketing Research 
49 (2012): 160. 
293 See Ibid. 
294 See Francesco Feri, Caterina Giannetti, and Nicola Jentzsch, “Disclosure of 
Personal Information Under Risk of Privacy Shocks,” University of Bologna School 
of Economics Working Paper 875 (Bologna, 2013). 
295 See Juan Pablo Carrascal et al., “Your Browsing Behavior for a Big Mac: 
Economics of Personal Information Online,” in Proceedings of the 22nd 
International Conference on World Wide Web (Geneva, 2013). 
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Regarding offline information in particular, it has been shown 
that—as it is intuitive—data subjects do not value all of its types in the 
same way. An inverse linear relationship has been shown between the 
desirability of their personal traits and the value they place on them; 
people ask for more money in order to reveal their undesirable traits with 
no direct financial or identity-theft repercussions, such as weight and 
age.296  
More specifically, some research has indicated that data subjects 
place different values over different types of offline personal information. 
For instance, they seem to place a high value on information related to 
their medical and financial status and information about their families, 
and to have less trouble disclosing information about product consumption 
and brand consumption, as well as media usage.297 
 This line of research suggests that there are relevant differences 
between the types of information data subjects choose to disclose—offline 
and online, sensitive and non-sensitive—, and if personal information is 
treated as fungible units then experimental results might not be entirely 
accurate. Since not all types of personal information impact data subjects’ 
utility in the same way, it is questionable to treat personal information as 
fungible units when analyzing transactions.298 
3.2.3. Context and accessibility 
Other papers explore the importance of context and accessibility of 
information at the moment of disclosure, which data subjects seem to 
respond to. They suggest that consumer behavior is less random than one 
might think based on the findings reviewed above.  
                                                
296 See Bernardo Huberman, Eytan Adar, and Leslie Fine, “Valuating Privacy,” 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Security and Privacy Magazine 3 
(2005): 22. 
297 See Daniel Horne and David Horne, “Domains of Privacy: Toward an 
Understanding of Underlying Factors,” in Direct Marketing Educators’ Conference 
(San Francisco, 1998). 
298 See Luc Wathieu and Allan Friedman, “An Empirical Approach to 
Understanding Privacy Valuation,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 07-
75 (Boston, 2007). 
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When taking the context of disclosure into account, there is some 
evidence in favor of agents that behave rationally when facing simple 
privacy issues.299 Data subjects’ privacy concerns seem to be sensitive not 
only to direct harms—defined as an immediate perceived harm provoked 
by an information release such as fear of fraud or spam—but also to the 
indirect consequences of the transmission of information—such as fear of 
ending up being the object of price discrimination. Data subjects seem 
mainly concerned about the use that is given to their information—even 
more than about its transfer.300 An increment in control over the 
publication of data subjects’ personal data decreases their concerns over 
their privacy and hence increases their willingness to disclose sensitive 
information.301  
Data subject’s ability to act in their own self-interest when dealing 
with privacy issues changes when these issues become complex—there 
does not seem to be a generalized inability to deal with them.302  
Other studies have shown that when information about security is 
made visible, for instance available on browsers themselves, data subjects 
respond to it.303 One of them shows that, when information about privacy is 
available directly on search engines, data subjects do prefer websites that 
offer a higher protection for their privacy, in particular regarding 
purchases that involve the disclosure of sensitive information.304 Another, 
                                                
299 See Ibid. 
300 See Ibid. 
301 See Leslie John, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein, “Strangers on a 
Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information,” Journal 
of Consumer Research 37, no. 5 (2011): 858. 
302 See Ibid. 
303 See Julia Gideon et al., “Power Strips, Prophylactics , and Privacy, Oh My!,” in 
Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (New York, 
2006), 133; Janice Tsai et al., “The Effect of Online Privacy Information on 
Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study,” Information Systems Research 22, 
no. 2 (2011): 254; Nicola Jentzsch, Sören Preibusch, and Andreas Harasser, “Study 
on Monetising Privacy: An Economic Model for Pricing Personal Information. 
Report for the European Network and Information Security Agency” (Heraklion, 
2012). 
304 See Julia Gideon et al., “Power Strips, Prophylactics , and Privacy, Oh My!,” in 
Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (New York, 
2006), 133. 
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explores whether a different display of privacy policies induces data 
subjects to incorporate better privacy considerations. It shows that when 
information is available and salient, data subjects prefer to purchase from 
retailers that protect their privacy better and are even willing to pay a 
premium to do so.305  
Conversely, it has been shown that when information about privacy 
is not salient, data subjects display a low willingness to pay for their 
personal information. Participants were shown two otherwise identical 
stores that differed only in the requested information; one store asked for 
sensitive information and the other for non-sensitive information. When 
prices between the stores differed, subjects chose to buy from the cheapest 
store—even if it required more disclosure—and when the prices of the 
stores were equal, they were indifferent between the stores.306 
Finally, while the level of comprehension of privacy policies is very 
low, and while an accessible link to the privacy policy in websites does not 
significantly affect levels of disclosure, other more “visceral” notices—such 
as anthropomorphic elements, self-focused attention mechanisms and a 
high level of formality in web design—do achieve higher levels of 
comprehension on data subjects and have an effect on their levels of 
disclosure.307  
                                                
305 See Janice Tsai et al., “The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing 
Behavior: An Experimental Study,” Information Systems Research 22, no. 2 
(2011): 254. 
306 See Alastair Beresford, Dorothea Kübler, and Sören Preibusch, “Unwillingness 
to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment,” Economics Letters 117, no. 1 (2012): 25. 
For an extension of this experiment to an unraveling market, and showing that to 
some extent data subjects react to privacy costs, see Volker Benndorf, Dorothea 
Kuebler, and Hans-Theo Normann, “Privacy Concerns, Voluntary Disclosure of 
Information, and Unraveling: An Experiment,” Forthcoming in European 
Economic Review, 2015.  
307 See Victoria Groom and Ryan Calo, “Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An 
Experimental Study,” in Proceedings of the 39th Telecommunications Policy 
Research Conference (Schertz, 2011). 
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3.3.  Competing Explanations 
3.3.1. Hyperbolic discounting 
In a first approximation to explain the privacy paradox, an explanation 
that has been offered for it pictures data subjects within a model of self-
control problems with agents who hyperbolically discount.308 
A two-fold explanation has been offered for this. First, if data 
subjects declare that they value their privacy highly, but then they act 
disregarding it by offering it for low compensations, this behavior can be 
interpreted as setting a certain plan of action or consumption pattern (they 
possess a good which they value highly so they should only sell it for a high 
price) and then deviating from it (they offer the good for a low 
compensation). Second, this behavior is consistent with the literature that 
suggests that people in many situations discount the distant future at 
lower rates than the near future.309  
It has been argued that based on the available data from 
experimental findings it is unrealistic to expect rationality from data 
subjects. Behavioral economics has shown individuals display in many 
occasions hyperbolic discounting, under insurance, self-control problems, 
and immediate gratification, all of which alter people’s ability to make 
decisions. From this perspective, it was argued that the privacy paradox is 
an example of these biases driving behavior.310  
                                                
308 Hyperbolic discounting is an increasing rate of time preference over time so 
that the distant future is more heavily discounted than the near future. 
309 See Richard Thaler, “Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency,” 
Economics Letters 8 (1981): 201. 
310 See Alessandro Acquisti, “Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics 
of Immediate Gratification,” in Proceedings of the Fifth Association for Computing 
Machinery Conference on Electronic Commerce, ed. Jack Breese, Joan 
Feigenbaum, and Margo Seltzer (New York: Association for Computing Machinery 
Press, 2004), 21; Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, “Privacy Attitudes and 
Privacy Behavior,” in The Economics of Information Security, ed. Jean Camp and 
Stephen Lewis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004); Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and 
George Loewenstein, “What Is Privacy Worth?,” Journal of Legal Studies 42, no. 2 
(2013): 249. 
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Based on this line of reasoning, models of self-control problems 
have been offered as an explanation for the experimental data. Data 
subjects’ behavior has been then explained based on a model of immediate 
gratification where agents hyperbolically discount when facing decisions 
involving different delays,311 as a response to the consideration that it is 
unrealistic to assume knowable probabilities or complete beliefs.312  
It has also been mentioned that data subjects face uncertainty 
about the possible outcomes, the magnitude of their consequences, the 
possible measures to protect themselves, the actions taken by those who 
desire their information, and the existence of some unforeseeable events, 
between others.313 Exploring further the role of uncertainty could thus 
shed light in data subjects’ behavior. 
 In economics there are two possible reasons to discount payoffs—
costs of waiting and hazard rates—which produce two different reasons for 
choice reversal. The first, hyperbolic discounting, relies on assumptions on 
the agents, while the second, a decreasing or uncertain hazard rate, relies 
on assumptions on the context. 
The second stage of the explanation given to data subjects’ behavior 
can be reevaluated. To do this the literature that reconciles non-constant 
discounting with dynamic consistency can be used to offer a feasible 
explanation to the observed consumer behavior within rational-choice 
theory. 
                                                
311 See Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, “Choice and Procrastination,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 1 (2001): 121. 
312 See Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, “What Can Behavioral 
Economics Teach Us About Privacy?,” in Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies 
and Practices, ed. Alessandro Acquisti et al. (Boca Raton: Auerbach Publications, 
2007), 363; Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in 
Individual Decision Making,” Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Security and Privacy Magazine 3, no. 1 (2005): 26. 
313 See Ibid.; Yoan Hermstruwer and Stephan Dickert, “Tearing the Veil of Privacy 
Law: An Experiment on Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten,” Preprints 
of the Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods (Bonn, 2013); Alessandro 
Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte, and George Loewenstein, “Privacy and Human 
Behavior in the Age of Information,” Science 347, no. 6221 (2015): 509. 
 
 
96 
3.3.2. Discounting based on a declining hazard rate 
Time discounting means that people care less about future consequences 
than about present consequences, for any possible reason. A relevant 
reason to discount is that waiting is costly. Another relevant reason is 
that, over time, payoffs have the risk of depreciating or disappearing; 
payoffs have a certain hazard rate.  
Imagine an agent who has two choices. The first one is a choice 
between a certain payoff V (100 Euros) at time T (now) or a bigger payoff 
V’ (150 Euros) at further time T’ (a year from now). The second one is 
between the same payoffs (V and V’) at times    (3 months from now) 
and   (a year and 3 months from now).314 
If the hazard rate that payoffs have is independent of time (in the 
example, there is a constant chance of the promisor of the 150 euros going 
bankrupt), then the discount rate of a rational agent should be constant. If 
the agent has a choice between a payoff V at time T or a bigger payoff V’ at 
further time T’ with a constant hazard rate , then the expected payoff 
he compares with V should be .315 The same applies to the second 
choice. 
On the other hand, if the hazard rate () is not independent but 
dependent on time (T), such that    in a way that  decreases in T 
(  , then closer payoffs would be discounted at a higher rate than 
distant payoffs (each month there is a lower chance of the promisor going 
bankrupt, because he handles his business better).316 This increases the 
discount rate as hyperbolic discounting.317 
This equivalence between the hyperbolic discounting function and 
the discount function based on a hazard rate, it should be noted, does not 
                                                
314 See Peter Sozou, “On Hyperbolic Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences 265, no. 1409 (1998): 2015. 
315 See Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin, “Uncertainty and Hyperbolic 
Discounting,” The American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 1290. 
316 See Ibid. 
317 See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue, “Time 
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic 
Literature 40, no. 2 (2002): 351. 
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happen with any kind of risk, but only in those cases in which the hazard 
rate decreases over time. Due to the declining hazard rate the agent is 
more afraid of the payoff disappearing in the first period, and therefore 
discounts the first choice and the second choice in a different way. This 
could happen, for instance, with college students, who have a decreasing 
hazard rate of dropping out, and start-up firms, which have a decreasing 
hazard rate of going bankrupt, or the unfortunate promisor of the example. 
Using a different example, the following table illustrates this 
procedure. 
 
Delay Probability 
of survival 
 
Hazard 
rate 
Expected 
value of cake 
  
Expected 
value of wine 
  
No delay 1 0% 2 3 
1 month 
 
50% 1 
 
2 months 
 
27% 
 
1 
3 months 
 
8% 
 

 
Intrinsic value of cake    
Intrinsic value of wine    
 
Table 1. Illustrates choice reversal over a hypothetical choice between 
cake and wine. A cake now is preferred over wine in one month, but 
wine in 3 months is preferred over cake in 2 months. Based on the 
table in Sozou (1998). The hazard rate is added for clarity using the 
probabilities available in the original table. 
 
In the table, the agent has the choice between cake and wine in 
different time periods. If he has to choose between cake and wine now, he 
prefers wine (  ). If he has to choose between cake now and wine in a 
month, he would rather take the cake (  ), since the promise of wine has 
a probability of 50% to materialize itself in a month (   

). However, 
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even when fully rational and absent of behavioral biases, if he has to 
choose between cake in two months and wine in three months, he would 
rather choose wine ( 

). His choice between the options shifts because 
the hazard rate of cake and wine (their marginal probability of 
disappearing) is decreasing over time. This example illustrates how a 
rational agent would reverse his choices when placed in a particular 
context.  
3.3.3. Discounting based on an unknown hazard rate 
If one assumes that the hazard rate is not declining but it is unknown to 
the agent, then a rational agent will approach the new situation in a 
similar way. The first choice he has is only relevant in a conditional way to 
the payoffs surviving after the first period of time T (in the example, now), 
while his second choice is only relevant conditional to the payoffs surviving 
after the first period of time    (in the example, 3 months).  
Since the agent faces uncertainty over the hazard rate in each 
scenario, he will again be afraid of the payoff disappearing in the first 
period and will use a discount rate that is lower for the second case. So the 
(rational) agent will behave less patiently in the first choice, even without 
a declining hazard rate.318 319 In the example, if he cannot get the prize 
that was promised to him at time T  (now) anyhow, and he must face the 
unknown risk (he does not know how well the promisor handles his own 
business), he would rather wait longer (  , 3 months) and get a larger 
reward.  
                                                
318 See Peter Sozou, “On Hyperbolic Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences 265, no. 1409 (1998): 2015; 
Yoram Halevy, “Strotz Meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty 
Effect,” The American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (2008): 1145; Omar Azfar, 
“Rationalizing Hyperbolic Discounting,” Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 38 (1999): 245. 
319 There are also accounts for the change in discounting based on the effect of 
intervals. See Daniel Read, “Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?,” 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 23, no. 1 (2001): 5; Daniel Read and Peter 
Roelofsma, “Subadditive versus Hyperbolic Discounting: A Comparison of Choice 
and Matching,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 91, no. 2 
(2003): 140. 
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Rational agents with no strict time preferences that include in their 
analysis unknown risks such as their own mortality have been shown to 
display diminishing impatience while maintaining time-consistent 
choices,320 even when the unknown hazard rate is increasing.321 Non-
expected utility models can be the result of rational behavior when faced 
with uncertainty in the future, which means that preference reversals do 
not imply impatience when risk is present.322 
This idea has been supported by experimental evidence, where it 
was found that when uncertainty for the present increased from 0 to 0.5, 
subjects choosing immediate rewards in standard choice reversal problems 
decreased from 82% to 39% (present bias is reduced when the present is 
also risky).323 A procedure to test for hyperbolic discounting while 
controlling for uncertainty has also been presented.324325 Other studies 
                                                
320 See Peter Sozou, “On Hyperbolic Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences 265, no. 1409 (1998): 2015; 
Omar Azfar, “Rationalizing Hyperbolic Discounting,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 38 (1999): 245. 
321 See Yoram Halevy, “Diminishing Impatience: Disentangling Time Preference 
from Uncertain Lifetime,” University of British Columbia Department of 
Economics Working Paper 05-17 (Vancouver, 2005). 
322 See Yoram Halevy, “Strotz Meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the 
Certainty Effect,” The American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (2008): 1145. 
323 See Gideon Keren and Peter Roelofsma, “Immediacy and Certainty in 
Intertemporal Choice,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 
63, no. 3 (1995): 287; Bethany Weber and Gretchen Chapman, “The Combined 
Effects of Risk and Time on Choice: Does Uncertainty Eliminate the Immediacy 
Effect? Does Delay Eliminate the Certainty Effect?,” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 96, no. 2 (2005): 104. 
324 See Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and Arijit Mukherji, “Can We Really Observe 
Hyperbolic Discounting?,” Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 
02-08 (Philadelphia, 2006); Gregory Besharov and Bentley Coffey, “Reconsidering 
the Experimental Evidence for Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting,” Duke Department 
of Economics Working Paper 03-03 (Durham, 2003). 
325 Agents in an experiment have consumption choices involving immediate and 
delayed consumption, and receive shocks in their preferences before each choice. 
Agents receiving different shocks initially make different decisions regarding 
those choices, while as the time horizon is moved forward shocks become 
irrelevant. The demand for pre-commitment devices during the whole experiment 
is very low. 
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indicate that this is also the case for uncertain delays.326 This implies 
incurring in fewer assumptions than an uncertain hazard rate since in 
such case the prize (or penalty) is certain but only its moment of execution 
is uncertain. 
This is how a rational agent facing two equivalent choices with 
different delays—even without a declining hazard rate—might have delay-
dependent discounting and exhibit choice reversal when the hazard rate is 
uncertain.327  
A way of discriminating between preference-based (dynamically 
inconsistent) diminishing impatience and uncertainty-based (dynamically 
consistent) diminishing impatience is checking for preferences towards 
pre-commitment or flexibility.328 While sophisticated agents who discount 
due to self-control problems should be willing to pay to pre-commit—since 
that would maximize their long-term utility—sophisticated agents 
discounting due to uncertainty should be willing to pay for flexibility—
since their utility is increased by the ability to adjust to new 
information.329   
Agents facing a temptation problem who are aware of that problem 
would be willing to pay for a mechanism to bind oneself in order to avoid 
changing a certain decision in the future, and hence resist temptation. 
Some common examples of this mechanism are not having alcohol or 
unhealthy food at home, or taking a limited amount of money—and no 
credit cards—to the casino.  Agents facing an uncertainty problem and who 
                                                
326 See Joseph McGuire and Joseph Kable, “Decision Makers Calibrate Behavioral 
Persistence on the Basis of Time-Interval Experience.,” Cognition 124, no. 2 
(2012): 216; Joseph McGuire and Joseph Kable, “Rational Temporal Predictions 
Can Underlie Apparent Failures to Delay Gratification.,” Psychological Review 
120, no. 2 (2013): 395. 
327 A mathematical explanation of this can be found in the appendix to this 
chapter, showing how the uncertainty-based discount function can take the same 
shape as a hyperbolic discount function. 
328 See Marco Casari, “Pre-Commitment and Flexibility in a Time Decision 
Experiment,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 38, no. 2 (2009): 117. 
329 Sophisticated agents are defined as those who are aware of the reason for the 
diminishing impatience, while naïve agents are defined as those who are not. 
Naïve agents, of course, are not willing to pay for either pre-commitment or for 
flexibility. 
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are aware of it, on the other hand, would be willing to pay to be able to 
adapt to the context once expectations becomes certain. Naive agents, of 
course, will be willing to pay for neither. 
The next section evaluates the feasibility of applying these theories 
to data subjects. Section 4.4.1 evaluates whether data subjects’ behavior 
resembles the behavior of other agents who face temptation, and section 
4.4.2 evaluates whether their context resembles a context of a decreasing 
or uncertain hazard rate. 
3.4.  Contrasting Data Subject Behavior with 
Discounting Models 
3.4.1. Explaining consumer claims 
One of the key features of self-control problems is that people recognize a 
certain behavior in themselves that is not consistent with a certain aim 
they have. They display a certain willingness to stop that behavior and—if 
sophisticated—they also recognize that they will probably continue to 
exhibit it. Pre-committing is then an optimal strategy.330  
A model of data subjects who hyperbolically discount should lead 
one to conclude that an optimal strategy for data subjects is pre-
commitment. Policy recommendations would then approach the privacy 
paradox from a paternalistic or libertarian-paternalistic standpoint.331 The 
aim of a regulation that takes this interpretation of user behavior into 
account would be the provision of tools to pre-commit not to disclose 
personal information. Alternatively, a regulation aiming to do this can 
create a system of reward substitution—paying to avoid disclosure, 
charging to disclose, creating guilt, imposing additional obstacles, etc.  
                                                
330 See Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, “Choice and Procrastination,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 1 (2001): 121. 
331 See Alessandro Acquisti, “Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral Economics of 
Personal Information,” Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Security 
and Privacy Magazine 7, no. 6 (2009): 82. 
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On the other hand, a model of uncertainty-based discounting data 
subjects such as the one suggested here would reverse this idea and lead to 
the conclusion that policy should provide data subjects with flexibility 
regarding their choices.  
In order to distinguish between the two discounting mechanisms, as 
it was mentioned, it is relevant to ask: are data subjects and consumer 
associations demanding the introduction of pre-commitment mechanisms 
regarding their privacy, or are they asking for something else? In this 
context, regret does not seem to be a central driver of consumer claims. 
Even taking into account availability bias, most data subjects would say 
that they experience regret only on a small proportion of their information 
sharing. At the same time, at least anecdotal evidence shows surprise in 
data subjects when they discover how much others can know about their 
personal information based on what they disclose. Social network users do 
not typically promise themselves to close their profiles and fail to do so—as 
many dieters, smokers and people who want to do more exercise do—but 
they are sometimes shocked on how targeted advertisements display the 
topics they were recently concerned about.  
The demands made by consumer associations typically focus on a 
lack of transparency in personal information processing. The European 
Data subjects Organization, for instance, has said through one of its 
members that “data subjects are sleep-walking in a world without privacy. 
They do not realize their data are being collected and processed.”332 
Similarly, the popular objection against targeted advertising is a visceral 
reaction that qualifies it as “creepy” or “spooky.”333 Why would an 
increment in the relevance of advertising content with regards to data 
subjects’ interests be qualified in such a way? It fits this characterization 
                                                
332 Matt Warman, “EU Fights ‘Fierce Lobbying’ to Devise Data Privacy Law,” The 
Telegraph, February 9, 2012. 
333 See Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove, “PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, The,” NYU Law Review 86 (2011): 
1814; Blase Ur et al., “Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: Perceptions of Online 
Behavioral Advertising Perceptions of Online Behavioral Advertising,” in 
Proceedings of the Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (New York: 
Association for Computing Machinery Press, 2012). 
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to state that the reason is that those data subjects are not aware which 
companies have information about their interests until they find the 
advertisements and are surprised.  
A simple but illustrative example can be obtained by imputing into 
Google Trends (which illustrates interest over time of chosen key words as 
expressed in Google searches) the key words “delete data” against “stop 
sharing data”—or similar alternatives. The numbers obtained, which in 
the case of those key words are 99% for “delete data” and 0% for “stop 
sharing data” for September 2013,334 seem to indicate that data subjects—
or at least data subjects searching on Google—are substantially more 
concerned, and are getting increasingly concerned, about how to delete 
their data (flexibility) as opposed to how to stop sharing it (pre-
commitment).335 
The experimental data reviewed in the first section also coincides 
with this. As it was seen, data subjects’ reaction to privacy decisions 
change depending on the complexity of the decisions336 and when 
information about privacy becomes more visible data subjects do respond 
to it by choosing higher privacy protections.337 This behavior is less 
consistent with a model of irrational data subjects that display self-control 
problems than with a model of data subjects facing an uncertain decision-
                                                
334 The company does not disclose the absolute search volumes, so numbers are 
relative, being 100% the maximum number of searches for any of the keywords in 
the chosen period. 
335 For an analysis of this since 2004 until now see 
http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=delete%20data%2C%20%20stop%20shari
ng%20data%2C%20%20avoid%20uploading%20data&cmpt=q (Last time accessed 
25/11/2013). 
336 See Luc Wathieu and Allan Friedman, “An Empirical Approach to 
Understanding Privacy Valuation,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 07-
75 (Boston, 2007); Leslie John, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein, 
“Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive 
Information,” Journal of Consumer Research 37, no. 5 (2011): 858. 
337 See Julia Gideon et al., “Power Strips, Prophylactics , and Privacy, Oh My!,” in 
Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (New York, 
2006), 133; Janice Tsai et al., “The Effect of Online Privacy Information on 
Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study,” Information Systems Research 22, 
no. 2 (2011): 254. 
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making scenario, since irrationality would prevent data subjects from 
responding to these stimuli. 
At a more general level, the fact that data subjects systematically 
display different valuations for different types of information about them338 
and that they react rationally to changes in context and accessibility339 
indicates that they have a rational approach towards their personal 
information. An agent who faces temptation and discounts hyperbolically 
should discount independently of context, while the available experimental 
evidence has shown that data subjects respond to context when such 
context is visible. 
3.4.2. Privacy breaches as a hazard rate 
The case of internet privacy presents two differences with the traditional 
experiments on hyperbolic discounting. First, while in the latter agents 
have a choice between a monetary payoff in the present time and a larger 
monetary payoff in the future, in the case of internet privacy the tradeoff 
that agents have is between a certain penalty in the present time (not 
extracting the benefits of disclosing their information) and a larger penalty 
in the future in the form of a privacy breach.340  
This risk of privacy breach represents the disutility of any use that 
can be made with the traded information that is unpleasant to the data 
subject, and hence he should take it into account as an expected cost when 
deciding whether to disclose. Therefore, it can take many forms, the most 
common ones ranging from mostly harmless annoyances such as receiving 
spam email, to more serious consequences such as public disclosure of 
                                                
338 See section 3.2.2. 
339 See section 3.2.3.  
340 There is also the element that data subjects face eventual losses instead of 
gains as it is the case in most of the hyperbolic discounting literature. This is 
illustrated in O’Donoghue and Rabin: while gains are preferred now better than 
later, losses are preferred later better than now. See Ted O’Donoghue and 
Matthew Rabin, “Doing It Now or Later,” The American Economic Review 89, no. 
1 (1999): 103. This is notwithstanding the fact that people seem to discount losses 
with a lower discount rate that the one they use to discount gains. See Richard 
Thaler, “Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency,” Economics Letters 
8 (1981): 201. 
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embarrassing information, the acquisition of information by medical 
insurers or future employers that would financially damage the person, 
identity fraud or identity theft.  
The second difference with decision of whether to disclose personal 
information online is the existence of uncertainty over the outcome. In this 
case, the privacy breach, which materializes the hazard rate, has an 
unknown probability of occurrence at each stage. 
In experiments where agents have a choice between different 
monetary payoffs at different times, they are aware of the size of the 
payoffs and the probability of the larger payoff occurring. Similarly, when 
people face daily-life situations in which they hyperbolically discount they 
are aware of this as well. In the classic example where someone faces the 
choice of whether to eat cake or fruit salad, he already knows the extent to 
which cake might damage his health. If he chooses it still, one can argue 
he was discounting hyperbolically because he knew about the expected 
payoff beforehand—if he had not known the adverse health effects of cake 
then the decision would not have been based on hyperbolic discounting but 
on blissful ignorance.  
On the other hand, when people decide whether to disclose their 
personal information, they ignore the probabilities of the bigger penalty 
(privacy breach) occurring in each period—this is, they ignore the hazard 
rate. This takes place not only due to the changing environment in which it 
takes place, given the changes in technology over time, but also due to the 
externalities present in data trading. 
Every time a company trades a data subject’s personal information 
with another, the data subject faces an increment in the risk of a privacy 
breach. This ranges from legitimate transfers of information, which can be 
traded to other companies with a different business model, to illegitimate 
transfers, such as hacking. A large amount of data-dredging practices, for 
instance, take place through virus attacks. As the number of databases 
that possess a certain piece of information increases, the more likely such 
piece of information is to be subject of a virus attack, keeping other 
conditions stable.  
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When companies trade this information, the data subject has his 
personal data out of his range of control—as his consent is not needed any 
more to trade it—while its use still has the potential of impacting his 
welfare negatively. In other words, there are externalities in data 
trading.341 Securing such trade is the main role of companies who buy and 
sell aggregated data subjects’ personal information acting as 
intermediaries between data collectors and advertisers.342 While these 
exchanges are only agreed by data collectors and the intermediaries, or by 
the intermediaries and the advertising companies, data subjects also face 
expected costs from each of trade. These externalities imply an incentive 
for companies to overuse information, since they do not face all costs, 
which is aggravated by the fact that data subjects will often not learn 
about the over-disclosure and hence have no opportunity to discipline such 
companies.343 
Hence, even if at the moment of making the decision of whether to 
disclose the data subject had full information about expected costs and 
benefits, he would make such decision based on an uncertain hazard rate 
because the risk of a privacy breach is not dependent on his behavior alone 
but also on the subsequent behavior of the companies that acquire his 
data. This fact leads both to difficulties in making a welfare-maximizing 
decision and, as the previous section showed, to a discount function that 
should resemble hyperbolic discounting.344 
                                                
341 See Kenneth Laudon, “Markets and Privacy,” Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery 39, no. 9 (1996): 92; Hal Varian, “Economic 
Aspects of Personal Privacy,” in Cyber Policy and Economics in an Internet Age. 
Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series., ed. William Lehr and Lorenzo 
Pupillo (Norwell: Springer, 2002), 127. 
342 See John Hagel and Jeffrey Rayport, “The Coming Battle for Consumer 
Information,” Harvard Business Review 75, no. 1 (1997): 53. 
343 See Peter Swire and Robert Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, 
Electronic Commerce and the European Privacy Directive (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1998). 8. 
344 An example of these expected costs materializing that has turned famous due 
to its magnitude is the Sony scandal of 2011. In that year, data from 100 million 
users were stolen from the Sony Online Entertainment databases, including 
name, address, birth date, and in many cases debit and credit card information, 
which was user later on for different types of fraud. See Sony Online 
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Moreover, if behavioral research is to be taken into consideration, 
then the uncertainty over the hazard rate in the case at hand is not only 
determined by the externalities which are unknown to the data subject. 
There are arguments to believe that, in addition to this objective 
uncertainty, data subjects face subjective uncertainty, which could be 
produced by limitations in their computational capacities or by high 
information costs that are rationally not incurred. 
Data subjects many times do not comprehend privacy policies and 
license agreements345 and the available privacy protection tools.346 
Protecting privacy on internet properly requires technical skills that very 
few data subjects possess.347 Some data subjects ignore the simplest 
behaviors to engage to protect their privacy, namely to avoid opening 
unwanted email (spam), sharing files, downloading from non-secure sites 
and clicking on pop-up advertisements. More than half of all Americans 
believe that the mere existence of a privacy policy means that companies 
cannot trade their data.348 Several data subjects disclose their birth date 
in social networks under privacy configurations that make them visible to 
any other internet user, despite the fact that the increases the probability 
of making them victims of identity fraud349 and identity theft.350 
                                                                                                                            
Entretainment Press Release, “Sony Online Entretainment Announces Theft of 
Data from Its Systems,” 2011. Many of those data subjects did not use the device 
that uploads information to that database, but their information was in the 
database nonetheless because it had been replicated or moved. That replication, or 
that movement, had imposed on them an expected cost in the form of an 
externality of which they were not aware. 
345 See George Milne and Mary Culnan, “Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy 
Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices,” Journal of 
Interactive Marketing 18, no. 3 (2004): 15. 
346 See Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in 
Individual Decision Making,” Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Security and Privacy Magazine 3, no. 1 (2005): 26. 
347 See Joseph Turow, “Americans and Online Privacy: The System Is Broken,” 
The University of Pennsylvania Annenberg Public Policy Center Report 
(Philadelphia, 2003). 
348 See Joseph Turow et al., “Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three 
Activities That Enable It,” The University of Pennsylvania Annenberg Public 
Policy Center Report (Philadelphia, 2009). 
349 In the Netherlands, for example, around 5% of the population was a victim of 
identity fraud in 2012 alone either by phishing or pharming—which are different 
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Since in cases of online disclosure of personal information the 
outcomes of the choice—a large negative payoff—do not occur with 
certainty, a study where a discount rate or discount factor is inferred only 
from observed consumption will include in the same category both the 
discounter for the delay of the penalty and the discounter for its hazard 
rate. Any perceived risk will therefore alter the observed discounting for 
delay.351  
This suggests that models that incorporate uncertainty-based 
discounting might explain better the privacy paradox. 
3.5.  Normative Implications 
3.5.1. The right to be forgotten 
If one takes the argument that the uncertainty that data subjects face is a 
relevant problem in their interaction with service-providing companies, 
then one encounters the question on how to design regulations that can 
help data subjects to reduce it.  
As with consumer claims, some of the main contemporary debates 
over the regulation of privacy seem to go in the direction of providing data 
subjects with additional flexibility regarding their choices of whether to 
disclose. A relevant example of this is the right to be forgotten, the most 
debated feature of the GDRP, and one of its main pillars.352  
                                                                                                                            
methods to use an internet site to obtain personal information. See Ministry of 
Security and Justice and the Central Bureau of Statistics, “Safety Monitor 2012,” 
2013. 
350 Comparing survey data with data from the FTC, studies seem to indicate that 
73% of people underestimate the actual chances of identity theft. See Alessandro 
Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, “Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision 
Making,” Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Security and Privacy 
Magazine 3, no. 1 (2005): 26. 
351 See Peter Sozou, “On Hyperbolic Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences 265, no. 1409 (1998): 2015; 
Yoram Halevy, “Strotz Meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty 
Effect,” The American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (2008): 1145. 
352 See Pere Simon Castellano, “The Right to Be Forgotten under European Law: A 
Constitutional Debate,” Lex Electronica 16, no. 1 (2012): 1. See also article 17 of 
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  As it will be seen with more detail in the following chapter, what 
the right to be forgotten attempts to provide data subjects with is a right to 
request entities that collect or process data to erase from their database 
any piece of information regarding that data subject, regardless of the 
source. 
From the perspective of theory that has been evaluated above353 one 
can see that the right to be forgotten could be valuable to data subjects 
from a welfare perspective inasmuch as it provides them with additional 
flexibility when making decisions of whether to share personal 
information. Data subjects would be able to publish a certain piece of 
information and later on reverse their decision by requesting its deletion. 
This possibility, as it was mentioned, would be helpful for them if dealing 
with an uncertain hazard rate in personal information sharing. 354 
This is linked to some of the main arguments in favor of the right. 
Namely, the argument that individuals should be able to act and speak 
freely without the fear that this will lead to dire consequences in the 
future as the freedom to change is an element of self-development.355 
Similarly, A29WP has expressed that control over one’s personal 
information is a central aspect of informational privacy, where control is 
commonly instrumented by consent.356 
                                                                                                                            
the GDRP. The right to be forgotten with be further analyzed in chapter 4, and 
particularly in the context of the GDRP, in section 4.2. 
353 See sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.2. 
354 In the Frequently Asked Questions of the proposed regulation, for instance, it is 
stated that “a reinforced ‘right to be forgotten’ will help people better manage data 
protection risks online” European Commission, “Data Protection Reform: 
Frequently Asked Questions,” MEMO/12/41, 2012. 
355 See Jean-François Blanchette and Deborah Johnson, “Data Retention and the 
Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness,” The Information Society 
18, no. 1 (2002): 33; Chris Conley, “The Right to Delete,” in Intelligent Information 
Privacy Management (Palo Alto: Association for the Advancement of Artificial 
Intelligence, 2010); Franz Werro, “The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be 
Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash,” in Haftungsbereich Im Dritten Millennium 
(Liability in the Third Millennium), ed. Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. (Baden: 
Nomos, 2009), 285. 
356 See A29WP, “O.J. 15/2011 On the Definition of Consent” (Brussels, July 13, 
2011). 
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This feature, in addition, appears to be a central aim of the 
regulation. In the Frequently Asked Questions, for instance, it is stated 
that “a reinforced ‘right to be forgotten’ will help people better manage 
data protection risks online.”357 
The right to be forgotten has been, at the same time, criticized from 
different angles, mainly due to the limits it imposes for freedom of 
expression.358 The right, indeed, might be socially costly, and it could be 
difficult to defend in efficiency terms. What this perspective indicates is 
that the right has some value also beyond a deontological perspective, and 
that inasmuch as it increases flexibility it is not unreasonable to consider 
it in a more limited version in the public debate. 
3.5.2. Increasing transparency 
While it is hardly possible to completely eliminate uncertainty for data 
subjects, providing marginal increases in flexibility is possible from a 
regulatory standpoint at lower burdens for providing companies than those 
that the right to be forgotten would present.  
The experimental literature reviewed points to the relevance of 
context in the disclosure of information. Evaluating the contextual 
differences that helped at informing data subjects can, potentially, reduce 
the uncertainty over the hazard rate.  
A policy that might appear attractive at a first glance are publicly 
run privacy seals. Privacy seals are a type of trust seal issued by a certain 
entity to a website or a company to show that they comply with certain 
minimum requirements regarding data protection. In such way, they aim 
to operate as signaling devices to data subjects, for whom it would be costly 
to acquire the information by themselves. However, besides being costly to 
implement, it has been suggested that privacy seals are largely 
                                                
357 European Commission, “Data Protection Reform: Frequently Asked Questions,” 
MEMO/12/41, 2012. 
358 See Jeffrey Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten,” Stanford Law Review Online 
64 (2012): 88. 
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ineffective.359 Most seals consist in an image that, with a certain level of 
technical ability, the owner of an unsafe website can copy and paste, 
reducing its signaling value. Additionally, once a seal is granted to a 
website, its level of security can change, and it is too expensive for the 
entity managing the seal to screen all websites with enough frequency to 
ensure that the seal reflects its current level of safety. Moreover, there are 
already available privacy seals programs that have emerged in the private 
market, reducing the added value of publicly-run programs. 
A useful first step would be to require complete privacy policies. An 
example of this insufficiency is the frequent use of Flash cookies by many 
websites—with the ability to track despite having been deleted—even 
though few of them mention it in their privacy policies. Another is the even 
less transparent re-spawning of traditional cookies by data storage 
mechanisms that other websites use and not always mention to their 
users. 
A second step is working on the transparency of such documents.360 
The topic of the incorporation of privacy policies is inevitably connected to 
the limits in computational ability that data subjects have. Showing the 
actual document—as opposed to only a hyperlink to it—and allowing data 
subjects to accept it only after scrolling it to the bottom can marginally 
improve their incorporation, like it is done with regular contracts—one 
cannot sign a contract at the top as a manifestation of agreement, even if 
one does not read it when signing at the bottom. This consideration is in 
line with the experimental literature on the topic.361 Although the 
difference in the information absorbed by making data subjects screen a 
document is probably small, given that the cost of the change is negligible 
it is a useful requirement to consider. 
                                                
359 See Kai-Lung Hui, Hock Hai Teo, and Sang-Yong Lee, “The Value of Privacy 
Assurance: An Exploratory Field Experiment,” Management Information Systems 
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2007): 19. 
360 Transparency is, in fact, one of the central values of EU DPL. See Directive 
1995/46/EC. 
361 See Janice Tsai et al., “The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing 
Behavior: An Experimental Study,” Information Systems Research 22, no. 2 
(2011): 254. 
 
 
112 
Still, privacy policies in their current state are costly to read; it has 
been estimated that an average user would spend 201 hours per year 
reading all privacy policies.362 An improvement on this would be to provide 
a digested summary at the top of privacy policies stating its most relevant 
elements, which by reducing the cost of reading would increase the 
probability of being read by data subjects.363 While 70% of people consider 
privacy policies are difficult to understand,364 research indicates that when 
privacy is offered in a clear and understandable way people do value it.365 
The experimental literature on visceral notices also suggests this measure 
should have a relevant impact.366 These summaries can also be set to 
clarify a list of pre-defined facts that are considered relevant to increase 
transparency, such as whether the company is allowed to trade the user’s 
information with others, which uses it is authorized to give to the 
information that it receives, and whether the information is deleted after 
the user removes it from the system. At a more general level, privacy 
policies should be made more readable.367 
                                                
362 See Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, “The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies,” I/S: Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 4 (2008): 543. 
This would cost, according to the authors, $3,534 to the average American internet 
user each year. 
363 See Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz, “The No-Reading Problem in Consumer 
Contract Law,” Stanford Law Review 66 (2004): 545. The authors propose a 
similar system to be applied to standard-form contracts in consumer law in 
general. 
364 See Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman, and Kimberly Meltzer, “Open to 
Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline,” The University of 
Pennsylvania Annenberg Public Policy Center Report (Philadelphia, 2005). 
365 See Adam Shostack and Paul Syverson, “What Price Privacy? (and Why 
Identity Theft Is about Neither Identity nor Theft),” in Economics of Information 
Security, ed. Jean Camp and Stephen Lewis (Norwell: Kluwer, 2004), 129. 
366 See Victoria Groom and Ryan Calo, “Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An 
Experimental Study,” in Proceedings of the 39th Telecommunications Policy 
Research Conference (Schertz, 2011). 
367 See Patrick Kelley et al., “Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of 
the Nutrition Label Approach,” in Proceedings of the Association for Computing 
Machinery Special Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction Conference 
(New York: Association for Computing Machinery Press, 2010), 1573; Patrick 
Gage Kelley et al., “A ‘Nutrition Label’ for Privacy,” in Proceedings of the Fifth 
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (New York: Association for 
Computing Machinery Press, 2009), 4. 
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Articles 7(2) and 11 of the GDRP work in this direction. The first 
requires that if consent for processing data is requested in a declaration 
that also addresses other issues then the request must be made 
distinguishable. The second demands that data controllers have privacy 
policies that are transparent and easily accessible and that 
communications to data subjects regarding the processing of their personal 
data should be done in an intelligible way, with plain language that is 
adapted to the data subject. So do articles 14(1) and 14(2), regarding 
information and the access to data, and 19(2), which states that the right 
to object must be explicitly and intelligibly manifested to the data subject.  
Implementations of this idea have been designed in the form of 
Facebook nudges to raise awareness about privacy.368 These nudges 
introduce visual cues about the audience to which posts are visible, time 
delays for posts—as Gmail has as an optional feature—and feedback about 
potential negative perception of posts based on cue words. An 
implementation of this can require a disclaimer that warns data subjects 
when a certain information disclosure will be completely public, as some 
companies have already done, providing information in a way that is 
accessible for users. 
Regarding types of information, while it is not always easy to 
distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive information, online and 
offline information can be easily distinguished, and it seems that they 
should also be treated differently, since online information presents 
smaller expected externalities than offline information. It has been shown 
that data subjects value online and offline information very differently,369 
which reflects the fact that most disutility for data subjects stems from 
disclosure of offline information since all sensitive information is 
necessarily offline information. Simultaneously, most behavioral 
                                                
368 See Yang Wang et al., “Privacy Nudges for Social Media: An Exploratory 
Facebook Study,” in Proceedings of the Twenty Second International Conference 
on World Wide Web Companion, 2013, 763. 
369 See Juan Pablo Carrascal et al., “Your Browsing Behavior for a Big Mac: 
Economics of Personal Information Online,” in Proceedings of the 22nd 
International Conference on World Wide Web (Geneva, 2013). 
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advertising—and hence most profit—is taken from browsing patterns, 
which is online information. 
Finally, it is possible to introduce an incentive system in order to 
nudge companies into nudging data subjects, which can be implemented in 
a similar way to how governments nudge companies into other behaviors 
such as taking care of the environment. Focusing on compensation instead 
of punishment—for instance, via partial tax exemptions—has been 
successful in the past. This focus can be implemented to this issue with 
means such as the creation of social prestige: for example, a prize to the 
companies that take care of their data subjects the best. Guidelines that 
reward companies who follow them are easier to design and to monitor 
than the creation of a strict regulation that imposes fines to companies 
who do not follow it, and they can fit with what we know about the way in 
which data subjects behave. 
3.6.  Keeping the Money Where the Mouth Is 
The chapter explained the privacy paradox and provided an economic 
explanation for it not considered in the privacy literature so far. This 
explanation bases itself on the fact that internet consumers (data subjects) 
seem not to have different preferences from standard consumers, but a 
different scenario. 
The inference of self-control problems from observed choice 
reversals depends crucially on the absence of uncertainty.370 As it was 
argued, data subjects who have a choice of whether to disclose personal 
information encounter a high level of uncertainty regarding the likelihood 
of eventual future penalties. Hence, an uncertainty-based choice reversal 
model with stable preferences can explain their behavior.  
 In turn, policy recommendations that equate non-constant 
discounting and dynamic inconsistency can produce welfare-decreasing 
                                                
370 See Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and Arijit Mukherji, “Can We Really Observe 
Hyperbolic Discounting?,” Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 
02-08 (Philadelphia, 2006). 
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outcomes if agents were in fact dynamically consistent.371 The elimination 
of future choices or pre-commitment, although optimal for hyperbolically 
discounting agents, is rarely optimal when more information is expected to 
arrive in the future.372 This arrival of future information is likely to be the 
case in contexts where costs depend on future behavior of other agents and 
where benefits largely depend on network externalities. Data subjects, 
when encountered with a non-exceptional change of context, many times 
simply change their minds.  
This framework reverts the policy recommendations in favor of pre-
commitment devices for data subjects that stem from the privacy paradox 
literature. The policy conclusions of an uncertainty-based model fit 
consumer claims and policy debates better than those of the hyperbolic 
discounting model. Pre-commitment is neither what data subjects and 
consumer associations demand nor what policymakers consider 
implementing as additional regulation for new technologies. Increasing 
flexibility with devices such as the right to be forgotten, and reducing of 
uncertainty with devices such as the requirement for informed consent, on 
the other hand, seem to match the demands that are currently present in 
the public debate. 
3.7.  Appendix A to chapter 3 
Formal explanation of discounting based on uncertainty 
The seminal model can be used to formally show the discounting 
mechanism explained in the chapter.373  
The expected utility model where the discounting is based on this 
risk of disappearance of the payoff—as opposed to the cost of waiting—can 
be illustrated as 
                                                
371 See Omar Azfar, “Rationalizing Hyperbolic Discounting,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 38 (1999): 245. 
372 See Manuel Amador, Ivan Werning, and George-Marios Angeletos, 
“Commitment vs. Flexibility,” Econometrica 74, no. 2 (2006): 365. 
373 See Peter Sozou, “On Hyperbolic Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences 265, no. 1409 (1998): 2015. 
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     (1) 
where u is the utility derived from the reward (or penalty),    is that 
utility after waiting time  and  is that utility at time 0, while s() is the 
survival function that translates in the probability of the payoff surviving 
after the delay . 
 The proposed discounting mechanism can be then represented as 
   

   
 
(2) 
where k is a constant whose value symbolizes discounting (the larger k the 
higher the discounting) and   . 
Hyperbolic discounting rates are identified with the form  as 
opposed to the form  of regular discount functions.
374 The survival 
function that corresponds to this (hyperbolic) time preference function is 
then 
   

   
 
(3) 
 Now, say that the hazard rate  is constant but unknown, and it 
is drawn from a known distribution . The hazard rate is different at 
each period, but each time it is drawn from the same distribution, so it is 
neither decreasing nor increasing over time. The survival function will be 
the aggregation of all those hazard rates at different moments, so one can 
draw the survival function by direct superposition. If  can take any value 
of a certain set N, and the probability of is , that of  is , and so 
forth until  and , then the probability of surviving until time  is 
         
 
(4) 
then by taking the Laplace transform of    the survival function for the 
reward after a certain delay  will be 
                                                
374 The first function converges into the second as t becomes larger. 
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       


 
 
(5) 
which defines the time-preference function precisely in the same way as 
hyperbolic discounting. If     where    and f is continuous at 0, 
then the value of the integral should decline hyperbolically as  
increases.375 
 Now, substituting (3) into (5) we have that    has to satisfy 
     

  


 
 
(6) 
which gives that 
   

 
 
 
(7) 
3.8.  Appendix B to chapter 3 
Experimental Design  
Based on the existing experimental literature on how to distinguish 
between dynamically consistent diminishing impatience and dynamically 
inconsistent diminishing impatience,376 an experimental design can be 
suggested to distinguish uncertainty-based discounting from temptation-
based discounting in data subjects. 
Subjects of the experiment face a series of decisions that aim to 
measure their preference either for pre-commitment or for flexibility. 
Instead of facing a choice between two alternative payments—as in 
traditional experiments for choice switch—each subject faces two decisions 
at different times: first, one at in the lab during the experimental session, 
                                                
375 Omar Azfar, “Rationalizing Hyperbolic Discounting,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 38 (1999): 245. 
376 See Marco Casari, “Pre-Commitment and Flexibility in a Time Decision 
Experiment,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 38, no. 2 (2009): 117. 
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and second, one over email later on. Since subject do not need to interact, 
this can be done in a field experiment. 
On the baseline treatment (treatment 1), each subject faces a series 
of choices between a smaller payment in the form of a discount in a 
shopping simulation accompanied by a privacy loss (SP),377 and a larger 
payment in the form of a lower discount with the avoidance of such privacy 
loss (LP).378 During the experimental session, subjects can either pre-
commit to LP or postpone the choice between SP and LP to the future, 
deciding upon the reception of an email that will be sent to them after one 
week, when the payment will take place. The date of realization of the 
payments remains the same regardless of the choice made during the 
experimental session. Two variants of this choice are then introduced 
under separate treatments.  
Treatment 2 makes pre-commitment costly. In order to do this, it 
incorporates a lower payment amount for the choice made during the 
session (with   ). Under this treatment, subjects choose between LP’ 
and having the later choice between LP and SP, so pre-commitment is not 
available for free but for a cost in order to measure whether subjects are 
willing to pay for pre-commitment (WTPC).  
Treatment 3 makes flexibility costly. In order to do this, instead of 
paying a cost to restrict the choice set, it makes subjects pay a cost to make 
it wider (with     ). Under this treatment, subjects choose 
between LP and having the later choice between LP’’ and SP, so flexibility 
is only available at a cost, measuring whether subjects are willing to pay 
for flexibility (WTPF).  
The difference between the number of subjects who are willing to 
decide now under treatment 2 compared to the number of subjects who are 
willing to do so on the baseline treatment shows how much subjects value 
pre-commitment in the choice. In turn, the difference between the number 
of subjects who are willing to decide later under treatment 3 compared to 
                                                
377 For example, a $10 discount card with the disclosure of the name and email of 
the person in a website. 
378 For example, a $7 discount card without the disclosure. 
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the number of subjects who are willing to do so on the baseline treatment 
shows how much subjects value flexibility in the choice 
Moreover, if the number of subjects who are willing to pay under 
treatment 2 is higher than the number of subjects who are willing to pay 
under treatment 3 (  ), then subjects have a preference for 
pre-commitment over flexibility. If the reverse is true (  ), 
then subjects have a preference for flexibility over pre-commitment. The 
first shows that they discount dominantly based on temptation, while the 
second shows that they discount dominantly based on uncertainty. 
The conjecture about the results of the experiment is illustrated in 
figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Illustrates expected results of the experiment proposed. 
Subjects who must pay for pre-commitment prefer to choose later with 
a significant deviation from the baseline. Subjects who must pay for 
flexibility prefer to choose now with a slight deviation from the 
baseline. 
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4.1.  The Right to be Forgotten as a Right to 
Erase 
The right to be forgotten was popularized in the public debate by Mayer-
Scho nberger’s story about Stacy Synder.379 Synder was studying to become 
a high school teacher when one of her professors encountered a picture she 
had posted on her profile in a social network website drinking with a 
pirate hat and with a caption stating “drunken pirate.” After the professor 
contacted the university authorities, she was expelled and disallowed to 
continue her studies elsewhere in the US. She sued to reverse that decision 
but did not succeed.380 
Another case that motivated debate is the case of Mario Costeja, 
who requested Google and a Spanish newspaper to eliminate an article 
which reported details of a government auction on his house. The national 
court requested an opinion from the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). The opinion of the advocate general stated that the current 
European legal framework does not provide a right to eliminate truthful 
but embarrassing information, and in addition that under the current 
                                                
379 The idea originally comes from the French droit à l’oubli and the Italian diritto 
al' oblio for criminal records—sometimes called right to oblivion, and literally 
translatable as right to forget. Both rights were affirmed by courts based on the 
constitutional dispositions about the social reinsertion aims of prison 
punishments, stating that it is in the interest of both social reinsertion and the 
privacy of people who were convicted for the records to be erased after some time. 
This works in the same lines as the 1931 US case Melvin v. Reid, where the court 
ordered the creators of the movie “The Red Kimono” to avoid using the real name 
of the acquitted criminal who’s trial the movie is based on, focusing still not on a 
right to privacy but on a right to rehabilitation (see 297 P. 91, Cal. Ct. App. 1931). 
The same decision was made by another court in 1971 in Briscoe v. Reader’s 
Digest Association Inc. (see 483 P.2d 34, Cal. 1971). However, both decisions were 
later on overruled for the protection of freedom of expression. See Steven Bennett, 
“The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives,” Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 30, no. 1 (2012): 161; Alessandro Mantelero, “The 
EU Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation and the Roots of the ‘right 
to Be Forgotten,’” Computer Law & Security Review 29, no. 3 (2013): 229. 
380 See Viktor Mayer-Scho nberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital 
Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 1-15. 
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regulation Google is not a data controller but only a search engine.381 As it 
will be seen later in this chapter, the court disagreed with his opinion.382 
Mayer-Scho nberger argued that one of the main problems of data 
storage is that it lacks the human characteristic of forgetting.383 He thus 
proposed what can be called “the right to forget,” meaning that information 
should have expiry dates.384 There are several possible objections to this 
idea. 
Firstly, there are memories (information) that indeed remain 
permanent in the human mind—for example, the name of one’s spouse, or 
the birthdays of one’s children. It seems implausible that policymakers 
would make a distinction of their retention in databases as opposed to 
other types of information. Secondly, humanity has been trying through 
history to make accurate records of information, ranging from paintings to 
hand written and then printed books. This has allowed us to profit from 
the works of ancient thinkers and historians and, more generally, to “stand 
in the shoulders of giants” as the much quoted phrase by Isaac Newton 
poses. It seems implausible for the European regulation proposal to 
include a pretension for societies to suddenly abandon these efforts. 
Thirdly, even if this idea was desirable, it is easy to elude the regulation. 
Information can be copied and pasted somewhere else, constituting “new” 
information, which could have a new expiry date. Moreover, information 
can be found from a different source, and information can be found in a 
different jurisdiction.385  
Policymakers, especially in the European Union (EU), were 
sympathetic to the idea that one has a right to escape one’s past, but 
                                                
381 This opinion was based on the interpretation of article 2(b) of the Data 
Protection Directive given by the ECJ in Lindqvist. See Bodil Lindqvist v. 
Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, ECJ C-101/01 (2003). 
382 See section 4.3. 
383 See Ibid., 92-127. 
384 See Ibid., 169-195.  
385 For an interesting criticism of the right to forget see Daniel Solove, “A Tale of 
Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere,” Washington 
University Law Review 84 (2006): 1195. 
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detached from the automatic deletion of the right to forget.386 While the 
right to forget focuses on the expiration of information after some time, the 
right to be forgotten focuses on the control over one’s personal 
information.387  
The right to be forgotten has been deemed to signify any of three 
possible things.388 First, and least controversially, the right to be forgotten 
can mean that one has the right to delete information that one posts 
online. Many websites already allow for this. Second, it can mean that one 
has the right to delete any information about oneself that one originally 
posted online, including information that others have re-posted later on, 
reproducing one’s initial post. This seemed to be the original intention of 
Reading when proposing the right.389 Third, it can mean that one has the 
right to eliminate any information that is available online about oneself, 
regardless of its origin. This is the scope of the right to be forgotten in the 
GDRP.  
As it is stipulated in the GDRP, the right establishes that anyone 
could demand information about himself to be deleted by entities that 
collect or process data.390 This extends the right of data subjects allowing 
them to request any data controller, at any time, to eliminate from their 
databases any piece of information regarding that data subject, regardless 
of the source of the information, and regardless of whether that 
information produces harm. The analyses of this disposition have mainly 
focused on supporting it from the perspective of the human right to 
                                                
386 See Jeffrey Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten,” Stanford Law Review Online 
64 (2012): 88., 89 
387 See Rolf Weber, “The Right to Be Forgotten More Than a Pandora’s Box?,” 
Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 2 
(2011): 120. 
388 See Peter Fleischer, “Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion,” Privacy, 
March 2011; Jeffrey Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten,” Stanford Law Review 
Online 64 (2012): 88. 
389 See John Hendel, “Why Journalists Shouldn’t Fear Europe’s ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten,’” Atlantic, January 2012. 
390 See Viviane Reding, “The Upcoming Data Protection Reform for the European 
Union,” International Data Privacy Law 1 (2011): 3. 
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privacy, being left to evaluate its dynamics as it is drafted in the 
regulation and its potential consequences.  
In order to perform this analysis, the next section evaluates the 
draft of the right to be forgotten as it would be incorporated in the 
European Data Protection regime by the GDRP. This is followed by an 
evaluation of the Google v. Spain case, which has been said to incorporate 
a milder version of such right, in section 4.3. Section 4.4 considers the 
potential consequences of the right to be forgotten from a law & economics 
perspective, and section 4.5 suggests a modification of the right to account 
for the different situations that it regulates and, in such way, to avoid 
some of its main drawbacks. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2.  The EU Regulation Proposal 
4.2.1. Disentangling the GDRP 
The right to be forgotten is incorporated to the GDRP in its article 17(1).391 
The article states that people can request data controllers to erase any 
piece of data that is related to them when any one of four conditions are 
met. The first condition is that the data are no longer necessary for the 
purpose for which it was collected (purpose limitation principle).392 The 
second is that the data subject withdraws his consent when such consent 
was the legitimating basis for the collection of data.393 The third one is that 
the data subject exercises his right to object.394 The fourth is a residuary 
clause that includes any violation of the regulation.395 
The new right that the right to be forgotten would incorporate in 
the European data protection system is captured by the second condition of 
the article, and to some extent the fourth. This is, by the withdrawal of 
consent of a data subject without need to prove harm. The other three 
                                                
391 See also recitals 53 and 54. 
392 Article 17(1)(a). 
393 Article 17(1)(b). 
394 Article 17(1)(c). 
395 Article 17(1)(d). 
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conditions are already present, although not systematically, in the Data 
Protection Directive.396 While the first and the fourth condition of article 
17 seem clear, the second and third condition, which are the most 
controversial since they allow data subjects to require the elimination of 
data without a violation of the regulation, can benefit from some 
explanation.  
The second condition refers to article 6(1) of the proposal, which 
determines in which cases it is legitimate to collect or to process personal 
data, and in particular to its part (a), which refers to consent. Data 
subjects can hence request the elimination of their personal data based on 
a change of mind according to the article, but only when their consent was 
originally the legitimating basis for acquiring (or processing) their 
personal data. If the data were acquired based on legitimizing reasons 
other than consent,397 then article 17(1)(b) is not applicable. This is a 
significant limitation since sections (b) to (f) of article 6(1) contain 
legitimating purposes that could be applicable; concretely, the performance 
of a contract,398 the existence of a legal obligation,399 vital interest of the 
data subject,400 public interest,401 and legitimate interests of the data 
controller.402 
Regarding the third condition, it refers to the right to object, 
currently recognized in article 14 of the Data Protection Directive,403 with 
the requirement of proving compelling legitimate grounds relating to a 
particular situation. The proposal stipulates it in article 19, which 
                                                
396 See Meg Ambrose and Jeff Ausloos, “The Right to Be Forgotten Across the 
Pond,” Journal of Information Policy 3 (2013): 1. See also section 4.3. 
397 Sections (b) to (f) of article 6(1). 
398 Article 6(1)(b).  
399 Article 6(1)(c). 
400 Article 6(1)(d). 
401 Article 6(1)(e). 
402 Article 6(1)(f). The article clarifies that those legitimate interests cannot 
override the rights of data subject (which could not be otherwise since any 
interests that do so would not be legitimate) and mentions special protection for 
minors. 
403 Directive 1995/46/EC 
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contemplates two situations in which a data subject can object to the use 
or processing of his data.  
The first part of article 19 refers to situations in which the data 
were acquired based on vital interest of the data subject, public interest, or 
legitimate interests of the data controller,404 “unless the controller 
demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which 
override the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data 
subject.”405 This requirement excludes data acquired based on consent,406 
on contracts,407 and for the carrying out of a legal obligation.408 Data 
acquired based on consent409 needed not to be included in the disposition 
because this is already done by the second condition of article 17(1). 
However, it is salient that there is no right to ask for the deletion of data 
when the legitimating basis is the performance of a contract or a legal 
obligation of the data controller, while there is a right to ask for deletion 
when there is a vital interest of the data subject to keep it, public interest 
or legitimate interest of the data controller.410  
The second part of article 19 refers to the situation where the data 
are processed for marketing purposes (i.e. behavioral advertising),411 
independently of the legitimizing means of their acquisition. Hence, it 
covers all legitimizing means,412 not only those covered by the first part of 
the article. The disposition turns then redundant for any information 
acquired under consent,413 which is covered by the second condition of 
article 17(1), and any information acquired under vital interest of the data 
                                                
404 Sections (d) to (f) of article 6(1). 
405 Article 19(1). 
406 Article 6(1)(a) 
407 Article 6(1)(b). 
408 Article 6(1)(c). 
409 Article 6(1)(a). 
410 The regulation does not specify the grounds that can override fundamental 
rights of data subjects. These grounds, however, could not be a legal obligation, 
public interest, a vital interest of the data subject, or legitimate interest of the 
controller, because if they were so then the article would then be contradictory. 
411 Article 19(2). 
412 Article 6(1). 
413 Article 6(1)(a). 
 
 
127 
subject, public interest or legitimate interests of the data controller,414 
which are covered by the first part of the article. The right is already 
granted for those cases by other dispositions without making it conditional 
on the data being used for marketing. It is then relevant only for data 
acquired under a contract415 and a legal obligation416—the loopholes 
identified in the previous paragraph. This requirement leaves two 
interpretative options: either data controllers have the duty to eliminate 
data subject’s information that they must store due to a legal obligation, 
and thus breach that legal obligation, but only when that data has been 
used for marketing; or there is a mistake in article 17(1)(c) and the 
reference should not be to article 19 in general but to article 19(1) only. 
Two additional facts should be noted about article 19. The first is 
that the article only mentions a duty to stop using or processing data—the 
right to object—but not eliminate it, so there is no duty to eliminate based 
on article 19 itself but only based on the reference article 17(1)(d) makes of 
article 19. The second is that the exceptions contained in it apply only to 
article 17(1)(d), which references it, and not to article 17(1) (a) to (c). 
4.2.2. Discussion 
Given its interrelation with articles 6(1) (a) to (f) and 19(1), the final 
disposition of 17(1) seems to be the following. The general rule is that any 
person can request a data controller at any time to eliminate data that can 
be traced back to himself, unless (exemption 1) that data are being 
processed in the carrying of a legal obligation of the data controller or 
(exception 2) there is some (undetermined) legitimate ground to override 
the fundamental rights of the data subject. Even if one of the former 
exceptions are applicable, the data subject can require the elimination of 
the data if (exception to the exceptions 1) the data were acquired based on 
direct consent of the data subject, (exception to the exceptions 2) they are 
no longer needed for the purpose for which they were collected, or 
                                                
414 Article 6(1) sections (d), (e) and (f). 
415 Article 6(1)(c). 
416 Article 6(1)(d). 
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(exception to the exceptions 3) their storage violates any other part of the 
regulation. 
Table 1 captures this formulation structuring the right to be 
forgotten based on the sections of article 17, while Table 2 does so by 
structuring it from the legitimating basis for processing. 
Fact Condition Exception(s) 
Data are no longer 
necessary for purpose 
- - 
Consent is withdrawn Basis for processing was 
consent 
- 
Right to object Basis for processing was  
(i) Vital interest of the subject, 
(ii) public interest, or  
(iii) legitimate interest of 
controller. 
Compelling 
ground to override 
fundamental 
rights and 
freedoms 
Regulation is violated - - 
Data are used for 
marketing 
- - 
Table 2. The right to be forgotten in the GDRP structured by the fact 
that can trigger it. 
 
 
Basis for 
processing 
Right to be forgotten Exception(s) 
Consent Always - 
Contract When (i) Data are no longer 
necessary for purpose,  
(ii) regulation is violated, or 
(iii) data are used for 
marketing 
Legal obligation 
Vital interest of the 
subject 
When no ground to override 
fundamental rights and 
freedoms 
(i) Data are no longer 
necessary for collection 
purpose, 
(ii) regulation is violated, 
or 
Public interest 
Legitimate interest of 
controller 
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(iii) data are used for 
marketing 
 
Table 3. The right to be forgotten in the GDRP structured by basis of 
processing 
 
Article 17(1), as it can be seen, can lead to some questionable 
results. Namely, in the framework of the EU it is unorthodox to establish 
an undetermined possibility to override fundamental rights, and a 
possibility to force a data controller to breach legal obligations to keep data 
if such data were used for marketing. It is easy to imagine situations in 
which information that was initially collected for marketing becomes 
socially useful and hence desirable to remain in storage. Some of these 
situations are mentioned in other sections of the regulation itself but not 
incorporated in the disposition. 
4.2.3. General exceptions for data subjects 
Notwithstanding the exceptions and conditions established in article 17(1) 
for the different justifications for right to be forgotten, the proposed 
regulation also establishes general exceptions applicable to all of them, 
which attempt to reconcile the right with otherwise conflicting principles. 
Article 17(3) establishes five exceptions for the right to be forgotten 
specifically: freedom of expression,417 public interest in public health,418 
research purposes,419 a legal obligation to retain the data by the Union or a 
Member State (MS),420 and the variety of cases in which processing data 
should be restricted instead of eliminated.421  
The first exception—freedom of expression—refers to article 80 of 
the proposed regulation, which addresses the issue of freedom of 
expression. Article 80, however, only indicates that MS must establish 
some exceptions that reconcile the right to privacy with freedom of 
                                                
417 Article 17(3)(a), referring to article 80. 
418 Article 17(3)(b), referring to article 81. 
419 Article 17(3)(c), referring to article 83. 
420 Article 17(3)(d). 
421 Article 17(3)(e), referring to article 17(4). 
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expression—and notify the EC of such dispositions. Making the right to be 
forgotten compatible with freedom of expression is one of the cruxes of the 
former, since freedom of expression is the basis for one of the main 
criticisms to the right. This makes the delegation problematic given that 
the proposed regulation does not provide concrete guidelines for it,422 and 
MS could have large differences in implementing it, resulting in different 
scopes for the right which would defeat the purpose of having a unified, 
rather than harmonized, DPL.  
The second exception—public health—refers to article 81, which 
has three parts. The first part, which is the most relevant, refers to the 
exception of health purposes for the prohibition to process sensitive 
data423—to clarify the disposition.424 The second part reaffirms the 
exception of research purposes425 to which the article treats as a fourth 
case, and the third part refers to the delegation of power of article 86.  
The third general exception—research purposes—refers to article 
83.426 The article allows in its first part for personal information to be 
processed for historical, statistical or scientific research427 when (i) this 
cannot be done with anonymous data428 and/or (ii) the data that identifies 
the data subject is kept separately when possible.429 In its second part, the 
article establishes that the data processed for these conditions can be 
publicly disclosed430 when (i) there is consent,431 (ii) disclosure is necessary 
to present findings or facilitate further research,432 and/or (iii) the data 
subject publicly disclosed the data.433  
                                                
422 While recital 121 also refers to the matter, it is not specific. 
423 Article 9(2)(h). 
424 See also recitals 122 and 123. It would improve clarity, if back-references are 
used, that the article also referred article 17(3)(b) together with article 9(2)(h).  
425 Article 83. 
426 See also recitals 125 and 126, referring to the topic although not specifying 
matters further. 
427 Article 83(1). 
428 Article 83(1)(a). 
429 Article 83(1)(b). 
430 Article 83(2). 
431 Article 83(2)(a). 
432 Article 83(2)(b). 
433 Article 83(2)(c). 
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The fourth exception—obligation to retain data—refers to a legal 
obligation by the EU or by a MS. In that respect, it is similar to the 
exception of carrying out of a legal obligation,434 but it is more restrictive. 
While article 6(1)(c) refers to any legal obligation, article 17(3)(d) requires 
that such obligation is made by the Union or by a State that is member to 
it. The article also adds that if the legal obligation derives from a law of a 
MS it should meet an objective public interest, respect the essence of the 
right and be proportional, although this requirement would be applicable 
to any law and not only to those referring to the right to be forgotten. 
The last general exception refers to article 17(4), which 
contemplates four situations under which, instead of eliminating the data, 
the data controller should restrict its processing. The first one is when the 
data subject challenges the accuracy of the data during the period in which 
the controller verifies its accuracy.435 The second is when the data has to 
be maintained for proof purposes.436 The third one is when the data subject 
asks for the restriction in the processing of data instead of its deletion 
when its processing does not have a legitimate basis.437 The last one is 
when the data subject provided the data himself (consent or contract) and 
he invokes his right to data portability.438 
In addition to this, in a continuation of the policy in European DPL 
to give sensitive information a special protection,439 article 9 prohibits the 
processing of data “revealing race or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religion or belief, trade union membership, and the processing of genetic 
data or data concerning health or sex life or criminal convictions or related 
security measures.”440 The exceptions for this prohibition are consent,441 
                                                
434 Article 6(1)(c). 
435 Article 17(4)(a). 
436 Article 17(4)(b). 
437 Article 17(4)(c). 
438 Article 17(4)(d). 
439 Sensitive information is given a stricter protection by article 8 of Directive 
1995/46/EC. 
440 Article 9(1). 
441 Article 9(2)(a). 
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exercise of a legal obligation,442 exercise of a right of employment law,443 
protection of the vital interests of the data subject or someone else unable 
to give consent,444 activities of a non-profit body regarding its members,445 
data made public,446 legal claims,447 public interest,448 health purposes as 
defined in article 81,449 scientific purposes as defined in article 83,450 and 
data for security measures processed by an official authority.451 
Although article 9 does not provide a right to eliminate personal 
information processed in breach of this prohibition, this information falls 
in the general reference of article 17(d) and hence the situations in article 
9 are covered by the right to be forgotten under the proposed regulation. 
While most exceptions of the article seem reasonable, the exception 
of article 9(2)(e)—data made public—seems problematic. Companies can 
process, according to the provision, personal data about a data subject on 
sensitive topics without his consent if he manifestly made it public. 
However, this exception only applies for this type of data and it is not 
present in the general exceptions. Hence, data controllers can process 
sensitive data—for which the regulation attempts more protection—
without the data subject’s consent when it was made public, but they 
cannot process non-sensitive data—for which the regulation attempts less 
protection—under the same situation.  
4.2.4. Connected duties of data controllers 
Having described how the proposed regulation establishes the right, it is 
left to see how this right affects the duties of data controllers in the 
                                                
442 Article 9(2)(b). 
443 Article 9(2)(b). 
444 Article 9(2)(c). 
445 Article 9(2)(d). 
446 Article 9(2)(e). 
447 Article 9(2)(f). 
448 Article 9(2)(g). 
449 Article 9(2)(h). 
450 Article 9(2)(i). 
451 Article 9(2)(j). 
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disposition. Due to the close relation between rights and obligations, this 
element will also affect data subjects’ possibilities to enforce their right.452  
The main article for this is article 17(2)—which refers to duties of 
data controller. The disposition states that, when a data subject expresses 
his will to exercise his right to be forgotten, the controller who is 
responsible for the publication of the data must take all reasonable 
measures to eliminate the data and to communicate to other parties who 
are processing the data to eliminate it as well.  
The most relevant aspect of this rule is that it is a negligence rule. 
The controller is not responsible for the result—the actual elimination of 
data—but for undertaking reasonable means for such result. Therefore, 
data controllers are not liable if they took reasonable means and the 
information is still on the internet.  
On the one hand, the presence of a negligence rule should mitigate 
a portion of the controversy over the right to be forgotten. Some of its 
participants are weary of the right due to the duty it imposes on data 
controllers to eliminate information that has disseminated over the 
internet since, being out of their database, it is difficult when not 
impossible for data controllers to eliminate it. Even though the scope of the 
reasonable means to which the regulation refers is still to be determined, a 
negligence rule in the matter is significantly less burdensome for 
companies than the strict liability rule that the objection seems to imply. 
The requirement of reasonable means of a negligence rule excludes by 
definition these difficult technical situations in which controllers cannot 
eliminate the data.  
On the other hand, this negligence rule significantly limits the right 
to be forgotten that data subjects seem to acquire with few limitations in 
article 17. If data controllers face a negligence rule and not a strict liability 
rule, then data subjects do not have a right to be forgotten in a strict sense, 
                                                
452 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal 23, no. 1 (1913): 16; Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial 
Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal 26, no. 8 (1917): 710. 
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but only a right to request data controllers to display reasonable means for 
the deletion of their information. 
4.2.5. The right to be forgotten in Europe 
As it was seen, the European Commission (EC) issued a communication to 
the European Parliament in 2010 stating that, although the core principles 
of the Data Protection Directive are still valid, a new regulation is needed 
to enhance data protection in order to address the impact of new 
technologies.453 
The right to be forgotten has been a concrete topic of policy debate 
in the EU since then,454 its importance increasing since Commissioner 
Reding presented the GDRP in 2012.455 Although the regulation proposal 
follows the general principles of the Data Protection Directive as requested 
by the EC, it incorporates additional elements, the most relevant of them 
being the right to be forgotten.456 In commissioner Reading’s words, “if an 
individual no longer wants his personal data to be processed or stored by a 
data controller, and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data 
should be removed from their system.”457 
One of the central elements of the regulation regarding the right to 
be forgotten, if not the central element, is the second condition of article 
17(1), which incorporates in the European data protection system the 
possibility to revoke consent without the need to prove harm. This 
                                                
453 See European Commission, “A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection in the European Union,” Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, The Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee on the Regions, November 2010. See also chapter 1. 
454 In the US a similar right to the right to be forgotten has also been proposed but 
limited to children, through an amendment to the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act. 
455 See European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data,” 2012. 
456 The similar right to erasure is already present in article 12(b) of the Directive, 
but the proposed regulation would impose significant modifications on it. 
457 Viviane Reding, “The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the 
Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age,” Speech 
12/26 at the Innovation Conference: Digital, Life, Design (Munich, January 24, 
2012). 
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condition refers to the article that defines the legitimate collection and 
processing of personal data, particularly as it pertains to consent. This 
means that, in situations where the subject’s consent was originally the 
basis for acquiring or otherwise processing the data, data subjects could 
request the elimination of their personal data from a database, based 
solely on a change of mind and without needing to prove to a court that the 
subject suffered actual harm.458  
Shortly after the second anniversary of the regulation proposal, the 
CJEU ruled on Google v. Spain. 459 
4.3.  Google v. Spain 
4.3.1. The case 
In 2010, Mario Costeja requested that Google and the Spanish newspaper 
La Vanguardia remove two articles published January 19, 1998 and March 
9, 1998 (along with the corresponding links in the search engine) that 
reported details of a government auction on his house due to his failure to 
pay social security debts.460  
The Spanish Data Protection Authority did not back the claim 
against the newspaper due to the fact that the information was published 
lawfully. However, it did order Google Spain SL and Google Inc. to “take 
steps to remove its index data and preclude future access to the same.” 
                                                
458 If the data were acquired based on legitimizing reasons other than consent, 
then Article 17(1)(b) is not applicable. This limitation is relevant since parts (b) to 
(f) of Article 6(1) contain legitimating purposes that could be applicable; 
concretely, the existence of a contract (Article 6(1)(b)), of a legal obligation (Article 
6(1)(c)), vital interest of the data subject (Article 6(1)(d)), public interest (Article 
6(1)(e)), and legitimate interests of the data controller (Article 6(1)(f)). Directive 
1995/46/EC. 
459 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, CJEU C-131/12 (2014). Hereafter, Google v. 
Spain. 
460 See Google v. Spain. 
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Both Google Spain SL and Google Inc. appealed the resolution, and the 
case arrived to the court Audiencia Nacional.461 
Audiencia Nacional requested a preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU.462 In the request, the court was asked three questions: (i) if the 
European data protection framework established in the Data Protection 
Directive is applicable to Google, (ii) if search engines are considered data 
controllers under the Directive, and (iii) if a data subject can demand a 
search engine to remove the indexation of a certain piece of information.463 
Regarding the first question, the advocate general and the court 
agree that the European framework does apply to Google, not because it is 
dealing with EU citizens, but because Google Spain is a subsidiary of 
Google Inc. situated in Spanish territory which sells advertisement spots 
in Spain that, in turn, finance the search engine. Therefore, even if data 
are not processed in Spain, the processing is done within the context of the 
activities of an establishment in a MS.464 This part of the ruling confirms a 
previously issued opinion by A29WP, which has expressed an equivalent 
position for the applicable law of the directive.465 
Regarding the second question, both the advocate general and the 
court noted that Google is dealing with personal information. The court 
further affirmed that by indexing data, Google retrieves, records and 
organizes data, even if Google’s indexing is done automatically without 
distinguishing content and when this data were previously published 
elsewhere. Accordingly, the Court treats Google (and other search engines) 
as a controller, with the duties that such classification implies under the 
Directive.466  
The third question is the most relevant for the purposes of this 
comment. The question reads: 
                                                
461 See Ibid. at ¶¶ 15-18. 
462 See generally TFEU, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, art. 267. 
463 See Google v. Spain, at ¶¶ 19-20. 
464 See Ibid. 
465 A29WP, “O.J. 8/2010 on Applicable Law” (Brussels, December 16, 2010). 
466 See Google v. Spain, at ¶¶ 66-88. 
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“Must it be considered that the rights to erasure and blocking of 
data, provided for in Article 12(b), and the right to object, 
provided for by [subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of 
Article 14] of Directive 95/46, extend to enabling the data 
subject to address himself to search engines in order to prevent 
indexing of the information relating to him personally, 
published on third parties’ web pages, invoking his wish that 
such information should not be known to internet users when he 
considers that it might be prejudicial to him or he wishes it to be 
consigned to oblivion, even though the information in question 
has been lawfully published by third parties?’” 467 
Regarding this question, the court considered that, if the inclusion 
of certain links in the search results is at some point in time incompatible 
with the provisions of the Directive, and the data subject requests so, such 
links must be erased. The Court emphasized that, due to Article 7 of the 
Directive, data processing must be lawful at all times in order to be 
allowed to be continued.468 In addition, even information initially collected 
in a lawful way can—with the passing of time—become unlawful to 
maintain when the data becomes inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive for 
the purposes of the processing.469  
For data processing to be incompatible with the Directive, the 
information does not necessarily have to be incorrect. It is sufficient that 
the data are inadequate or excessive for the purpose of the data processing, 
that they are outdated or that they are kept for a time longer than 
necessary for such purpose.470 The court noted that sensitive information 
contained in sixteen-year-old search links, can fall under the 
aforementioned categories.471  
As a response to the ruling, Google established a governance 
mechanism on May 30th through which European data subjects can now fill 
an online form to request that obsolete data about them be deleted from 
                                                
467 Ibid. 
468 See Ibid. at ¶ 95. 
469 See Ibid.  
470 See Google v. Spain, at ¶¶ 72, 92-9; Directive 1995/46/EC at art. 6(c)-6(e). 
471 See Ibid. at ¶¶ 94-98. 
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the lists of results.472 The search engine has already received more than 
70,000 requests.473 
4.3.2. Applicable norms 
The court explains that the preliminary ruling is centrally concerned with 
Articles 2(b), 2(d), 4(1)(a), 4(1)(c), 12(b) and 14(1)(a) of the Data Protection 
Directive.474 While Article 2 concerns definitions and Article 4 concerns 
applicable national law, Article 12 refers to the right to erasure and Article 
14 to the right to object.475 The latter two articles are relevant for the third 
question posed.476 
The directive contains a similar right to the one proposed in Article 
17 of the regulation proposal in Article 12(b) and Article 6(1)(e).  However, 
only the second condition of that article is new.477 Article 12(b) of the 
directive establishes the right to erasure, which allows data subjects to 
request the elimination of their personal data when its retention or 
processing violates the terms of the directive, in particular (but not 
exclusively) because of being incomplete or inaccurate. 
While a narrow reading of the article will interpret “in particular” 
as “exclusively” and will only allow the deletion of the data when such data 
are incomplete or inaccurate, a broad reading will allow for such deletion 
whenever the data processing is in violation of any term of the directive.478 
In turn, the directive establishes the purpose-limitation principle in 
Article 6(1)(e);479 accordingly any collection, processing or storing of 
                                                
472 Online form at 
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch 
473 See Rosa Jimenez Cano, “Google Comienza a Aplicar El ‘Derecho Al Olvido,’” El 
País, July 13, 2014. 
474 See Google v. Spain, at ¶ 1. 
475 The court also mentions later on Articles 6, 7, 9 and 28. See Ibid. at ¶ 1. 
476 See Ibid. at ¶ 89. 
477 See Bert-Jaap Koops, “Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical 
Analysis of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice,” SCRIPT-Ed 8, no. 3 
(2011): 229. 230, 232-233 & 240-245. 
478 This, as it was seen, is similar to the fourth element of Article 17 of the 
regulation proposal. See GDRP. 
479 See generally A29WP, “O.J. 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation” (Brussels, October 
2, 2013).  
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personal data must be done based on a specific, explicit and legitimate 
purpose.480 The last of the three requirements indicates that companies 
need a legitimizing basis to collect personal data, of which the most 
common is consent.481  
Data cannot be kept for longer than is necessary for the purposes 
for which it is collected or processed—a purpose that is defined, however, 
by the data controller. This rule is extended to secondary use, according to 
which the data are retained for a legitimate purpose that is different than 
the original purpose.482 This obligation for data controllers and data 
processers can be invoked, if original purpose terms are violated, by data 
subjects claiming the right to erasure contained in Article 12(b) when 
interpreted broadly,483 as Costeja seems to have done.  
The right to object is recognized in Article 14 of the Directive. It 
establishes that a data subject, proving compelling legitimate grounds 
relating to a particular situation, can object to the continued processing of 
his personal data. If a data subject does object, and he can successfully 
prove compelling legitimate grounds, then the controller must stop 
processing the data subject’s personal data, although is the controller has 
no duty to eliminate data already processed.484 
                                                
480 The Directive is applicable, according to its Article 2(a), whenever there is 
collection, processing or storing of personal information, where personal 
information is defined as any information that can be traced back to a data 
subject. See Directive 1995/46/EC. 
481 As it was seen, consent is defined in Article 2(h) of the Data Protection 
Directive as “any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by 
which the data subject signifies his agreement.” See Directive 1995/46/EC.  
482 See Bert-Jaap Koops, “The Inflexibility of Techno-Regulation and the Case of 
Purpose-Binding,” Legisprudence 5 (2011): 171. 
483 See Bert-Jaap Koops, “Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical 
Analysis of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice,” SCRIPT-Ed 8, no. 3 
(2011): 229. 
484 Individuals have a right to withdraw their consent when they desire to, but this 
withdrawal only affects future processing. This means that data subjects do not 
have, under the current directive, the right to request the elimination of any data 
solely based on the withdrawal of consent. See A29WP, “O.J. 15/2011 On the 
Definition of Consent” (Brussels, July 13, 2011). 
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4.3.3. An application of different rights 
Under the classification made above on the possible interpretations of the 
right to be forgotten, the regulation proposal would establish the third, 
most expansive category of the right, while the data protection directive 
does not establish any of the three classifications. Under the third 
category, the right to be forgotten would likely involve not only the 
publisher of the content but also search engines that link to that 
content.485 This, however, does not mean that any involvement of search 
engines in terms of liability for published content pertains the right to be 
forgotten.  
As can be seen in the previous sections,486 none of the three 
questions presented to the court are, strictly speaking, about the right to 
be forgotten. Even though the third question is related to it, and although 
Audiencia Nacional asked it mentioning the right to be forgotten,487 the 
actual question refers in its formulation only to the rights of erasure and 
the right to object.488  
The opinion of the advocate general Jaaskinen, in turn, is clear in 
stating that the rights to erasure (Article 12(b)) and the right to object 
(Article 14(a)) in the Data Protection Directive are not equivalent to the 
right to be forgotten. The opinion is categorical in pointing out that the 
right to be forgotten is nowhere to be found in the current EU legal 
framework for cases in which the publication of information is de facto 
legitimate. European DPL does not provide a right to eliminate truthful 
but embarrassing information.489 
Even when deciding differently than the advocate general, the 
CJEU seems to maintain this principle in its ruling. The court extends the 
broad reading of Articles 12 and 14 of the directive to hold that any 
                                                
485 See Jeffrey Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten,” Stanford Law Review Online 
64 (2012): 88. 
486 See section 4.3.2, contrasted to sections 4.1 and 4.2.5. 
487 Concretely, “regarding the scope of the right of erasure and/or the right to 
object, in relation to the ‘derecho al olvido’ (the ‘right to be forgotten’).” Google v. 
Spain, at ¶ 20. 
488 See Google v. Spain, at ¶¶ 66-88. 
489 See Google v. Spain, at ¶ 17. 
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information that is no longer relevant violates the directive, and its 
elimination can be therefore requested by invoking the right to erasure.  
The central difference between the right to erasure and the right to 
be forgotten is that the latter also includes data that does not breach any 
norm.490 This difference might not always be as clear as it seems. A certain 
processing of information could be considered as breaching a general 
provision of the directive because it harms a data subject; or, as the court 
does, because it is no longer relevant, even without being outdated or 
inaccurate. At the margin, the difference means that with a right to be 
forgotten, a data subject could request the deletion of the data based on a 
whim, or a preference, while under the current system there are 
significant probative and argumentative efforts necessary to prove to a 
court that such data are harmful and they violate personality rights.491 
If the right to be forgotten was enforced in the EU data protection 
system, a data subject’s personal information would have to be deleted at 
his request irrespective of harm or of the legality of the processing—with 
differing levels of amplitude depending on which of the three versions of 
the right is enforced. The right, additionally, would likely cover not only 
links displayed by search engines but also the original publications of the 
content. 
In the form established by Google, however, data subjects’ requests 
must be justifiable and will be evaluated individually on their merit. In 
that evaluation, the company has the ability to reject them, and those who 
disagree with the decision made by the company will have to ask a court to 
intervene. In this way, the result of the case illustrates the differentiating 
elements between the right to be forgotten and the rights data subjects 
have under the directive, which someone must evaluate—in this case, 
Google supervised by the court. Unless European data subjects can prove a 
violation of the directive and the presence of harm, they will at least for 
now have to face being remembered. 
                                                
490 See Bert-Jaap Koops, “Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical 
Analysis of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice,” SCRIPT-Ed 8, no. 3 
(2011): 229. 
491 See Ibid. 
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4.3.4. Critical discussion 
Under the E-commerce Directive, internet service providers in the EU are 
not liable for hosting illegal content; only the users who upload the content 
are liable. 492 The reason behind this rule is that, otherwise, providers 
might find themselves forced to police the internet in order to remove 
content for which they could be held liable.493 The social costs of such 
policing activity—both in the form of the actual costs for the company and 
the costs of the chilling effects it would intake—are likely to be higher than 
its benefit.494 The only way to eliminate false negatives (allowing 
illegitimate content, which should have been removed) would be to incur in 
false positives (removing legitimate content, which should have been 
allowed), thus leading to collateral censorship.495 
Until recently, there was a debate on whether a similar immunity 
would apply to the data protection directive, both for internet providers 
and for search engines.496 Google v. Spain, as it was seen, makes it clear 
that for the moment it will not. 
A problem with adopting this decision is that search engines such 
as Google work with automatic algorithms, which makes it difficult for 
them to become a censor of what is published and what is not published. 
Google localizes information but it does not control it; Google cannot make 
                                                
492 Directive 2000/31/EC. 
493 See Giovanni Sartor and Mario de Azevedo Cunha, “The Italian Google-Case: 
Privacy, Freedom of Speech and Responsibility of Providers for User-Generated 
Contents,” International Journal of Law and Information Technology 18, no. 4 
(2010): 356. 
494 See generally Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, “Holding Internet Service 
Providers Accountable,” Supreme Court Economic Review 14 (2006): 221; Mark 
Lemley, “Rationalising Internet Safe Harbors,” Journal of Telecommunication and 
High Technology Law 6 (2007): 101; Keith Hylton, “Property Rules, Liability Rules 
and Immunity: An Application to Cyberspace,” Boston University Law Review 87 
(2007): 1; James Grimmelmann, “The Google Dilemma,” New York Law School 
Law Review 53 (2008): 939. 
495 See Jack Balkin, “The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age,” Pepperdine 
Law Review 36 (2008): 427. 
496 See Giovanni Sartor, “Providers’ Liabilities in the New EU Data Protection 
Regulation: A Threat to Internet Freedoms?,” International Data Privacy Law 3, 
no. 1 (2013): 3. 
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any choices regarding its means and purposes in terms of Article 4(d) of 
the directive.  
This, as the advocate general makes clear in his opinion, makes it 
close to impossible for Google to make sure all information it indexes 
complies with Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the directive on data quality. It would 
be one thing to shift the responsibility from the content creator (in this 
case, La Vanguardia) to the content indexer (in this case, Google) if (and 
only if) the content indexer displayed reasonable means to prevent the 
indexation of such content, but to place search engines as the internet’s 
censors is something different.  
Still, this is not the main problem with the Google v. Spain decision. 
The main problem is that free speech is not about being able to express 
oneself in a vacuum, but about being able to transmit a message to people 
who want to hear it. 
The court argues in the case that the information indexed by Google 
is not relevant. But the decision begs the question of who decides what is 
relevant. If what information is relevant enough to be accessed is to be 
decided neither by people looking for such information nor by the person 
publishing that information, but centrally decided by a court, both freedom 
of expression and the right to access information will suffer a blow. 
Search engines are not megaphones, sending content unilaterally to 
passive recipients. Search engines are an intermediary. Recipients of the 
information that they index choose the results they look for and they 
choose which web pages from those results they read. The European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR), from this perspective, has mentioned that 
people have the right to obtain information that is of general interest, and 
that the internet is a key actor to obtain such information.497 
The job of search tools such as Google is to help those internet users 
find the content they want to find.498 This means that if a certain piece of 
                                                
497 See Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, ECHR 40397/12 
(2013). 
498 James Grimmelmann, “Don’t Censor Search,” Yale Law Journal Pocket Part 48 
(2007): 117. (further arguing that his enhances autonomy since locating 
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information (such as the auction of Costeja’s house) appears in the top 
search results, it does so because a large number of internet users 
considered it to be relevant: they searched for it, and when finding the 
result they accessed it.  
If there was a problem with search engines leading internet users to 
find unwanted content by accident, and such content was harmful for other 
internet users, then search engines would have incentives to correct this as 
fast as possible.499 But this is not the problem the court is concerned with.  
The court is concerned with people who look for such information 
and find it, and cobbles a solution allowing for the existence of the 
information but making it unavailable for the public who look for it on 
search engines. It is difficult to say, in such case, that the information is 
not relevant; moreover, it is hardly consistent to say that the information 
should be kept online (since it was published legally) but made inaccessible 
at the same time.500 
4.4.  The Hazards of Forgetting 
4.4.1. Freedom of expression 
A section of the media501 and politicians502 have opposed the right to be 
forgotten based on the idea that it conflicts with free speech, to a point in 
                                                                                                                            
information is important for making choices, and it is economically efficient by 
allowing numerous welfare-enhancing information exchanges that would 
otherwise not take place). 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid. (stating that if it is considered desirable to suppress the content given its 
harm, then one should note that the owner of the website in which it appeared will 
have, in most cases, better information about the content itself as well as about its 
truthfulness and about who created it). 
501 See, for example, Tessa Mayes, “We Have No Right to Be Forgotten Online,” 
The Guardian, March 11, 2011. 
502 See, for example, Kenneth Clarke, “Data Protection (Speech)” (London, May 26, 
2011). 
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which the right has been called “the biggest threat to free speech on the 
internet in the coming decade.”503  
These fears raise a series of difficult questions. The traditional 
doctrinal position that attempts to balance the relation between privacy 
and free speech is that it is against free speech, and hence not protected by 
the right of privacy, to prevent the dissemination of embarrassing but 
truthful information when that information was legitimately acquired.504 
Is there a sufficient reason to change this in online information?505 If an 
individual makes a true statement about someone else through the 
internet, should the second have the right to request the server to 
eliminate the content? Why is this so for the internet and not for other 
massive means of communication such as the television or radio? Can one 
say truthful but embarrassing things about someone in a printed 
newspaper but not in an online newspaper?  
The Google v. Spain case, while less intrusive than the GDPR on 
freedom of expression, has been criticized for overriding it, and for ignoring 
the ECHR case law on the balancing of the right to privacy and the right to 
freedom of expression,506 and that search engines have a freedom of 
                                                
503 Jeffrey Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten,” Stanford Law Review Online 64 
(2012): 88. 88. 
504 This is mainly the doctrine of the USSC set in Florida Star v. B.J.F. (491 U.S. 
524). It is also related to the doctrine of actual malice for freedom of the press. See 
“The New York Times v. Sullivan” (1954), “Time Inc. v. Hill” (1967), “Rosembloom 
v. Metromedia” (1967) and “Gertz v. Roberts Welch” (1974). 
505 The treatment of peer-to-peer privacy violations and provider liability varies 
per jurisdiction. See Mario de Azevedo Cunha, Luisa Marin, and Giovanni Sartor, 
“Peer-to-Peer Privacy Violations and ISP Liability: Data Protection in the User-
Generared Web,” International Data Privacy Law 2, no. 2 (2012): 1; Giovanni 
Sartor and Mario de Azevedo Cunha, “The Italian Google-Case: Privacy, Freedom 
of Speech and Responsibility of Providers for User-Generated Contents,” 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 18, no. 4 (2010): 356; 
Giovanni Sartor, “Providers’ Liabilities in the New EU Data Protection 
Regulation: A Threat to Internet Freedoms?,” International Data Privacy Law 3, 
no. 1 (2013): 3. 
506 Stefan Kulk and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, “Google Spain v. Gonzalez: 
Did the Court Forget about Freedom of Expression?,” European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 5, no. 3 (2014): 389. 
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expression claim protected by article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.507 
The third category of the right to be forgotten also raises conflicts in 
need of balance with freedom of the press. A right to eliminate any 
information about oneself which is electronically stored limits the scope of 
people who can inform others about true facts, as it restrict such scope to 
those who have the approval of those involved in the piece of information. 
The right could be used, along these lines, as a tool for censorship. 
While article 80, as it was seen, attempts to address this problem 
requiring MS to issue regulations that will make these rights compatible, 
it does not provide guidelines to do so. In turn, it seems unclear how this 
possibility can materialize at all without either restricting the right to be 
forgotten to one of the two other categories or stating that privacy in these 
cases simply overrides freedom of expression. 
4.4.2. Access to information 
The first problem that the right would generate from the perspective of the 
right to access information are the prospective chilling effects that the 
right would produce. In the light of the strict requirements and the high 
fines that the regulation imposes on data processors and controllers, they 
might react by acting conservatively regarding data management in order 
to avoid large expected costs. Upon receiving a request to eliminate 
content, the data controller or intermediary must decide whether the 
request is well-founded and the content should be eliminated, or it is not 
and the content should remain. Allowing for a piece of information upon a 
request poses the risk of producing a high fine if the judgement was 
mistaken, while disallowing for the piece of information has no direct 
negative consequences. For almost all cases, this expected cost would 
exceed the expected benefit that such information can represent to the 
intermediary; when in doubt, it will be better for the intermediary to 
                                                
507 Joris van Hoboken, Search Engine Freedom. On the Implications of the Right 
to Freedom of Expression for the Legal Governance of Web Search Engines 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2012). 
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delete the content even if the probability of the request being well-founded 
is low.508 This would produce a chilling effect: it would reduce the flow of 
information in the internet, which could be socially costly and, in turn, 
would affect the right to access information of the same data subjects that 
are being protected with the right to be forgotten. 
A related issue is the creation of uncertainty regarding who owns 
which piece of information. The right to eliminate content that refers to 
oneself but belongs to someone else—for example, a picture in someone’s 
photo album where both appear—without that person’s consent also raises 
issues regarding the property of such information, especially if the 
argumentation of this new right frames it as a fundamental human 
right.509 Such a rule crosses a distinct line between the right to have 
control over one’s data and the right to have control anyone’s data that 
somehow relates to one. From that perspective, the focus changes from 
allowing people to control the information that they own, to giving 
everyone somehow involved with it a veto power. 
Some information presents due to its type a high social value 
produced by the uses it can be given. Medical records, for instance, while 
containing sensitive information are valuable to determine—in 
aggregation—public health policies that are beneficial for the population 
as a whole. Criminal records can be valuable due to security reasons in 
crimes with high recurrence rates. Tax records are valuable to evaluate the 
government´s revenue and to fight tax avoidance. Electoral rolls are 
important for statistical purposes. There are several pieces of information 
that, notwithstanding freedom of speech, are needed for security reasons, 
innovation, art, and literature. 
                                                
508 The potential indirect negative consequence is that, if one assumes a 
competitive scenario among intermediaries, then if an intermediary eliminates a 
substantially larger amount of information than its competitors, and users are 
able to detect this, they might vote with their feet and move to their competitor if 
doing so is costless. This, however, is likely to have a milder effect that the risk of 
fines. 
509 The first recital of the proposed regulation states that “the protection of natural 
persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right”, and 
refers to article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and to article 16(1) of the Treaty. 
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Article 83 of the proposed regulation attempts to protect the 
generation of “historical, statistical and scientific research.” However, the 
proposed regulation does not define the scope of “historical, statistical and 
scientific research”, which is a broad term. The relevance of the exception 
seems to require clarification. Is any record of any fact historical research? 
Is any quantitative study statistical research? Are student papers 
scientific research?510  
More problematic is that it is not evident from the article if the 
conditions are cumulative or alternative. In article 83(1) it would seem 
that the requirements are that research cannot be done with anonymous 
data and the data that identifies the data subject is kept separately when 
possible—this is, that they are cumulative. Indeed, it would not be 
proportional, when it is sufficient to use anonymous data, to use non-
anonymous data and keep the identity separate. However, in article 83(2) 
it would seem that the requirements are that there is consent, disclosure is 
necessary to present findings or facilitate further research or the data 
subject publicly disclosed the data—this is, that they are alternative. 
Indeed, consent is an autonomous legitimizing means in the rest of the 
GDRP, and it would hence not be coherent to require in this case that the 
data subject previously made it public in addition to giving his consent, or 
that disclosure is necessary in addition to the given consent. However, if 
one enumeration is cumulative and the other is alternative, why would the 
article use the exact same sentence structure? And if both dispositions 
have the same logical structure, are they both cumulative or both 
alternative? 
4.4.3. Implementation costs 
The proposed right, simultaneously, presents implementation costs that 
would make it a costly mechanism to increase data subjects’ control over 
their information. This overlooked aspect is not negligible, at least 
                                                
510 Moreover, is historical and statistical research not within the scope of scientific 
research? If it is, why are the three categories stated as separate? If it is not, what 
other disciplines are not considered within the scope of scientific research? 
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inasmuch it is relevant in order to be aware of the social cost to be paid for 
the right. 
Firstly, the right to be forgotten is likely to present obstacles in the 
relation with companies from outside the EU due to the significant 
difference between the treatment of personal information under the 
proposed regulation and its treatment under other legal systems.511 
Obstacles in bilateral relations are especially likely to arise with the US, 
with whom the EU has signed the Safe Harbor agreement.512 How will the 
proposed regulation be harmonized with the agreement? If American 
companies cannot invoke Safe Harbor regarding the proposed regulation, 
then the agreement would be rendered useless and its economic benefits 
would dissipate; it would be then left to see how many American 
companies that collect or process data continue doing business in the EU. 
If the so-called data giants—all based in the United States—can invoke 
the agreement in their collecting and processing of data, then the right to 
be forgotten would find itself limited to local firms, finding its utility 
strongly limited.513 
                                                
511 See Paul Schwartz, “The EU-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures,” Harvard Law Review 126 (2013): 1966. 
512 The agreement, signed between the EC and the US Department of Commerce, 
establishes a voluntary program for US firms to show they comply with a set of 
standards that is a combination of the EU and US standards on privacy. 
Compliance is overseen by the FTC and most claims in Europe have to be taken to 
the US. See Virginia Boyd, “Financial Privacy in the United States and the 
European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization,” Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 24 (2006): 939; Stephen Kobrin, “Safe Harbours Are 
Hard to Find: The Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Dispute, Territorial Jurisdiction 
and Global Governance,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 (2004): 111; 
Alexander Zinser, “The Safe Harbor Solution: Is It an Effective Mechanism for 
International Data Transfers Between the United States and the European 
Union?,” Oklahoma Journal of Law & Technology 1 (2004): 11. 
513 Recital 79 of the proposed regulation states that the regulation should not 
interfere with international agreements between the Union and other countries 
regarding the transfer of personal data. This would indicate that, from the two 
aforementioned scenarios, the latter would be the case, and American companies 
would still be able to invoke the Safe Harbor agreement. However, since recitals 
do not have binding power this is still to be materialized in a binding disposition. 
In addition, it does not seem certain that this would cover the Safe Harbor 
agreement, since the recitals only refers to the transfer of data. 
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Moreover, the obligations adjacent to the right would increase the 
costs of local small and medium firms by imposing requirements such as to 
hire additional personnel and to consult with data protection authorities. 
At the same time, the limits in the use of information for advertising will 
reduce their profits. It has been estimated that the average small to 
medium firm in the EU will find its annual costs increased by 3000 to 7200 
Euros, depending on the industry, which represents a 16% to 40% cost 
increase.514 These increases in costs are likely to have a negative impact on 
business creation and on employment.515 
At a more general level, this new right lacks a new justification. 
One of the fundamental lessons of economics is that transactions between 
consenting parties in a world where exchange is instantaneous and 
information is perfect is beneficial to all parties and to society as a 
whole.516 Policy recommendations that foster intervention, for this reason, 
should attempt to identify which of these conditions is not fulfilled in order 
to define how to address the problem. 
 The right to be forgotten, aimed mainly at protecting internet 
consumers, would be a substantial intervention for any company that 
processes or stores individuals’ personal data. Does this right address any 
market failure that justifies the intervention? More importantly, does the 
right address a market failure that is not already tackled by the 
traditional means of addressing privacy issues? Even though the right is 
novel, privacy protection is not. So it seems appropriate to ask whether the 
new technologies for data collection and data processing justify a different 
type of regulation; and if they do, to what extent. 
                                                
514 See Laurits Christensen et al., “The Impact of the Data Protection Regulation 
in the EU,” Intertic Policy Paper 13-1, 2013. (Last time accessed on 09/10/2013) 
515 See Ibid. Technical implementation problems have also been pointed out. See 
Luiz Costa and Yves Poullet, “Privacy and the Regulation of 2012,” Computer Law 
& Security Review 28, no. 3 (2012): 254. 
516 This is the central idea behind the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics. 
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4.4.4. Risk compensation 
A drawback that the right to be forgotten would present if incorporated in 
the EU which is likely to be more relevant than the previous is that, due to 
the technological limits to its implementation, it could induce data subjects 
to engage in offsetting behavior which leads to risk compensation. Based 
on the promise of being able to delete their information, data subjects 
could develop a feeling of safety that would lead them to engage in risky 
behavior that they would have otherwise not engaged in, and later find 
that the information cannot be deleted. Due to this problem, which extends 
to any of its three interpretations, the existence of the right could take 
data subjects to a situation in which they are worse off than with no right 
to be forgotten at all.  
The main driver of this limitation is that the most relevant 
exposure for any type of personal data is the initial exposure in which the 
data goes online. After such exposure, it is often not possible to take the 
situation back and eliminate the information permanently from the 
internet in general—and from the minds of those who saw it already.517 
This might not be a problem in an ideal scenario where each data subject 
could enforce his right to be forgotten without practical limitations, but it 
turns into one given the factual limitations that regulators have in the 
internet’s context. 
At a general level, this problem is present even in an ideal scenario 
where a legal system (such as the EU) attributes to data subjects a right to 
be forgotten and companies succeed in complying with their obligation to 
delete all requested data. A certain amount of people, in this scenario, will 
have already learned the information, possibly even storing either digital 
or analog copies, which makes it difficult if not impossible for the 
information to disappear. 
Still, this difficulty is even more present in the current context, 
where the EU can regulate the content of search engines and websites in 
                                                
517 This is especially so with the advancements in search and storage mentioned 
before. See section 1.1. 
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its jurisdiction—but these are a minority, since most are based in the US—
and it cannot regulate the content of search engines and websites under 
the jurisdiction of other countries. For this reason, the only way the EU 
could effectively implement the right would be moving to a model of State-
monitored internet like those implemented by countries that heavily 
regulate it.518 Otherwise, its users can still access the content through 
websites based in the US or elsewhere. While the CJEU can request 
Google to remove contents from Google.es, Europeans can still find the 
content by entering Google.com.519 
In addition to this general problem, it is difficult at an individual 
level to target all companies that managed a certain disseminated content, 
and it is especially difficult to target all search engines that index such 
content. A clear example of this lays in the Google v. Spain case through 
two mechanisms: one inside, and one outside of the courtroom.  
The first is the paradox of any attempt to claim privacy via the 
public system of administration of justice: a vastly larger amount of people 
know that Costeja’s house was appropriated after the case that granted 
him the right to delete the information than before. The attempt to remove 
information had, in this way, the unintended effect of publicizing it 
further.520 
The second mechanism is formed by the limitations that these 
claims have outside of the courtroom: if someone wants to read about the 
                                                
518 An example of this is the system in place in China. In an extreme case, this 
would lead to a model of closed internet such as the one in place in North Korea. 
519 The A29WP issued an opinion stating that the results should be removed from 
all domains, including the .com. See A29WP, “Guidelines on the Implementation 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on ‘Google Spain and Inc. 
v. AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez’” (Brussels, November 26, 2014). However, 
this opinion is contestable, given that according to the court EU DPL was 
applicable not because the case dealt with European data subjects but because 
Google Spain—managing the results of google.es—is situated in EU territory, 
which is not the case of Google Inc.—managing the results of google.com. See 
Google v. Spain, at ¶¶ 19-20, and section 4.3.1. 
520 This has been called “the Streisand effect.” See Yoan Hermstruwer and 
Stephan Dickert, “Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on Chilling 
Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten,” Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for 
Collective Goods (Bonn, 2013). 
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appropriation of Costeja’s house, they only need to open Bing, Yahoo, or 
any other competitor of Google. These might willingly remove the links to 
certain content after a prominent case such as Costeja’s, but it is not 
possible for them to know of and eliminate all content that is denounced by 
data subjects to Google, which means that the content will remain both in 
the internet and indexed by search engines.  
If data subjects are not fully aware of these significant limitations, 
the right to be forgotten would produce in them an increased false feeling 
of safety when sharing personal information. They might upload and 
share, for this reason, more information than they would have without the 
incorporation of an imperfect right to be forgotten in the EU, trusting that 
they are able to delete it later on if they wish to do so.  
This effect has been called ‘the Peltzman effect’ after the scholar 
who discovered it, originally for seatbelt regulations.521 What Peltzman 
argued is that, counter-intuitively, after the introduction of the rule that 
mandated the use of seatbelts in the US, the frequency of car accidents 
increased. This occurred due to the fact that people wearing seatbelts felt 
safer while driving (and the law told them that with seatbelts they were 
safer while driving), which made them drive more recklessly than before. 
Peltzman’s methodology has been criticized and his study remains 
controversial,522 but these criticisms were said to be limited to the case 
study and not pertain the effect at a general level.523 The size of the 
offsetting behavior will differ from case to case, and the presence of the 
                                                
521 See Sam Peltzman, “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation,” Journal of 
Political Economy 83, no. 4 (1975): 677. 
522 See Hans Joksch, “Critique of Sam Peltzman’s Study: The Effects of 
Automobile Safety Regulation,” Accident Analysis & Prevention 8, no. 2 (1976): 
129; Leon Robertson, “A Critical Analysis of Peltzman’s ‘The Effects of Automobile 
Safety Regulation,’” Journal of Economic Issues 11, no. 3 (1977): 587.  
523 See John Graham and Steven Garber, “Evaluating the Effects of Automobile 
Safety Regulation,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 3, no. 2 (1984): 
206; Sam Peltzman, “A Reply to Robertson,” Journal of Economic Issues 11, no. 3 
(1977): 672. 
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effect will depend on it.524 This effect has also been found to be present in 
in childproof safety caps,525 food labels disclosing health risks,526 and 
medical breakthroughs such as the discovery of antibiotics.527 
A similar effect has been experimentally shown for data subjects, 
who have an increased perception of control over their personal 
information when PETs are in place. In these situations, data subjects 
seem to increase their willingness to disclose to a point in which they 
increase the objective risk.528 If this offsetting behavior is also substantial 
for the right to be forgotten—and a Peltzman effect is hence present—this 
would mean that the regulation in question would fail to increase data 
subjects’ privacy. 
A perfect implementation of the right to be forgotten, where all 
jurisdictions incorporate it simultaneously and data subjects have no 
search costs—being possible for them to request all entities managing or 
indexing that content to delete it—would not present this problem. 
However, the imperfect right to be forgotten that the EU can incorporate 
could introduce, in some magnitude, a Peltzman effect. This is largely an 
empirical question, which policymakers could take into account before 
deciding whether to incorporate the right. This effect, if present, could 
make the right to be forgotten not only self-defeating but also, depending 
on its magnitude, counterproductive. 
                                                
524 See Robert Crandall and John Graham, “Automobile Safety Regulation and 
Offsetting Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates,” American Economic Review 
74, no. 2 (1984): 328. 
525 See Kip Viscusi, “The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging 
on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions,” American Economic Review 74, no. 2 (1984): 
324; Kip Viscusi, “Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety 
Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 28, no. 3 (1985): 527. 
526 See Kip Viscusi and Wesley Magat, “Informational Regulation of Consumer 
Health Risks: An Empirical Evaluation of Hazard Warnings,” RAND Journal of 
Economics 17, no. 3 (1986): 351. 
527 See Sam Peltzman, “Offsetting Behavior, Medical Breakthroughs, and 
Breakdowns,” Journal of Human Capital 5, no. 3 (2011): 302. 
528 See Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein, 
“Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox,” Social Psychological 
and Personality Science 4, no. 3 (2012): 340. 
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4.5.  Flexibility without Censorship 
4.5.1. The right under the framework 
It has been shown that there are different interpretations of the right to be 
forgotten,529 of which the GDRP establishes the strongest one530 and the 
Google v. Spain case establishes none since it requires proof of harm.531 
Then, it has been shown that the right to be forgotten in general, and its 
implementation in the GDRP in particular, have significant drawbacks 
from an economic perspective.532 
After evaluating this, the right can be seen from the perspective of 
the framework previously proposed533 in order to evaluate its merits, and 
be able to contrast them with the aforementioned costs. It has been shown 
that data subjects would benefit from an increment in flexibility regarding 
their data management,534 which points to an economic reason in support 
of the right to be forgotten, which by allowing data subjects to withdraw 
their consent and delete information about themselves would undoubtedly 
grant them flexibility regarding their personal information.  
From this perspective, a right to be forgotten without the 
implementation problems evaluated could be seen as analogous to an 
inalienability rule.  
A full property right includes the right of alienation, and therefore 
the characteristic that upon trade property is transferred.535 An 
inalienability rule, on the other hand, takes alienation out of a bundle of 
                                                
529 See section 4.1. 
530 See section 4.2. 
531 See section 4.3. 
532 See section 4.4. 
533 See chapters 2 and 3. 
534 See chapter 3, particularly section 3.4. 
535 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Review 85, no. 6 
(1972): 1089. 
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rights, hence including a prohibition to transfer the good to others in a 
binding way.536  
Similarly to an inalienability rule, the right to be forgotten would 
include the right to nullify ex-post any transfer of personal information 
which had consent of the data subject as a legitimizing basis. In such way, 
it would include the possibility to retract the good offered (personal 
information) without returning the good obtained (use of a product).537 
Under a full property rule of informational privacy, transfers of private 
information would be binding for the data subject offering such 
information, who would not be able to take it back without the consent of 
the person he contracted with. Under an inalienability rule, on the other 
hand, the data subject would be able to nullify the transfer and obtain the 
information back. This ability to claim back the exchanged good is 
functionally equivalent to the power that would be given to data subjects 
by the right to be forgotten. 
As it was seen, property rules over personal information were 
considered under the suggested framework to be too protective for 
informational privacy.538 This is even more so with an inalienability rule, 
which would imply a higher level of protection than a property rule. It has 
been argued that data protection presents a convex function with respect 
to the amount of information available, and that both a zero protection 
rule and an absolute protection rule would reduce the amount of 
information available.539 For this reason, the right to be forgotten would be 
considered too protective if the objective is to increase information flow.540 
                                                
536 See Ibid.; Randy Barnett, “Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 4 (1986): 179. 
537 This would be, in some sense, similar to a permission to breach a contract, if 
privacy policies were taken to be so. 
538 See section 2.4.2. 
539 See chapter 2, in particular section 2.3. 
540 This coincides with the argument that informational privacy does not fit within 
the traditional justifications for inalienability given from an economic perspective. 
See Kenneth Arrow, “Gifts and Exchanges,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 4 
(1972): 343; Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the Theory of Property 
Rights,” Columbia Law Review 85, no. 5 (1985): 931; David Andolfatto, “A Theory 
of Inalienable Property Rights,” Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 2 (2002): 
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This theoretical prediction falls in line with the concrete concerns 
expressed regarding freedom of expression and access to information,541 
and is confirmed by experimental data suggesting that the right to be 
forgotten does not reduce chilling effects of information sharing.542 
4.5.2. An alternative formulation of the right 
To this one can add one last consideration regarding the scope of the right. 
The right to be forgotten regulates simultaneously two situations that 
involve different agents in the interaction. First, there is the case of 
someone sharing personal information about himself and then wanting to 
delete that information—for example, Stacy Synder. Second, there is the 
case of someone sharing information about someone else, and that second 
person wanting to delete that information—for example, Mario Costeja.  
These situations present different incentive structures with 
different costs and benefits. The first involves a degree of relevance for 
flexibility, while the second does not. One can ask, due to this, if it is 
possible to formulate an alternative version of the right that can maintain 
that benefit while avoiding its larger costs. 
The main economic reason in favor of the right, it was argued, is 
that data subjects acquire an additional flexibility that is helpful when 
dealing to the uncertain hazard rate that sharing personal information 
implies. That reason refers to the first of the two situations that are 
regulated by the right. The most important costs of the right, however, 
refer not to data subjects’ ability to eliminate the information they upload 
themselves, but the conflicts the right presents when allowing someone to 
eliminate data that has been uploaded by someone else. It is when one 
allows people to delete information which is shared by someone else that 
                                                                                                                            
382; Shi-Ling Hsu, “A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property 
Rights Regimes,” University of California Davis Law Review 36, no. 4 (2003): 813; 
Lee Anne Fennell, “Adjusting Alienability,” Harvard Law Review 122, no. 5 
(2009): 1403. 
541 See sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. 
542 See Yoan Hermstruwer and Stephan Dickert, “Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: 
An Experiment on Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten,” Preprints of 
the Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods (Bonn, 2013). 
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the right presents conflicts with freedom of expression, freedom of press, 
right to access information, and welfare impacts in the form of obstacles 
regarding chilling effects and potential harms to valuable information.543  
Although this means that there are arguments to consider that the 
right to be forgotten has an economic reason behind it, this reason would 
not include cases in which freedom of expression is concerned, since 
flexibility is only relevant when one is evaluating whether to disclose 
information about oneself. The problematic that the second situation 
currently approached by the right to be forgotten presents (information 
published about others) is the potentiality of a negative externality from 
the publisher of the data to the person to whom the data refers. This is an 
equivalent externality to those which traditional tort law internalizes, 
which seems to indicate that this branch of law is sufficient to internalize 
this problem as well. Moreover, the situation presents an incentive 
structure that is not modified by the technological developments which 
motivate DPL: publishing information about someone else in an online 
newspaper and in a physical newspaper introduce, essentially, the same 
challenges for privacy, freedom of expression and access to information. 
In these lines, an alternative formulation of the right can be 
suggested. One could propose a version of the right to be forgotten where 
data subjects can request data processors and data controllers to eliminate 
the content they shared themselves, while not extending this right to 
information that was shared by others. This formulation is equivalent to 
the first, more restrictive interpretation of the right. In turn, it is 
supported by the intuition that it is often appropriate to have two different 
regulations where there are two different situations involving different 
actors with different incentives. The second case, in which someone shares 
information about someone else, can also present problems, but these are 
similar to the problems generated by newspapers, photo cameras and 
                                                
543 The Peltzman effect would remain. 
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televisions, and which traditional privacy law has been able to address 
long before the existence of DPL.544 
This tailored alternative presents the advantage of avoiding most of 
the mentioned costs of the right to be forgotten. While it strips internet 
users of some of the benefits they can derive from the right in the proposed 
regulation, it maintains the benefit of flexibility, which seems to be the 
main welfare gain from the right. 
This proposal, in addition, is in line with the suggestion made 
before that, in order to incentivize information, there should be a higher 
level of protection where consent is the basis for data processing than in 
those cases where external parties incurred in costs to develop such 
information, and with the argument that in order to incentivize the 
generation of information some property interests should be granted to the 
creator of information, independently of whom the information is about.545 
A limitation that the right could present in any of its forms is that 
it might create a risk compensation problem. It is not always possible to 
take information back, even when exercising a right to be forgotten. If data 
subjects are not fully aware of this, they might have a false feeling of 
safety when sharing personal information, and this effect could turn the 
right useless or even counterproductive, depending on its magnitude.546 
4.6.  A Step in the Right Direction? 
The chapter shows some unintended consequences of the main policy 
change of the last decade regarding privacy. In the way in which is it 
formulated in the regulation proposal, the right to be forgotten overrides 
freedom of expression and access to information, has large implementation 
                                                
544 These are similar but not identical, since technology has also reduced the cost 
of acquiring information. However, there is an argumentative step to be made 
between the reduction of this cost and a regulation such as the right to be 
forgotten in its ample interpretation. 
545 See section 2.5.4. 
546 See Sam Peltzman, “The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation,” Journal of 
Political Economy 83, no. 4 (1975): 677. 
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costs, and could introduce a risk compensation problem that has the 
potential of making it self-defeating.  
 The question that is left to answer is then how much are data 
subjects willing to pay for the increase in flexibility that the right to be 
forgotten represents, both in the form of sacrificing parts of other 
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and access to 
information, and in the form of the social costs of monitoring that such 
measures would imply. The answer to this question will determine if a 
society will prefer mild regulations focusing on transparency,547 or if it will 
prefer the possibility for its members to be forgotten. 
Data subjects in a society could be willing to sacrifice a lot, leading 
to public-interest driven policymakers to accept the regulation proposal as 
it is. Also, they could also be willing to sacrifice less, leading the same 
policymakers to modify the scope of the right to one of the two more 
restrictive interpretations, in which one has the right to delete what one 
uploaded but not the right to delete information uploaded by someone else. 
This would retain the risk compensation problem but it would eliminate 
the frictions with freedom of expression and access to information, together 
with most of its costs. Finally, by accepting that the right to be forgotten 
cannot be properly enforced by one jurisdiction alone, they could be willing 
to sacrifice little or nothing at all, and abstain from incorporating the right 
to be forgotten in any of its forms. These options present, after all, a 
societal choice that depends on the values that are placed on each of these 
rights, which makes it unsurprising that some jurisdictions (such as the 
EU) are discussing strong version of the right while others (such as the 
US) are not considering the right at all. 
The right to be forgotten can mean different things in the European 
data protection regime, among which the GDRP seems to pertain to the 
stricter one and Google v. Spain seems to pertain to none. The case is 
centrally about defining the legal obligations of intermediaries such as 
search engines under the directive. In it, the CJEU dictates that the 
                                                
547 See section 3.5.2. 
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processing of data, which is no longer relevant, violates the terms of the 
directive and extends the right to erasure and the right to objection to 
include search engines as a consequence of considering them data 
controllers (question 2) who fall under the jurisdiction of the European 
data protection system (question 1). Defenders of freedom of expression 
might be relieved. One should not forget, still, that it can be dangerous to 
censor search. 
4.7.  Appendix to chapter 4  
Proposed modification of article 17(1)  
 
Article 17 
Right to be forgotten and to erasure 
1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller 
the erasure of their personal data and the abstention from its 
further dissemination, especially in relation to personal data which 
are made available by the data subject while he or she was a child, 
where one of the following grounds applies:  
a. the data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they were collected or otherwise processed;  
b. the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is 
based according to point (a) of Article 6(1); 
c. the storage period consented to has expired; 
d. there is no legal ground for processing of the data.  
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5. Online Tracking  
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5.1.  Regulating Cookies for Online Tracking 
Most of the content on the internet is financed through advertising.548 
From this perspective, it is advertisers, and in particular online behavioral 
advertisers, who receive the main benefits from tracking devices such as 
cookies. Unlike methods of mass advertising such as billboards, the 
internet is able to show personalized content. Having more information 
about data subjects’ interests, companies are able to increase the relevance 
of advertisements, targeting the particular interests of the person to whom 
the advertisement is shown. This increase in relevance allows for an 
increment in sales, and in turn for a higher rent for advertising spots, 
allowing for an increment in revenue both for sellers and websites. The 
click-through rate of advertisements (the fraction of visitors that click on 
them), commonly used as a measure of their success, has been shown to 
increase by approximately 670% with online behavioral advertisement 
compared to traditional advertisements.549  
The most commonly used devices for this function are cookies. 
Cookies are small text files that websites send to their visitors’ devices—
such as a computer, a tablet, or a smartphone—where they are stored. 
Cookies, later on, allow these websites to identify the device when it visits 
the website again, remembering some details about the interaction. Their 
function is to identify devices for websites.  
There are two main types of cookies. Session cookies disappear 
when the browser is closed, while permanent cookies remain in storage. 
The latter has several sub-types, such as third-party cookies, which 
automatically send the information they contain to other parties. Data 
subjects who know how, can delete (permanent) cookies they have in 
                                                
548 See Lokke Moerel, Big Data Protection. How to Make the Draft EU Regulation 
on Data Protection Future Proof (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 2014). 
Chapter 1. See also Alexander Furnas, “It’s Not All about You: What Privacy 
Advocates Don't Get about Data Tracking on the Web,” The Atlantic, March 15, 
2012. 
549 See Jun Yan et al., “How Much Can Behavioral Targeting Help Online 
Advertising?,” in Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on 
World Wide Web (New York: ACM, 2009), 261. 
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storage by using the options in their browsers or directly from the 
operating systems in their devices. 
Cookies can also present benefits for data subjects. They make 
navigation faster, prevent people from having to enter information such as 
their language preferences or their username and password repeatedly, 
and allow for useful features such as a shopping cart. They sometimes also 
increase the relevance of what is shown to a data subject on the internet, 
disregarding useless information and potentially saving his time550—such 
as in the case of Google searches, and some advertisements that the data 
subject might genuinely be interested in seeing. 
The main disadvantage of tracking devices is that they can make 
public certain pieces of information that people prefer to keep private, 
raising privacy concerns. This disadvantage is especially present regarding 
sensitive information, which typically consists of information that could be 
a basis for discrimination, such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
sexual orientation or religious beliefs. 
This chapter recurs to the experience of the EU and the behavioral 
economics literature on default rules to shed light on the question of how 
we can improve existing regulations on online tracking devices such as 
cookies. The argument made here is that few European regulations 
effectively prohibited tracking unless there is a previous and explicit 
manifestation of consent, and they faced severe difficulties in their 
implementation because behaviorally biased data subjects were framed by 
websites into opting into the tracking system.  
This framework leads to suggesting policy changes to approach 
online tracking. What the literature refers to as an active choice system 
presents itself as a strong candidate to achieve the goals of default-based 
policies in this case. Additionally, price theory seems to indicate that 
regulations could have undesirable unintended consequences unless they 
treat different kinds of cookies in a different way, in particular session 
cookies and permanent cookies. Finally, a way of tackling what the default 
                                                
550 See Weihong Peng and Jenniffer Cisna, “HTTP Cookies. A Promising 
Technology,” Online Information Review 24, no. 2 (2000): 150. 
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rules framework indicates as a central weakness of the current 
implementations of the policy can be engaging web browsers, who have 
fewer incentives to frame data subjects than websites, as the enforcing 
agents of the policy, even if they are not data controllers. 
The next section introduces the literature in behavioral economics 
on regulatory default rules, which can be used to study the online tracking 
regulations. Section 5.3 reviews the online tracking policy debate and some 
of its suggested solutions. Following this, section 5.4 explains the 
regulations that were made in the framework of the EU directives, with 
particular attention to The Netherlands and the UK, which are 
representative examples of implementations with explicit and implicit 
consent, respectively. Section 5.5 evaluates these regulations from the 
perspective of the behavioral literature introduced. Section 5.6 provides 
policy suggestions which combine this literature with the lessons derived 
from the Dutch and British experiences, and section 5.7 concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2.  Regulatory Default Rules 
5.2.1. Reason to regulate  
The main economic problem that appears in this interaction seems to be an 
asymmetric information problem. Websites know more than data subjects 
about the cookies that they install in their devices and data subjects do not 
know enough about them to be able to provide informed consent, which 
was identified as the aim of the regulation.  
This, however, is not enough of a reason in itself to justify a 
regulatory intervention from an economic viewpoint, since regulation 
cannot always perform better than the market at solving information 
asymmetries. Data subjects, for example, might be able to educate 
themselves about the functioning of cookies in a less costly way than the 
one implied by a regulation about them. Websites could also have some 
degree of incentives to care about their users’ privacy since that would 
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bring them more revenue from privacy-informed data subjects—even when 
such interest for privacy would be lower than the interest of data subjects 
themselves. More importantly, a change from an opt-out to an opt-in 
default system should not matter for well-informed and rational data 
subjects in a scenario where the cost of switching system is very low. This 
leaves us with two possibilities. 
One possibility is considering that data subjects are well informed 
and rational. Since the costs of opting in or opting out the default system 
are low in this context, if data subjects are fully informed and rational 
then they should choose the system according to their preferences, and the 
number of people opting into a tracking system under a do-not-track (DNT) 
default should be the same as the number of people not opting out of the 
tracking system under a track-me default. In such a case, a regulation 
changing the default system would be unhelpful. Under this assumption, 
adopting an opt-in system with explicit consent, an opt-in system with 
implicit consent, or an opt-out system, would be irrelevant. What is more, 
since explicit consent implies more transaction costs, the most protective 
system would be, in this scenario, the worst alternative of the three. 
 The other possibility is to consider that the informational 
asymmetry is part of a composite problem. One could consider that data 
subjects not only are uninformed about the specifics of cookies, but also 
they do not want to be informed. This could be so because the costs of 
informing themselves are too high, relating to the uncertainty problem 
addressed before, and the costs for companies of informing consumers are 
also high in terms of loss of information acquired and as a consequences of 
profit from advertising.551 Alternatively, it could be due to a status-quo 
bias—which could be caused either by reference dependence or by implied 
endorsement.552 Along these lines, one could consider that—as it is 
                                                
551 See chapter 3. 
552 See Craig McKenzie, Michael Liersch, and Stacey Finkelstein, 
“Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults,” Psychological Science 17, no. 5 
(2006): 414.  
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explored in the following subsection—a change in the choice system is 
significant because data subjects tend to stick to the default rule.553 
This would lead to an approach in which the regulatory 
intervention aims at protecting data subjects that do not engage in the 
necessary actions to protect themselves. 
5.2.2. Sticking to the default 
A few years ago, Thaler and Sunstein coined the term libertarian 
paternalism.554 They argued, based on different findings of behavioral 
economics, in favor of choice design mechanisms that nudge people into 
making better choices without reducing their range of options, or coercing 
them into choosing one thing in particular. 
One way to nudge people into making a choice is changing the 
default option—from an opt-out system to an opt-in system, or vice-versa. 
Default-based policies apply the research on the status-quo bias, which 
indicates that, when offered a choice that contains a default, people have a 
tendency to remain in that default option.555 This effect, which is relevant 
for nudging in choice design, is found even when the costs of switching 
away from the default choice are close to zero (such as ticking a box in a 
form the person is handed).556 
The tendency to stick to the default choice has been found in several 
domains. Adherence to savings plans has been found to increase up to 50% 
                                                
553 See Russell Korobkin, “Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The 
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms,” Vanderbilt Law Review 
51, no. 6 (1998): 1583. 
554 See Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, “Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron,” The University of Chicago Law Review 70, no. 4 (2003): 1159; Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” American Economic Review 
93, no. 2 (2003): 175. 
555 See William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (1988): 7; Daniel Kahneman, Jack 
Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 193. 
556 See Cass Sunstein, “Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. 
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01 (Boston, 2013); Eric Johnson and Daniel Goldstein, “Defaults and Donation 
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when employees are enrolled automatically.557 The number of organ donors 
has been found to be much higher in countries where being a donor is the 
default choice—also when comparing countries with similar cultures—with 
differences of up to 400%.558 The effect has been also found in insurance,559 
food choices560 and, lastly, in online marketing, where the difference in the 
number of consumers who accept e-mail marketing has been found to vary 
up to 50% depending on the default.561 
In contracts most rules are default rules, ultimately leaving the 
decision over their incorporation to the parties,562 but in regulations 
defaults are a less orthodox approach. Default choices that attempt to 
nudge people can be either established as policy defaults or as penalty 
defaults. Policy defaults aim at increasing the amount of people that will 
choose the default option, relying on user inertia to make most people 
remain in the default choice.563 Penalty defaults, on the other hand, aim at 
providing some private party with an incentive to provide information to 
another private party in order to correct for rent-seeking behavior under 
information asymmetries.564 In such way, penalty defaults rely on the 
                                                
557 See Brigitte Madrian and Dennis Shea, “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 
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563 See Craig McKenzie, Michael Liersch, and Stacey Finkelstein, 
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incentives of the agent with more information to initiate a negotiation in 
order to persuade the other agent to switch away from the default 
choice.565 
The general principle in default rules is that the default should be 
set in the option that the parties would have chosen if contracting was 
costless. In other words, the judge or regulator should rule as the parties 
would have decided if they had expressed their preference explicitly.566 
Both policy defaults and penalty defaults, however, stand in contrast to 
rules that the parties to the interaction want. The appeal of policy default 
rules in this context comes from a paternalistic aim to shape people’s 
preferences.567 The appeal of penalty defaults stems from the idea that, 
under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, without knowing ex-ante if they will be 
contract drafters or contract adherents, potential parties would (ex-ante) 
have wanted the default as well—the benefit for the contract adherent 
would be larger than the disfavor for the contract drafter.568  
Penalty defaults are intended, as mentioned above, for contexts of 
information asymmetries where the party with more information 
withholds that information from his counterpart engaging in rent-seeking 
behavior. This behavior occurs when such withholding reduces the size of 
the surplus to be divided between the parties, and the party withholding 
the information still does so in order to achieve a larger portion of such 
surplus for himself. This is possible when the share-of-the-pie-effect is 
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larger than the size-of-the-pie effect.569 In those cases it is efficient to set a 
rule that incentivizes the party to reveal the information since that will 
increase the size of the surplus to be divided. In an analogous way to 
presumptions in procedural law, penalty defaults in these contexts can 
sometimes counteract those incentives to strategically withhold 
information, making the rule attractive under a veil of ignorance.570 
 This said, default rules (both under the policy type and under the 
penalty type) have disadvantages. From the perspective of information, 
precisely because of the status-quo bias, default rules cannot express true 
preferences as well as active choices.571 When people stick to a default 
choice, it is not always possible to know if they did so because they 
genuinely prefer that option or if they did so because of inertia.572  
From the perspective of incentives, penalty defaults face the 
additional disadvantage that default rules have the potential of creating 
an endowment effect for the parties,573 which is intended for policy defaults 
but not for penalty defaults. A default rule necessarily establishes a 
certain status-quo from which parties can negotiate away, but the 
establishment of such status-quo can work in such a way that the person 
who benefited from the default will require a higher compensation to 
forfeit it than that he would have offered to acquire it, even when parties 
                                                
569 See Ibid. 
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have a clear valuation of the rights in play.574 This means that whatever 
default rule is chosen, it will generate situations in which the rule stays 
without being the most beneficial outcome for the parties, which reduces 
the difference in the outcomes of mandatory rules and default rules that is 
suggested by traditional economic analysis.575 Hence—as long as the 
objective is not to shape preferences—this general disadvantage of penalty 
defaults is a good reason to consider implementing a requirement for 
parties to select the preferred option or to set a default that is preferred by 
the majority, as opposed to a penalty default, when the information release 
generated by the default is low.576 
 Which type of default rule one will consider that was established by 
the amended e-Privacy Directive will depend on the aim one considers the 
directive has. If the aim of the directive is to reduce the overall amount of 
tracking devices being installed, then the default would be a policy default, 
while if its aim was to ensure informed consent, as it is considered here, 
then the default would be a penalty default. The idea that a DNT default 
in cookies works as a penalty default has been suggested before.577 There 
are good reasons, in fact, to consider that by changing the default option 
into the one that is more burdensome for websites (independently of how 
much each option benefits consumers) the choice mechanism forces them 
to educate data subjects in order to get them to switch away from the 
default.578 
This leads to the expectation—which might have been shared by 
the drafters of the Electronic Communications Framework Directive and of 
the Dutch cookie law—that changing the default system for cookies from 
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577 See Jay Kesan and Rajiv Shah, “Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from 
Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics,” Notre Dame Law Review 82, 
no. 2 (2006): 583. 
578 See Ibid. 
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an opt-out to an opt-in will leave data subjects better informed on the 
functions, the advantages and the disadvantages of cookies.  
5.2.3. When default rules fail 
In some cases, default rules do not give out the expected outcomes.  
A condition under which default rules are likely to fail is when they 
trust their own application to an agent who (i) has an interest on whether 
the other agents involved make a choice switch, and (ii) has the power of 
shaping the way the default rule is presented.579 Choice architecture can 
be a powerful device when policymakers design the choice mechanism but, 
when the choice is being designed by companies, they can often circumvent 
policymakers’ intentions.580 This possibility to circumvent regulation is 
especially attractive with penalty defaults, where the party engaging in 
rent-seeking behavior should find its profit reduced by the default rule. 
 An example of a penalty default not meeting its objective due to this 
mistake was the regulation for overdraft charges in the US. A national 
regulation required banks to obtain prior and explicit consent from their 
consumers (hence opting in) in order to provide them with overdraft 
coverage. The drafters of the regulation stated explicitly that they 
intended it as a default rule intended to protect consumers. However, most 
consumers opted-in, and the policy was considered a failure.581 
 Why was that so? When faced with the regulation, banks sent a 
letter to their consumers asking them if they wanted to keep their account 
the same and maintain the benefit they had so far of being able to 
withdraw money on overdraft, or to change the status of their account, by 
checking either yes or no in a form. The forms gave the options “yes: keep 
my account working the same with Shareplus ATM and debit card 
overdraft coverage / no: change my account to remove Shareplus ATM and 
                                                
579 See Lauren Willis, “When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults,” University of 
Chicago Law Review 80, no. 3 (2013): 1155. 
580 See Ibid.; Lauren Willis, “Why Not Privacy By Default?,” Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal 29, no. 1 (2014): 61. 
581 See Ibid. 
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debit card overdraft coverage.”582 Advertising done by banks, additionally, 
stated “Don’t lose your ATM and debit card overdraft protection.”583  
What banks were able to do without breaching the law, in other 
words, was to manipulate the opt-in system into an active choice. An active 
choice or forced choice system is one in which agents (in this case bank 
clients) do not face a clear default but are faced with two alternatives from 
which they must choose.584 Moreover, the choice was not neutral. Banks 
were able to change the perception of the status-quo and prime consumers 
into opting into the system by favoring one alternative in the active choice 
and highlighting the losses in the other.585 The regulation failed because it 
did not take into account that it targeted agents (banks) who were 
behaviorally informed (they were aware of the effects of default rules and 
active choices) and whose interests were against it.586 
For a change in the default choice system to yield the expected 
results people under both regimes must be treated, to the extent that this 
is possible, in the same way, yielding the same payoffs regardless of the 
choice under which they place themselves.587 If companies are able to 
present their customers with increasing incentives to switch choice, then 
most benefits of a default system will be lost. Regulation can 
hypothetically establish limits on to what extent differential treatment is 
allowed, but those limits are difficult to establish and even more difficult to 
monitor.588 The bank overdraft regulation could have been more specific in 
the design of the choice mechanism but it is likely that, even if in a less 
overt manner, banks would have found a way to re-frame the choice, and 
                                                
582 See Lauren Willis, “When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults,” University of 
Chicago Law Review 80, no. 3 (2013): 1155. 
583 See Lauren Willis, “Why Not Privacy By Default?,” Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 29, no. 1 (2014): 61. 
584 See Gabriel Carroll et al., “Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 124, no. 4 (2009): 1639. 
585 See Punam Keller et al., “Enhanced Active Choice: A New Method to Motivate 
Behavior Change,” Journal of Consumer Psychology 21, no. 4 (2011): 376. 
586 See Cass Sunstein, “Acceptance Speech for the Title of Honorary Doctor at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam,” November 8, 2013.  
587 See Lauren Willis, “Why Not Privacy By Default?,” Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 29, no. 1 (2014): 61. 
588 See Ibid. 
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the more specific choice design would have carried high monitoring costs 
without ensuring a benefit. This, at is will be seen later, has implications 
for online tracking.589 
5.3.  Policy Debate 
5.3.1. First considerations 
The central polemic which online tracking devices generate is that they are 
installed on data subjects’ devices without their explicit consent, which 
often means that they are installed without their consent at all.590 
Additionally, it has become a common practice to utilize third-party 
cookies, which are considered especially problematic because they allow for 
data subjects’ data to be directly aggregated by a different website or 
advertising company than the one the data subject interacts with, often 
without his awareness. 
Unlike social networks, where data subjects share their information 
and know who has it in storage, in the case of tracking devices it is 
possible that in the absence of regulation data subjects do not know who 
collects their personal information, and who stores it. While social 
networks are familiar to the data subjects whose information they retain, 
that is not the case for data brokers, which are not consumer-facing. 
These features can, on top of the societal costs produced by the 
potential individual harm derived from privacy breaches, lead data 
subjects to consider the internet as an unsafe environment. This can lead 
data subjects to equate all advertising with spam or attempt to block all 
advertising on privacy concerns, which is an undesirable result for all 
agents in the interaction. This leads to the question of whether regulation 
                                                
589 See section 5.5.2. 
590 See Joasia Luzak, “Much Ado about Cookies: The European Debate on the New 
Provisions of the ePrivacy Directive Regarding Cookies,” European Review of 
Private Law 21, no. 1 (2013): 221. 
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should allow websites and advertisers to continue tracking data subjects 
without their knowledge or consent.591  
5.3.2. The EU directives 
The regulatory efforts regarding tracking devices such as cookies started 
in Europe with the Data Protection Directive (1995)592 and continued with 
the e-Privacy Directive (2002)593, the Electronic Communications 
Framework Directive (2009),594 and country-level regulations made on 
their basis.  
The Data Protection Directive—applicable whenever there is 
collection, processing or storing of personal information595—establishes the 
purpose specification principle,596 according to which any collection, 
processing or storing of personal data must be done based on a specific, 
explicit and legitimate purpose. The latter indicates that companies need a 
legitimizing basis to collect personal data, of which the most common is 
consent.597 
At the passing of the Data Protection Directive, cookies were still a 
new technology, having been created only one year before.598 Under the 
framework of a directive that was meant for protecting personal 
information in general, the EU implicitly adopted an opt-out system for 
cookies. This meant that data subjects were considered to have given their 
consent for the installation of cookies unless they indicated otherwise, but 
                                                
591 See Lauren Willis, “Why Not Privacy By Default?,” Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 29, no. 1 (2014): 61. 
592 Directive 1995/46/EC. 
593 Directive 2002/58/EC. 
594 Directive 2009/136/EC. 
595 Directive 1995/46/EC, article 2(a). 
596 See A29WP, “O.J. 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation” (Brussels, October 2, 2013). 
597 Directive 1995/46/EC, article 2(h). 
598 Cookies were created in 1994 by Montulli and Giannandrea at Netscape. Before 
that, the way to trade these data was with session identifiers, which form a 
relatively unsafe system since there is no guarantee that only one person is using 
the identifier. 
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they had to be given an option to opt-out of the system.599 In other words, 
they were given a right to refuse tracking.  
After the passing of the directive, the use of cookies increased and 
issues of privacy in electronic commerce gained more prominence. The 
system in force had the problem that data subjects did not have an easy 
way of exercising the refusal: they could not directly tell a website to avoid 
installing cookies on their devices but had to use one of the available PETs 
to block their installation. Although this feature is now usually available 
in web browsers themselves, this option was not so salient and not all data 
subjects knew how to operate it. This led policymakers to pass the e-
Privacy Directive, concerning data protection specifically in the electronic 
communications sector. 
  At the passing of the e-Privacy Directive there was a debate on 
whether there should be a change towards an opt-in system where data 
subjects’ prior explicit consent is required for the use of cookies. The opt-
out system was maintained mainly due to industry arguments, which 
claimed that the change would hinder electronic commerce.600 As a result, 
article 5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive essentially repeated the 
requirements of the Data Protection Directive—which can be useful for 
clarification purposes, as they have a relation of lex specialis and lex 
generalis, but did not add new rights or obligations.601 Article 5(3) 
reinforced the right to refuse tracking, leaving data collectors with two 
main obligations: to provide information about the purposes of information 
collection and to give data subjects the right to refuse it (opt-out). 
In 2009, the Electronic Communications Framework Directive was 
passed introducing modifications to the e-Privacy directive and changing 
article 5(3). The new article requires for the installation of technologies 
                                                
599 See Joasia Luzak, “Much Ado about Cookies: The European Debate on the New 
Provisions of the ePrivacy Directive Regarding Cookies,” European Review of 
Private Law 21, no. 1 (2013): 221. 
600 See Sylvia Mercado Kierkegaard, “How the Cookies (almost) Crumbled: Privacy 
& Lobbyism,” Computer Law & Security Review 21, no. 4 (2005): 310. 
601 See Frederic Debussere, “The EU E-Privacy Directive: A Monstrous Attempt to 
Starve the Cookie Monster?,” International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 13, no. 1 (2005): 70. 
 
 
177 
that collect information that the data subject has given his consent. In this 
way, the article seems to indicate that consent has to be given previously, 
since although the word “previous consent” is not used, it refers to consent 
that “has [been] given.”602 
These regulations were complemented with the Working Document 
02/2013 (“providing guidance on obtaining consent for cookies”), which 
requires that data subjects are offered a real and meaningful choice, and 
that websites obtain their consent before installing any cookies. According 
to the A29WP, the EU finally moved with the new article 5(3) into an opt-
in system.603 Still, the wording of the article does not rule-out the 
possibility of implicit consent, only requiring it to be previous. In the use of 
the terms by its interpretative authority, it seems that for an opt-in system 
to be in force only previous consent is necessary, being thus possible to 
have opt-in systems with implicit and with explicit consent. 604 
5.3.3. Regulatory aim 
The debate on tracking devices as a subject of regulatory concern emerges 
in the framework of privacy and data protection on the internet, which is a 
high priority topic in the Digital Agenda for Europe 2020.605 In that 
context, the A29WP has expressed that control over one’s personal 
                                                
602 This does not concern cookies specifically but is technology-neutral, and aims to 
regulate the tracking of data subjects by any means. This said, the directive refers 
to “the storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already 
stored”, which limits its scope as it excludes tracking technologies that do not 
store information in a device nor retrieve information that is stored, such as some 
cases of fingerprinting or IP addresses. See Peter Eckersley, “How Unique Is Your 
Web Browser?,” in Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, ed. Mikhail 
Atallah and Nicholas Hopper (Berlin: Springer Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, 2010), 1. 
603 A29WP, “O.J. 2/2010 on Online Behavioral Advertising” (Brussels, June 22, 
2010). 13; A29WP, “O.J. 15/2011 On the Definition of Consent” (Brussels, July 13, 
2011). 9, 30.  
604 In these lines, here we will consider that for an opt-in system to be in force only 
previous consent is strictly necessary. 
605 See European Commission, “Digital Agenda for Europe. A Europe 2020 
Initiative,” 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/. Pillar III, action 35. 
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information is a central aspect of informational privacy, where control is 
commonly instrumented by consent.606  
Consent is additionally mentioned as a determinant of lawfulness 
in the Data Protection Directive,607 to which the e-Privacy Directive and 
the Electronic Communications Framework Directive refer to in the 
subject matter. While the same directive mentions the importance of 
explicit consent,608 it does not discard the possibility to manifest it 
implicitly, defining it as “any freely given specific and informed indication 
of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement.”609 
Consent as a regulatory aim, additionally, seems deductible from 
article 5(1) of the e-Privacy Directive on the confidentiality of 
communications, which determines the rationale of article 5(3). Article 5(1) 
focuses on the fact that the data subject has provided consent for the 
interception of his communications. This idea is further confirmed by 
document 02/2013 of the A29WP (“providing guidance on obtaining consent 
for cookies”). 
Finally, this idea is in line with article 8.2 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU on protection of personal data, which 
highlights the importance of consent to ensure a right to privacy. 
In sum, the aim of these regulations seems to be to ensure data 
subjects’ meaningful consent as a requirement for online tracking.  
5.3.4. A comparison with the US 
Although the US does not have yet a specific regulation on the topic to be 
compared with the European approach, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the US Commerce Department have suggested the 
implementation a DNT header in browsers.610 The header works in a 
                                                
606 See A29WP, “O.J. 15/2011 On the Definition of Consent” (Brussels, July 13, 
2011). 
607 Directive 1995/46/EC, recital 30. 
608 Directive 1995/46/EC, recital 33. 
609 Directive 1995/46/EC, article 2(h). 
610 See Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, “To Track or ‘Do Not Track’: Advancing 
Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising,” 
Minnessota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 13, no. 1 (2012): 281. This idea 
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similar way to the do-not-call registry, which was a list first created in the 
US and then incorporated by other countries in which people can subscribe 
to remove their telephone numbers from public lists and avoid receiving 
calls from telemarketers. 
The DNT header is an HTTP header field that is meant to express 
the preference of the data subject regarding tracking—for this reason, it is 
often referred to as the DNT browser feature.611 If the header is set to 1, it 
shows that the data subject does not want to be tracked, and if it is set to 0 
it shows the data subject does not object to tracking. There is also the 
possibility to send no header at all, which is the default mode. All five 
major browsers already have this possibility embedded.612 
While valuable, the limitations of the DNT header are significant. 
The header expresses a preference, but it does not block tracking devices, 
and websites can choose whether to respect the data subject’s wishes or 
not. Setting the default header to 1, thus expressing that the user of the 
device does not want to be tracked unless he expresses otherwise,613 would 
be in some way a default DNT system similar to the one implemented by 
the amended e-Privacy Directive, although no binding for websites. For 
this reason, it is understandable that some might think it is not enough to 
enhance data protection. 
Despite pressures to incorporate a stricter regulatory approach to 
online tracking in the US, the FTC has confirmed that it considers DNT a 
feasible data protection mechanism.614 Its 2012 privacy report states, in 
addition, that despite consumer inertia the difference between opt-in and 
                                                                                                                            
started in 2007 when public interest groups which focus on privacy issues (such as 
World Privacy Forum, CDT and EFF) requested the FTC to incorporate a DNT list 
for online behavioral advertising. 
611 It is also sometimes called the DNT policy, which is an inconvenient term as it 
is not the only possible policy that stops online tracking devices. 
612 Last year, the Tracking Protection Working Group moved DNT to “last call 
status”, which means that from a technological standpoint it is complete and 
ready to be implemented. See W3C Tracking Protection Working Group, “W3C 
Last Call Working Draft,” Tracking Preference Expression (DNT), April 24, 2014.  
613 This was done, for example, by Internet Explorer. 
614 This runs contrary to the opinion of A29WP in the matter. See A29WP, “O.J. 
2/2010 on Online Behavioral Advertising” (Brussels, June 22, 2010). 13. 
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opt-out mechanisms is not relevant for online privacy, clearly separating 
itself from the opinion of EU policymakers.615 
On a different line, a legislation proposal called the Securely Protect 
Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act (also called “SPY Act”) has been 
taken to the legislative power, and is currently under committee 
evaluation in the US Senate. The act attempts to turn the default system 
for tracking devices in the US into an opt-in system.616 In particular, the 
act states that, in order for tracking devices to be allowed, it is required 
that the data subject has consented to them.617  
The protection mechanism of the SPY Act is equivalent to the 
provision of the e-Privacy Directive amended by the Electronic 
Communications Framework Directive. The experience that the EU had 
with its implementation, which follows in the next section, might then be 
useful not only to improve the European regulations themselves but also 
for other jurisdictions, to be able to incorporate the successful elements of 
the European opt-in system while avoiding its obstacles. 
5.4.  Implementation of the Directives 
5.4.1. Differing implementations in the EU 
Regarding the MS, some have chosen to stay within an opt-out system, 
either in breach of the amended e-Privacy Directive or in a different 
interpretation of it than that of the A29WP. Most, however, made 
modifications in their regulations.  
In order to evaluate how the different MS incorporated the 
directive, data were gathered from their legislations and regulations (when 
available) to determine if MS made any modifications in their regulatory 
framework after the change in directive took place. The applicable norms 
                                                
615 See Federal Trade Commission, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change. Recommendations for Business and Policymakers” (Washington, 
DC, March 26, 2012). 
616 Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, section (a)3. 
617 Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, section (a)(2)(A). 
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were searched for, together with their dates of modification, and countries 
were classified either under an opt-in or an opt-out system for online 
tracking. For the countries falling under the first, they were further 
classified either as opt-in with implicit consent allowed or opt-in with a 
requirement of explicit consent.  
Implicit consent (typically used in trials) is the consideration that a 
certain person has agreed on an action without explicitly manifesting such 
agreement; he has implicitly manifested it with his actions or his inaction 
upon particular circumstances.618 Although there are parallels between 
opt-in vs. opt-out systems and implicit vs. explicit consent—they both 
either give or do not give significance to inactivity—, they are not 
equivalent binomials. One can either implicitly or explicitly opt-in or opt-
out of a certain choice, and a legal system can adopt any combination of 
the two binomials for a certain choice. While the first classification refers 
to the timing of consent, the second refers to the form in which such 
consent must be given.  
Countries were considered to be under an opt-in system when 
previous consent was needed in order for websites to be allowed to track 
data subjects’ behavior, and in an opt-out system if this requirement was 
not present. Countries were classified under opt-in with explicit consent if 
their legislations additionally required that such previous consent is 
explicit, and under opt-in with implicit consent if such requirement was 
absent or if the legislation or the regulation specified that consent can be 
manifested implicitly.  
The following table schematizes how the directive was implemented 
in the different MS: 
Countr
y 
Norm Date of 
amend
ment 
Syst
em 
Cons
ent 
Authority  Regula
tion 
Austria Telecommunicati
ons Act (section 
96.3) 
22 
Novemb
er 2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Österreichisc
he 
Datenschutz
behörde 
No 
                                                
618 See Elizabeth Fuller, “Implied Consent Statutes: What Is Refusal?,” American 
Journal of Trial Advocacy 9 (1986). 
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Belgiu
m 
Electronic 
Communications 
Act 
28 June 
2012 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Commission 
de la 
protection de 
la vie privée / 
Belgian 
Telecom 
Regulator 
(IBPT) 
Yes 
Bulgari
a 
Electronic 
Messages Act 
29 
Decemb
er 2011 
Opt-
out 
- Commission 
for Personal 
Data 
Protection 
No  
Croatia Electronic 
Communications 
Act (Zakon o 
elektronikim 
komunikacijama) 
15 July 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Croatian 
Personal 
Data 
Protection 
Agency 
No  
Cyprus Regulation of 
Electronic 
Communication 
and Postal 
Services Law 
18 May 
2012 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Commissione
r for 
Personal 
Data 
Protection 
No  
Czech 
Republi
c 
Act No. 101/2000 
Coll. 
1 
January 
2012 
Opt-
out 
- Office for 
Personal 
Data 
Protection 
No  
Denmar
k 
Act on Electronic 
Communications 
Networks and  
Services (Act No. 
169) 
14 
Decemb
er 2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Datatilsynet Yes 
Estonia Electronic 
Communications 
Act 
Not 
amende
d 
Opt-
out 
- Estonian 
Data 
Protection 
Inspectorate 
N/A 
Finland Personal Data 
Act 
(Henkilötietolaki 
1999/523) 
25 May 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Office of the 
Data 
Protection  
(Data 
Protection 
Board) 
No  
France Article 32 II of 
the Act of 6 
January 1978 
27 
August 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Commission 
Nationale de 
l'Informatiqu
e et des 
Libertés 
Yes 
German
y 
Telecommunicati
ons Act 
Not 
amende
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Der 
Bundesbeauf
N/A 
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d tragte für 
den 
Datenschutz 
und die 
Informations
freiheit 
Greece Law 3471/2006 
amended by Law 
4070/2012 
10 April 
2012 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Hellenic 
Data 
Protection 
Authority 
 
Hungar
y 
Act CVII of 2011 
on 
Communications 
3 
August 
2011 
Opt-
out 
- Data 
Protection 
Commissione
r of Hungary 
No  
Ireland Electronic 
Communications 
Networks and 
Services 
1 July 
2011 
Opt-
out 
- Data 
Protection 
Commissione
r 
No  
Italy Article 122 of the 
Data Protection 
Code 
28 May 
2012 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Garante per 
la protezione 
dei dati 
personali 
Yes  
Latvia Law on 
Information 
Society Services 
8 June 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Data State 
Inspectorate 
No  
Lithuan
ia 
Law on 
Electronic 
Communications 
1 
August 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
State Data 
Protection 
Inspectorate 
Yes  
Luxemb
urg 
2005 Act on the 
specific 
provisions for the 
protection of 
individuals in 
relation to the 
processing of 
personal data in 
the electronic 
communications 
sector 
1 
Septemb
er 2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Commission 
Nationale 
pour la 
Protection 
des Données 
(CNPD) 
No  
Malta Legal Notice 239 
of 2011 
1 
January 
2013 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Office of the 
Data 
Protection 
Commissione
r 
No  
The 
Netherl
ands 
Telecommunicati
ons Act article 
11.7a 
5 June 
2012 
Opt-
in 
Expli
cit 
College 
bescherming 
persoonsgege
vens 
Yes 
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Poland Telecommunicati
ons Law 
22 
March 
2013 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Bureau of 
the Inspector 
General for 
the 
Protection of 
Personal 
Data 
No  
Portuga
l 
Law 46/2012 
amending Law 
41/2004 
29 
August 
2012 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Comissão 
Nacional de 
Protecção de 
Dados 
No  
Romani
a 
Ordinance 
13/2012 
amending Law 
506/2004 
26 April 
2012 
Opt-
out 
- National 
Supervisory 
Authority for 
Personal 
Data 
Processing 
No  
Slovaki
a 
Act on 
Electronic 
Communications 
1 
October 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Office for 
Personal 
Data 
Protection of 
the Slovak 
Republic 
No  
Sloveni
a 
Electronic 
Communications 
Act (ZEKom-1) 
15 
January 
2013 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Information 
Commissione
r 
Yes 
Spain Information 
Society and 
Electronic 
Commerce law 
(34/2002) 
amended by 
Royal Decree 
13/2012 
2 
April 
2012 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Agencia de 
Protección de 
Datos 
Yes 
Sweden Electronic 
Communications 
Act (Sw. lagen om 
elektronisk 
kommunikation, 
2003:389) 
1 July 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Datainspekti
onen 
Yes 
UK Regulation 6 
PECR 
26 May 
2011 
Opt-
in 
Impli
cit 
Office of the 
Information 
Commissione
r Executive 
Department 
Yes 
Table 4. Summarizes incorporation of the directive by EU country and 
classifies them by system. 
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Five years after the passing of the Electronic Communications 
Framework Directive, its implementation in the EU has occurred in the 
following way: there are six MS that decided to stay in an opt-out system 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Romania), 
twenty one that have incorporated an opt-in system but allowing for 
implicit consent (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia and UK), and one 
that has incorporated an opt-in system requiring explicit consent (The 
Netherlands). 
 Given that only The Netherlands seems to have chosen the most 
demanding system (opt-in with explicit consent) it can be useful to 
evaluate its regulation further and to compare it with an example of the 
most widespread system (opt-in with implicit consent).  
The British regulation was chosen for this function. Both the 
Netherlands and the UK have adopted article 5(3) of the directive almost 
literally following the wording of the e-Privacy directive in their 
legislations, and have undergone significant regulatory efforts to 
implement it. Like The Netherlands, the UK regulated the issue in a 
complete and detailed way that helps to avoid ambiguities. In addition, the 
British regulation is arguably the most complete of the ones allowing for 
implicit consent. It has been often taken by other MS as a reference and it 
is sometimes cited directly, as in the French regulation. 
5.4.2. The Dutch regulation 
In the Netherlands, the right to refuse cookies exists since 2004 (two years 
after the e-Privacy Directive), having been established by the ministerial 
decree Decision on Universal Services and End-user Interests (Besluit 
Universele Dienstverlening en Eindgebruikersbelangen). The 
implementation of the directive came in place with the modification of 
Article 11.7a of the Dutch telecommunications law (Telecommunicatiewet) 
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on 5 June 2012,619 which works in the framework of the Dutch Data 
Protection Act.620 The new article, in line with the modification of article 
5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive, states that websites cannot install cookies 
in data subjects’ devices without prior and specific consent (terms used by 
the directive).  
It is noticeable that the article, like the directive on which it is 
based (Electronic Communications Framework Directive), does not require 
consent to be explicit.621 It was the National Regulatory Authority in 
charge of supervising the implementation of the Dutch telecommunications 
law (OPTA)622 who added this requirement in its guidelines.623 The 
authority considered that the Dutch Data Protection Act—which states in 
its article 23a that explicit consent is required for the collection of personal 
data—is applicable to tracking technologies in telecommunications and, in 
particular, to cookies. The obvious objection to this interpretation is that 
not all cookies collect this type of information, but the Dutch authority 
applied an inverse burden of proof according to which all cookies are 
                                                
619 The article reads: “Anyone who wishes to use electronic communications 
networks to store information on a user’s equipment, or to obtain access to 
information already stored in the terminal equipment of a user should, unabated 
the Data Protection Act, a. provide the user with clear and comprehensive 
information in accordance with the Data Protection Act, and in any case about the 
purpose of storing this information, inter alia, gaining access to this information, 
and b. have obtained the user’s consent for the concerned activity.” Available (in 
Dutch) at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0009950/geldigheidsdatum_08-01-2014 
620 Telecommunicatiewet, articles 8 and 33.  
621 See Joasia Luzak, “Privacy Notice for Dummies? Towards European Guidelines 
on How to Give ‘Clear and Comprehensive Information’ on the Cookies’ Use in 
Order to Protect the Internet Users' Right to Online Privacy,” Journal of 
Consumer Policy 37, no. 1 (2014): 91. 
622 While Data Protection Authorities are concerned with the implementation of 
the Data Protection Directive, National Regulatory Authorities are concerned 
specifically with data protection in the telecommunications sector, as does the e-
Privacy Directive.  
The Dutch Data Protection Authority is the College Bescherming 
Persoonsgegevens (CBP). The Dutch National Regulatory Authority was the 
Dutch Independent Mail and Telecommunications Authority (Onafhankelijke Post 
en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit, OPTA) until April 1st 2013. In that date OPTA 
merged with the Consumer Authority (Consumentenautoriteit) and the 
Netherlands Competition Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit) to form 
the Authority for Consumer Market (Autoriteit Consument en Markt). 
623 See OPTA, “Veelgestelde Vragen over de Cookieregels,” February 2013. 
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considered to carry personal data unless proved otherwise by the data 
collector.624 Although it is usual for regulatory authorities to specify the 
application of a law, it is less usual for them to add a new and significant 
requirement of this sort. 
To comply with the regulation, websites do not install cookies in the 
visitor’s device upon entering, and display a banner asking if the visitor 
allows for the installation of cookies. When a certain website has asked a 
visitor for his consent, this can be stored in a cookie in the visitor’s device 
avoiding the need to ask again the next time the website is used—although 
the visitor can “opt-out” again by deleting the cookie that stored his 
consent. So, if the visitor clicks on “yes”, he will not be asked again. 
However, if he clicks on “no”, he will be re-asked every time he visits the 
website or another section of the website, since as cookies are not allowed 
there is no way to record the negative answer. 
If the visitor, when asked, refuses the installation of cookies, the 
website is allowed under the Dutch Regulation—same as in the e-Privacy 
Directive625—to block access.626 This disposition became known as the 
“cookie wall.” 
In sum, the Dutch regulation not only almost literally adopts the 
wording of the directive, but goes a step further in the implementation of 
an opt-in system by requiring explicit consent unless the website proves no 
personal data are collected by a certain cookie. 
5.4.3. Implicit consent in the British regulation 
As mentioned above, a useful case of implementation to compare with The 
Netherlands is that of the UK, which is a representative example of the 
opt-in system with implicit consent followed by twenty-one MS.  
The UK implemented its regulation on cookies by an amendment in 
the Regulation 6 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulations (PECR) on the 26 May 2011. The amended regulation follows 
                                                
624 See Ibid. 
625 Directive 2002/58/EC, recital 25. 
626 See Ibid. 4. 
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the language of the directive and requires in subsection 2(b) that the data 
subject “has given his or her consent”, while the previous disposition only 
required that the data subject is given an opportunity to refuse (opt-out). 
However, with the amendment of section 2 of Regulation 6 PECR to 
match the language of the amended e-Privacy Directive, section 3 was also 
amended redefining consent. The amended section 3 states that data 
subjects can signify consent when they make changes in the internet 
browser or some other program, hence allowing for implicit consent.627 
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) issued detailed 
guidelines in May 2012 on how websites should gather data subject’s 
consent about cookies.  
Regarding the timing of consent, the guidelines state that “it is 
difficult to see that a good argument could be made that agreement to an 
action could be obtained after the activity the agreement is needed for has 
already occurred. This is not the generally accepted way in which consent 
works in other areas, and is not what users will expect.”628 However, they 
only require consent to be prior “whenever possible.”629 
The ICO guidelines, in line with regulation 6 PECR, do not require 
explicit consent, and allow interpreting that implicit consent was given 
when visitors take certain actions indicating so, such as visiting a website 
when cookies were not blocked. The British ICO has stated in this respect 
that “implied consent has always been a reasonable proposition in the 
context of data protection law and privacy regulation and it remains so in 
the context of storage of information or access to information using cookies 
and similar devices. While explicit consent might allow for regulatory 
                                                
627 The full text of the section reads: “For the purpose of paragraph (2), consent 
may be signified by a subscriber who amends or sets controls on the internet 
browser which the subscriber uses or by using another application or programme 
to signify consent.” 
628 Information Commissioner’s Office, “Guidance on the Rules on Use of Cookies 
and Similar Technologies” (London, May 2012). 1. 
629 Ibid. 5 (adding that “for implied consent to work there has to be some action 
taken by the consenting individual from which their consent can be inferred. This 
might for example be visiting a website, moving from one page to another or 
clicking on a particular button.” Ibid. 6). Implied and implicit are used here as 
alternative terms. 
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certainty and might be the most appropriate way to comply in some 
circumstances this does not mean that implied consent cannot be 
compliant.”630 
However, for cookies that imply gathering of sensitive data, explicit 
consent could be required. According to the ICO guidelines, “website 
operators need to remember that where their activities result in the 
collection of sensitive personal data such as information about an 
identifiable individual’s health then data protection law might require 
them to obtain explicit consent.”631  
This presents an important similarity with the system in force in 
The Netherlands, with two differences that provoke important divergences 
in their application. Firstly, the Dutch regulation requires explicit consent 
for all personal information, while the British would (potentially) require it 
for sensitive personal information only. Secondly, the Dutch regulation and 
the British regulation have an inverse burden of proof, and while The 
Netherlands requires that websites prove that the information carried is 
not personal information in order to avoid the requirement of explicit 
consent, the UK requires that the data subject (or a third party) proves 
that the information carried is personal and sensitive in order for explicit 
consent to be required. As it can be seen, despite having the same black 
letter law, the UK is much more lenient than The Netherlands in its 
regulatory application of the directive.  
The differences mentioned add to the fact that, in practice, the UK 
has been even more lenient in the implementation of the e-Privacy 
directive than what its regulation leads one to expect. An open letter 
issued by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport on 2011 has stated 
that focusing on providing data subjects with information and choices 
regarding tracking is reasonable and sufficient to comply with the 
regulation. Furthermore, the letter has stated that consent is not time-
                                                
630 Ibid. 5.  
631 Ibid. 6. 
 
 
190 
bound, and does not necessarily have to be given in a previous manner in 
cases in which it is impractical to do so.632 
In the UK the requirement of explicit and prior consent has been 
deemed too burdensome when applied to all cookies, since many websites 
install cookies at the moment that data subjects open them.633 The focus of 
the policy was shifted with the open letter to ensuring best efforts in 
minimizing the time between the installation of the first cookies and the 
obtaining of consent.634 This is a very wide interpretation of the guidelines 
of the ICO—which, according to the letter, was consulted before its 
writing—which request the installation of cookies to be delayed until 
consent is given every time this is possible. 
The British regulation, in sum, also almost literally copies the 
wording of the directive, but attenuates it strongly by allowing for implicit 
consent when no personal data are carried—with an inverse burden of 
proof compared to the Dutch regulation—and sometimes even for 
subsequent consent. It seems to stay, therefore, as close to an opt-out 
system as it is possible without breaching the directive. 
The possible criticism to the British regulation (which could extend 
to all other MS incorporating an opt-in system with implicit consent) is 
that if a data subject visiting a website without blocking cookies in 
manifesting implicit consent and hence opting in, is it doubtful to what 
extent this is really an opt-in system and not an opt-out system with a 
duty of notification.  
                                                
632 See Department for Culture Media and Sport, “Open Letter on the UK 
Implementation of Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive on Cookies” (London, 
May 24, 2011). 
633 See Information Commissioner’s Office, “Guidance on the Rules on Use of 
Cookies and Similar Technologies” (London, May 2012). 
634 See Department for Culture Media and Sport, “Open Letter on the UK 
Implementation of Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive on Cookies” (London, 
May 24, 2011). 
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5.5.  Default Cookie Rules and the Dutch 
Regulation 
5.5.1. Disappointments and modification of the 
regulation 
When The Netherlands incorporated the opt-in system with explicit 
consent for cookies, there were several complaints about the regulation. 
From the side of the industry, it was stated that the regulation is “a very 
hard-to-explain deviation from the European directive, which doesn’t help 
anybody and makes it more complicated for both us and for the 
consumer.”635 Before the passing of the law, stakeholders formally 
complained that the cookie law is not only excessive for the aim of the 
directive but also goes beyond the scope of personal information.636 The law 
was deemed especially problematic because Dutch public media companies 
are required to reach a certain percentage of the population, which they 
partly do via their websites, and the impossibility to install any type of 
cookies prevents them from monitoring how many people view their 
contents. 
Similarly, consumers seemed dissatisfied. Consumers associations 
have complained about what has come to be known as the “cookie wall” 
claiming that is has been mainly an annoyance for internet users, and 
requested privacy protection to be matched by user friendliness.637 
Sectors of the public opinion seemed dissatisfied with the regulation 
as well. Some have stated that the law was a failure due to its 
impracticality.638 Others stated that the law misses the point entirely, 
                                                
635 Matt Steinglass, “Dutch Cookie Law May Lead to Online Exodus,” TechHub, 
June 21, 2011.  
636 See Jan Driessen et al., “Verzoek Tot Inhoudelijke Behandeling Wijziging van 
de Telcommunicatiewet,” July 3, 2011.  
637 See Stephan Loerke, “The Dutch Find a Lighter Touch on Internet Privacy 
Laws,” AdAge, July 3, 2013.  
638 See Arnoud Groot, “‘Naïeve’ Cookiewet Loopt Achter de Feiten Aan,” Emerce, 
November 4, 2010; “Mislukte Cookiewet Is Een Wijze Les,” NetKwesties, April 11, 
2013. 
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since what is relevant for privacy is anonymity.639 It was reported that 
consumers found the regulation annoying and unhelpful, and that it led 
people to mindlessly click to allow cookies every time they attempt to enter 
a website, being useless for its purpose.640 
Dutch academics have called the regulation “a policy fiasco of 
impressive dimensions”641 and “a regulatory failure.”642 It has also been 
stated that the main effect of the regulation is making services more 
difficult to be offered643 and that it hinders e-commerce both within and 
outside the Netherlands.644 
In addition, compliance has been low. A large amount of websites 
have breached the law and installed prohibited cookies in their visitors’ 
computers,645 including the websites of most political parties that voted in 
favor of it646 and of the government itself.647 
When faced with these results, a large fraction of political parties 
who originally voted in favor of the law objected to its continuation. On 21 
November 2012, D66 filed a proposal to change the regime because they 
considered the current regime too strict and unclear, and proposed to 
change it for an informed consent approach.648 Later on, both VVD and 
                                                
639 See Freek Vos, “Waar Maakt Iedereen Zich Zo Druk over? Leve de Cookies!,” 
Volkskrant, October 17, 2012.  
640 See “Wetgever Maakt Surfen Onmogelijk,” Financieel Dagblad, June 11, 2010. 
641 Natali Helberger, “Freedom of Expression and the Dutch Cookie-Wall,” 
University of Amsterdam Institute for Information Law Working Paper 13-01 
(Amsterdam, 2013). 1. 
642 Ronald Leenes and Eleni Kosta, “Taming the Cookie Monster with Dutch Law. 
A Tale of Regulatory Failure,” Computer Law & Security Review 31, no. 2 (2015). 
1. 
643 See Bart van der Sloot, “Je Geld of Je Gegevens: De Keuze Tussen 
Privacybescherming En Gratis Internetdiensten,” Nederlands Juristenblad 86, no. 
23 (2011): 1493. 
644 See Gerrit-Jan Zwenne and Maxime Verhagen, “Dutch Cookie Law to Affect 
Businesses Outside Holland,” E-Commerce Law & Policy 13, no. 17 (2011): 1. 
645 See Arnoud Engelfriet, “Websites Negeren Massaal de Cookiewet,” 
Cookierecht, July 13, 2012. 
646 See Robert van Hittersum, “Dutch Political Parties Violate Their Own Cookie 
Law,” FleishmanHillard, June 7, 2012. 
647 See “Opta Overtreedt Eigen Cookie-Regels,” NU, October 26, 2012. 
648 See “Voorstel Voor Ruimere Cookiewet,” NU, November 21, 2012; “Kamp (EZ) 
Gaat Cookievoorstel D66 Bestuderen,” Emerce, November 22, 2012. 
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PvdA stated that the regulation was unworkable, and called it a “cookie 
hostage” (cookiegijzeling) that must be put to an end.649  
These circumstances led to the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs 
publishing a letter on 20 May 2013 containing a revision of the 
regulation.650 Besides clarifying issues regarding jurisdiction,651 the 
revision incorporates two changes: it (i) allows websites to let users show 
consent by clicking in any part of the website if it is clearly shown to them 
that doing so signifies consent and (ii) it allows analytics (cookies that do 
not track individual behavior) without requiring consent.652  
This means, in practice, that the Dutch regulation is moving to a 
system of implicit consent. While until it finally does the current 
regulation still applies,653 this means that The Netherlands would join the 
majority of MS in their implementation of the e-Privacy directive. 
5.5.2. Explanation from the perspective of default rules 
A possible reason why the Dutch regulation did not see its expected results 
in designing an opt-in system with explicit consent in compliance with the 
amended e-Privacy Directive is that, despite what was stated in the law, 
the regulation did not effectively make websites implement an opt-in 
system. 
                                                
649 See “Kamer Wil Einde Pop-Ups Door Cookiewet,” NU, February 13, 2013; 
“Meerderheid Tweede Kamer Wil Einde Aan Cookie-Popups,” Tweakers, February 
13, 2013. 
650 See Henk Kamp, “Kamerbrief over Analytische Cookies En Artikel 11.7a van 
de Telecommunicatiewet” ( ’s-Gravenhage, December 20, 2012). 
651 It states that the regulation is not limited to Dutch websites, but also includes 
under some circumstances foreign websites, as it is its aim to protect Dutch 
consumers. Although it is not specific on what websites fall under the regulation, 
it mentions that viable criteria could be the language, the possibility to order 
products from The Netherlands, and the type of information provided. 
652 See “Cookiewet Versoepeld: Verplichte Melding Voor Minder Cookies,” 
Volkskrant, December 20, 2012. 
653 For example, on November 2013—after a long investigation—the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority sanctioned Google for gathering information of data subjects 
via cookies without their explicit consent. See College bescherming 
persoonsgegevens, “Onderzoek CBP Naar Het Combineren van Persoonsgegevens 
Door Google. Rapport Definitieve Bevindingen,” November 25, 2013. 
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 In a similar way to American bank customers deciding on whether 
to allow for overdraft coverage, data subjects were asked a polar question: 
whether they agreed with the use of cookies made by the website, or they 
did not. This choice different from being faced with a default opt-in system, 
as both the bank customers and data subjects had to make a conscious 
choice.  
In both cases, the most effective way to get customers to switch 
away from the default system was not to inform them about the costs and 
benefits of each option. As a consequence, what data subjects faced after 
websites incorporated the regulation was not a DNT default but an active 
choice. This similarity illustrates what can happen when the choice 
architect has an interest in subverting the regulation. 
Furthermore, data subjects under the cookie regulation had more 
pressure on choice than bank customers. While the latter could still 
normally use other bank services after choosing the “no” option (since they 
were paying for them independently), data subjects were often either not 
able to access the website due to the “cookie wall”, or access it subject to 
several malfunctions because the negative choice also meant that session 
cookies, which are necessary for some features, would not be installed.  
The “cookie wall”, or the explanation offered in other cases 
presenting cookies as something necessary for the functioning of the 
website (which they sometimes are), framed data subject’s choice. Data 
subjects were often not making a neutral choice on whether they desired to 
be tracked, but were making a choice on whether they still wanted to visit 
a certain website seconds after typing its URL. This effect was even 
stronger in other websites which placed together with the “cookie wall” a 
banner that allowed only for the “yes” option—data subjects who wanted to 
say no would have to directly leave the website since they had nowhere to 
manifest their choice. 
As with other default choice systems, a DNT default choice system 
can work only if people under DNT regime are treated in the same way as 
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people in the track-me regime.654 If websites are able to present data 
subjects with increasing incentives to switch choice, then most benefits of 
the policy are lost.655 It has been argued before that the cookie wall was 
problematic since it can put pressure on choice.656 This, although not 
amounting to coercion, can potentially hamper the validity of consent by 
violating the requirement of free consent established by the A29WP.657 
The do-not-call registry mentioned before,658 for example, which 
was largely considered a success,659 was run not by telemarketers 
themselves but by a governmental agency. If telemarketers had run the 
registry it is likely that they would have made it more difficult for people 
to join, hence hampering the success of the policy.660 
The implicit consent system implemented by the UK also traces 
back to the behavioral considerations made.661 For this, one can pose the 
question of how would the bank overdraft regulation have worked if 
implicit consent had been allowed as a valid means to opt-in the overdraft 
system—as an opt-in policy more lenient towards banks—and whether this 
would have avoided its problems. In such a case, it becomes noticeable that 
it is difficult to imagine a choice design in which banks could have 
implemented an implicit consent opt-in in a way that it is not substantially 
the same for their clients as the previous opt-out regime.  
                                                
654 See Lauren Willis, “Why Not Privacy By Default?,” Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 29, no. 1 (2014): 61. 
655 See Ibid. 
656 See Joasia Luzak, “Much Ado about Cookies: The European Debate on the New 
Provisions of the ePrivacy Directive Regarding Cookies,” European Review of 
Private Law 21, no. 1 (2013): 221; Natali Helberger, “Freedom of Expression and 
the Dutch Cookie-Wall,” University of Amsterdam Institute for Information Law 
Working Paper 13-01 (Amsterdam, 2013). 
657 See A29WP, “O.J. 15/2011 On the Definition of Consent” (Brussels, July 13, 
2011).  
658 See section 5.3.4. 
659 See Federal Communications Commission, “Trends in Telephone Service” 
(Washington, DC, August 7, 2003); Federal Trade Commission, “Annual Report to 
Congress for 2003 and 2004 Pursuant to the Do Not Call Registry” (Washington, 
DC, October 4, 2005). 
660 See Lauren Willis, “Why Not Privacy By Default?,” Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 29, no. 1 (2014): 61. 
661 See section 5.2.3. 
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For an implicit consent opt-in to function appropriately, there has 
to be an available set of actions which are conducing to the belief that the 
subject has manifested a choice, albeit not explicitly. If merely 
withdrawing money from an ATM in overdraft is taken to be within this 
set of actions, then the functioning of the opt-in system with implicit 
consent would have been identical to the functioning of the opt-out system, 
where bank clients could do this directly. In addition, to comply with the 
definition of consent of the Data Protection Directive, implicit consent 
needs to rest on a specific indication of the data subject’s wishes.662 The 
CJEU, in turn, has stated that silence does not signify consent under the 
EU data protection framework.663 
This leads to a word of caution regarding the validity of many opt-in 
choices with implicit consent which is transferable to the case of online 
tracking; it leads to question whether accessing a website, unlike 
withdrawing money from an ATM, is sufficient to implicitly manifest an 
opt-in choice. If one considers that it is not, that would lead to the 
conclusion that countries with an implicit opt-in choice for online tracking 
are functionally staying in an opt-out system, disallowed by the amended 
e-Privacy Directive. 
Besides the type of consent chosen, the Dutch and other European 
regulations asked agents who are behaviorally informed and who have 
counteracting interests to these regulations to be the choice architects of 
an opt-in default system—like the bank overdraft regulation, and unlike 
the do-not-call registry. This has been identified as a flaw in the choice 
system.664 Are there regulatory alternatives that would avoid this 
problem? 
                                                
662 Directive 1995/46/EC, article 2(h). See also A29WP, “O.J. 15/2011 On the 
Definition of Consent” (Brussels, July 13, 2011).  
663 See Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert (joined cases), CJEU 
C-92/09 and C-93/09 (2010). 
664 See section 5.2. 
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5.6.  Policy Suggestions 
5.6.1. Reconsidering the penalty default 
Having evaluated how the different MS implemented the amended e-
Privacy Directive’s requirement of previous consent for tracking (opt-in 
system), one can pose the question of whether, in the context of the 
composite problem identified,665 it is desirable for the aim of the regulation 
to make the choice an opt-in,666 or if it is better to present it as an active 
choice with two options presented equally—as the Dutch regulation 
accidentally did.  
As it was seen, default rules can be set as policy defaults or as 
penalty defaults, depending on the aim with which the default rule is set. 
In the framework of policy defaults, opt-in choice systems are 
considered useful when there is a choice that is in itself more valuable 
than the other, either for most people facing the choice or for society in 
general.667 This is the case, for example, of increased savings in retirement 
plans or organ donation, where some jurisdictions change the default to 
increase the number of donors based on the idea that organ donation is in 
itself something valuable.  
However, for the case of tracking devices such as cookies it is 
arguable that it is desirable to reduce their use only inasmuch as they cost 
consumers more than they benefit them, and not to absolutely eliminate 
them from the internet, even when ignoring the benefits of companies, 
which should also be present in a social welfare function. Cookies are not 
inherently harmful, as they present both costs and benefits for the 
industry and for data subjects. The “stickiness” of an effective opt-in 
default policy, for this reason, could leave fewer cookies than what is 
socially desirable. This can have harmful dynamic effects. If the entry in 
the market of websites (which is financed by advertising) was diminished 
                                                
665 See section 5.2.1. 
666 See section 5.3.3. 
667 See Craig McKenzie, Michael Liersch, and Stacey Finkelstein, 
“Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults,” Psychological Science 17, no. 5 
(2006): 414. 
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by an opt-in system, this policy would lead to fewer websites in the future 
and a less interesting internet for data subjects. This idea is in line with 
the classification of this policy under penalty defaults. 
Penalty defaults can make a stronger case in favor of an opt-in 
system for cookies than policy defaults, as companies are clearly more 
informed than data subjects about the functioning of the cookies they 
install.668 
It was seen that penalty defaults are useful when (i) there is a 
party which is more informed than the other, (ii) he engages in rent-
seeking behavior by withholding information and reducing total welfare 
and (iii) contracting around such default rule can release that 
information.669 The question that one should ask in order to determine if a 
penalty default rule is useful to reduce an information asymmetry not 
solved by the market is then: does this rule increase the amount of 
available information by reducing what was previously withheld? 
This question involves two central elements. The first is 
determining whether there is rent-seeking behavior exploiting the 
information asymmetry.670 The second is whether the penalty default 
successfully poses a cost for the party with more information in such a way 
that it induces a negotiation between parties that involves disclosure of 
information that reduces the information asymmetry.671  
In this case, the only information release which was produced by 
the regulation is that the website under consideration utilizes cookies. 
Although there is a clear information asymmetry between websites and 
data subjects regarding the functions of cookies, it is not clear if this was 
the basis of rent-seeking behavior, and it is clear that the default did not 
                                                
668 See Paul Schwartz, “Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware,” 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 20 (2005): 1269; Rajiv Shah and Jay Kesan, 
“Policy through Software Defaults,” in Proceedings of the National Conference on 
Digital Government Research (New York: Association for Computing Machinery 
Press, 2006), 265. 
669 See section 5.2.2. 
670 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules,” Yale Law Journal 99, no. 1 (1989): 87. 127. 
671 See Ibid. 128. 
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induce a negotiation.672 In these lines, it has been argued that information-
forcing rules such as penalty defaults fail to work in contract law when 
people sign the contracts without reading them.673 Data subjects did not 
end up being more informed about the functions of cookies after clicking 
away the banners in the countries that applied the directive more strictly. 
Due to the high number of data subjects per product, entering individual 
negotiations that would induce them to opt into the tracking system would 
have high transaction costs, and it is difficult to determine if such 
provision of information about the characteristics of cookies would induce 
them to opt in. 
Given the difficulties of assessing the costs and benefits of cookies 
for each particular case, applying the principle of informed consent to an 
active choice by data subject presents some benefits over an opt-in policy 
that regulates the way in which the choice is presented. If a data subject 
knowingly agrees to cookies, there are good reasons to believe that such 
exchange is valuable.  
The presence of preference heterogeneity is commonly a substantial 
argument in favor of active choice designs instead of default rules,674 and 
data subjects have heterogeneous preferences regarding cookies. Different 
people have different levels of disutility from tracking, and even the same 
person has different levels of disutility depending on the topic the tracking 
                                                
672 Mandatory notices have long been doubted by commentators in their ability to 
inform consumers. See William Whitford, “The Functions of Disclosure Regulation 
in Consumer Transactions,” Wisconsin Law Review 2 (1973): 400; Homer Kripke, 
“Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform,” NYU Law Review 44 (1969): 1; 
Robert Jordan and William Warren, “Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale,” 
Michigan Law Review 64, no. 7 (1966): 1285. 
673 See Rip Verkerke, “Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules,” William 
and Mary Law Review 56 (2015): 833. For an argument in favor of the 
abandonment of this duty to read in consumer law, see Ian Ayres and Alan 
Schwartz, “The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law,” Stanford Law 
Review 66 (2004): 545. 
674 See Cass Sunstein, “Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. 
Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych,” Harvard Law School Working Paper 13-
01 (Boston, 2013). The author has argued, similarly, that default settings have the 
cost of narrowing our experiences, and an argument can be made in favor of active 
choosing in context where one would want people to develop their own preferences 
and values. See Cass Sunstein, “Choosing Not to Choose,” Harvard Public Law 
Working Paper 14-07 (Boston, 2014). 
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is about.675 A neutral presentation of the choice of whether to allow for 
tracking that introduces both options equally might then be more 
appropriate for the aim of meaningful consent, which the regulation wants 
to achieve. 
5.6.2. Differentiating cookies 
Cookies can present different levels of privacy costs. As a first distinction, 
session cookies and permanent cookies do not present the same risks for 
privacy breach. As mentioned above, session cookies disappear after the 
browser is closed, while permanent cookies remain in storage for a longer 
period of time, usually until deleted. If one assumes an equal risk of 
privacy breach per unit of time, then permanent cookies—which can last 
for years—present on average a much higher privacy risk than session 
cookies—which tend to last for a few hours. In addition, user profiling is 
normally done by using permanent cookies, while most cookies that allow 
functions in websites (such as a shopping cart) are session cookies. 
Permanent cookies, hence, present a higher (expected) total privacy cost 
than session cookies. 
There are good reasons to consider, from the incentive structure of 
website providers, that permanent cookies and session cookies should be 
treated differently by regulations. In the same way as permanent cookies 
involve a higher privacy cost for data subjects than session cookies, they 
involve a larger total payoff for websites and advertisers, since by lasting 
for a longer time they make it easier to collect information.  
A law that establishes a DNT default for all cookies reduces the 
amount that websites are able to install in data subjects devices 
(contingent on their consent) by making every cookie marginally less likely 
to be installed. This reduces websites’ ability to make user profiles and 
tailor advertisements based on those profiles. This, in turn, reduces the 
total payoff of cookie use for websites. If websites can install fewer cookies, 
and they can choose which cookies to install because all of them are 
                                                
675 See sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
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treated equal, they will install those that are most profitable for them. 
Therefore, a regulation that treats all cookies equally reduces the payoff of 
cookie diversification. By setting incentives for websites to install only the 
most invasive cookies, it shifts the relative prices towards cookies that are 
more costly from a privacy perspective.  
Even if one assumes that websites care about the privacy of their 
users and would thus install the least invasive cookie under a regulation 
that treats all of them equally, in a context where there is a fixed cost per 
installation of cookie (obtainment of consent), websites have to pay this 
cost only once for a permanent cookie, while they have to pay it several 
times if the same function is achieved by several session cookies. Assuming 
firms try to reduce costs, this will lead them to shift to permanent cookies 
whenever possible—both for websites under perfect competition and 
websites with monopoly power, as cost minimization is independent of 
market power. This increases the total privacy cost of cookies. 
On the other hand, if less invasive cookies (such as analytics, or 
session cookies in general) are installed without complications, while more 
invasive cookies require previous consent, websites will have incentives to 
invest in diversification of cookies, requesting to send permanent cookies 
only when they are necessary for the required goal. This leads to a lower 
privacy cost for the average data subject without harming websites. 
The same effect is caused from the side of the data subject. Under a 
regulation that does not differentiate cookies, data subjects face upon 
entering a website a notification that such website uses cookies, or a 
banner asking to agree to the use of cookies of that website. It is costly for 
that data subject to know, however, if such cookies are session cookies or 
permanent cookies, categories to which he could potentially have a 
different reaction. That banner or that notification alone will determine 
the perceived privacy risk, as well as the annoyance in browsing. In such 
situation, a website that maximizes the number of visitors will attempt to 
ask the question as few times as possible, hence recurring to fewer, more 
invasive permanent cookies. 
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On the other hand, under a regulation that requires authorization 
for permanent cookies but not for session cookies, the website has 
incentives to use session cookies as much as possible, and reduce the 
number of times data subjects will receive the notice or the banner for 
permanent cookies. This, simultaneously, makes the notice or banner more 
informative, since data subjects will know that it corresponds to 
permanent cookies. This should, additionally, make data subjects less 
prone to accept a banner requesting them to agree with cookie tracking—
since each acceptance is more costly on average than an acceptance to a 
banner that does not differentiate cookies—thus enhancing average 
privacy protection. 
From this point of view, the mechanism suggested in the following 
subsection to implement the DNT default, additionally, the benefit that it 
allows for session cookies while preventing permanent cookies from being 
installed.  
5.6.3. Targeting web browsers 
A possible way to address the problems that were encountered by the 
Dutch regulation676 is designing a regulation to target web browsers 
instead of websites.677 This modification is technically possible and 
relatively easy, while political feasibility would require a more complex 
analysis and will fundamentally depend on the context; the main obstacle 
in this case would be enforcement. European DPL has always targeted 
data controllers and not technology creators, and it seems difficult for 
individual MS to put requirements on web browsers. It was probably 
unfeasible for the Dutch regulators to make demands to browsers that are 
based in another jurisdiction. However, more feasible for the EU in general 
and for the US. Given that browsers responded well to DNT headers, it 
seems possible that if enacted by the appropriate jurisdictions, they would 
comply with a regulation of this sort. 
                                                
676 See section 5.5.1. 
677 See Ian Brown and Christian Marsden, Regulating Code: Good Governance and 
Better Regulation in the Information Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2013). 
 
 
203 
Firstly, a browser’s business model is not harmed by a policy 
attempting to reduce the use of cookies—or it is only inasmuch as the 
company who owns the browser also owns websites or applications which 
profit from targeted advertising. Web browsers have less incentives than 
websites to twist the default policy, while they have the technical 
possibility of blocking them.  
In a similar way as a regulation can call websites to apply a DNT 
preference and avoid sending cookies as was successfully done with DNT 
headers, it can call browsers to apply it by blocking cookies sent by 
websites. In this case, browsers operate as a gatekeeper, and the intention 
of websites notwithstanding, then can choose if to let cookies through or 
not. When this is done, it is more difficult for a website to set a cookie-wall 
as they did in The Netherlands and in the UK. Data subjects could have 
the choice, in this way, not between entering the website with cookies or 
not entering at all, but between entering the website with or without 
cookies. 
 Secondly, the costs of the regulation would be reduced, since web 
browsers are cheaper to monitor than websites regarding compliance. The 
internet has millions of websites. The browsers through which most of 
internet traffic goes through, on the other hand, are five.678 Since web 
browsers are able to block cookies, requesting them to do so can effectively 
implement a DNT default at lower enforcement costs. 
Together with enforcement costs, and also due to the reduced 
number of agents that have to direct efforts into enforcing the regulation, 
this would lower compliance costs. Under the current Dutch regulation, all 
websites that operate in The Netherlands have to design a banner for the 
opt-in mechanism—or the active choice. This consumes resources that 
could be used for something else, such as developing new features to 
attract customers. 
Also, web browsers can present the question of whether to navigate 
with cookies in a context in which it has more relevance than the context 
                                                
678 To this time, Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari and 
Opera. 
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in which—even when well-intentioned—websites can present it. In such 
way, browsers can implement the policy in a way that is less costly for data 
subjects. If websites are in charge of asking whether a data subject agrees 
with cookies to be installed, the data subject will be asked every time he 
changes website, which was found by most of them bothersome and not 
user-friendly.679 This not only interrupts navigation and thus bothers data 
subjects but also makes it difficult for them to visit a certain website being 
tracked in some occasions and not being tracked in others—which is often 
a desired feature, for instance with search engines. If browsers are in 
charge of posing this question, on the other hand, data subjects can be 
asked every time they open the browser to start navigation. This does not 
interrupt navigation and makes it easier for them to switch system if they 
desire to do so—they just have to open a new window. Moreover, this 
feature is in line with the policy recommendation explained before of 
enhancing data subjects’ flexibility when possible.680 
Requesting web browsers to block cookies, then, allows for a more 
user-friendly way of knowing whether a certain data subject wants to 
browse with or without cookies. This idea is supported by the Electronic 
Communications Framework Directive, which states that the request for 
consent must be as user-friendly as possible within the applicable 
technical limitations.681 
5.6.4. How to target web browsers 
If data subjects want to remain cookie-free, all five major browsers already 
offer a function under which they can navigate the internet without 
permanent cookies being installed. Data subjects can then navigate 
without leaving permanent traces in their device that allow for tracking, 
while receiving the less controversial session cookies that allow for the use 
of many functions of the websites, such as streaming video or placing items 
                                                
679 See Natali Helberger, “Freedom of Expression and the Dutch Cookie-Wall,” 
University of Amsterdam Institute for Information Law Working Paper 13-01 
(Amsterdam, 2013). 
680 See sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
681 Directive 2009/136/EC, recital 66. 
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in a shopping cart. This function prevents (with some exceptions) cookies, 
local storage, history and caches to remain in the computer after the 
browsing session is finished.682 
This function imbedded in browsers offers data subjects a real opt-
out choice for permanent cookies that only requires two clicks, and saves 
them the trouble of learning about and installing PETs. From a technical 
point of view, this opt-out choice is easy to turn into an opt-in; regulation 
can require browsers to open in Incognito Mode/Private Browsing, and 
switch to the now standard mode only after those two clicks are made.  
Opinion 2/2010 of the A29WP states that browser setting can only 
effectively represent an opt-in choice for data subjects in some situations 
because they accept cookies by default, and because data subjects often do 
not know how to change them.683 Although this flaw is of course true for 
current browser settings, it is not an obstacle for creating a regulation that 
approaches them to apply the DNT default instead of approaching 
websites. 
Policymakers could, hypothetically, design detailed forms for data 
subjects to complete every time they enter into a website specifying which 
types of cookies they would like to allow, for how long they would like to 
allow them, for the use of whom, and so on and so forth. However, this 
would be of little use. From the point of view of user-friendliness, most 
PETs—especially those that are more sophisticated—have usability 
problems,684 and so does a cookie wall applied by individual websites. This 
                                                
682 There are some exceptions for this. Information that is collected by browser-
independent plugins such as Adoble Flash is not cleared, but most browsers offer 
the option to deactivate it when using Private Browsing or Incognito Mode. Firefox 
does not clear persistent storage (window.globalStorage), Internet Explorer does 
not clear IE userData, and Safari used on Windows does not clear data at all. See 
Katherine McKinley, “Cleaning Up After Cookies Version 1.0,” Technical Report 
for ISEC Partners (San Francisco, 2010). 
683 See A29WP, “O.J. 2/2010 on Online Behavioral Advertising” (Brussels, June 22, 
2010)., 14. 
684 See Pedro Giovanni Leon et al., “Why Johnny Can’t Opt out: A Usability 
Evaluation of Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising,” in Proceedings of the 
Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on Computer-
Human Interaction Conference (New York: Association for Computing Machinery 
Press, 2012), 589. 
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function embedded in browsers, on the other hand, does not, as it is simple 
to use. Establishing this function as a default DNT choice would make it 
even simpler.  
In sum, this regulatory suggestion could provide a simpler 
regulation with less incentives for the choice architect to undermine the 
policy. 
5.7.  Online Tracking Meets Behavioral Economics 
This chapter has argued that the behavioral economics literature on 
default rules can help in identifying why online tracking regulations in 
Europe faced difficulties in implementing the policy. These regulations 
either arguably stayed in practice within an opt-out default system by 
allowing for implicit consent, or their policy was neutralized by websites, 
having an active choice system as a result. As it was seen, the only MS 
who adopted a DNT default that requires both previous and explicit 
consent decided to attenuate it moving to implicit consent thereafter, while 
this option seems functionally equivalent to the opt-in system from which 
the amended e-Privacy Directive aimed to part. 
Both The Netherlands and the UK implemented the wording of the 
amended e-Privacy Directive into their regulations but gave it in practice 
very different meanings. While the Dutch regulation follows what seems to 
be the intention of the amendment of the e-Privacy Directive and becomes 
what could be the strictest legal system in the world regarding cookies, the 
British regulation approaches the issue more conservatively and regulates 
it as close to an opt-out system as the wording of the amendment allows. 
Noting the implementation problems that the Dutch regulation faced, it 
might be easier to understand the reluctance of the British government to 
move to an opt-out system and why The Netherlands set itself in the way 
to moderating its own regulation later on. 
It was suggested here that this could have happened because 
penalty default rules were applied outside their scope and their design was 
trusted to agents with incentives to undermine them. If this is the case, 
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reconsidering the opt-in system, relying on web browsers instead of 
websites for the choice design, and taking into consideration the 
differences in privacy costs between permanent and session cookies, could 
help in improving consumer choice.  
The explanation and the policy suggestions offered can be 
potentially useful not only for The Netherlands but for any country 
considering incorporating a DNT default in their legislations. Within the 
EU, it can help in the design of an implementation that ensures informed 
consent and achieves the aims of the directive in line with the goal of 
Smart Regulations. The technology and the behavioral insights to 
implement effective limits on online tracking are already available; it is 
the law that needs to catch up. 
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6. Conclusions  
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6.1.  Tradeoffs in DPL 
The way in which we deal with our personal information and the limits of 
our privacy mutate with new technologies. The internet, the biggest agent 
in this change, has turned into a zero marginal cost distribution channel, 
both for voluntary and for involuntary exchanges. Thereafter, it has turned 
from a system of information storage by some and information retrieval by 
others to a system for connecting people, where anyone can create and 
retrieve content (peer-to-peer). This leads to personal information 
behaving as a good that, while still costly to produce from a privacy 
perspective, can be given costlessly to others; this implies the existence of 
positive spillovers that potentially lead to a deficit problem—much like the 
one addressed by copyright. 
Informational privacy, and in particular data protection, concerns 
the ability to exclude others from one’s personal information. Exclusion, in 
turn, takes us to the realm of entitlements and of the different possible 
ways to protect them: liability rules, property rules and inalienability 
rules. Some level of exclusion (this is, some level of data protection) creates 
incentives to generate information, reducing the deficit problem. 
Informational privacy in cyberspace can be characterized as: (i) a 
public good, (ii) a good that can be traded with low transaction costs, (iii) a 
good that has not been yet produced, and (iv) a good that is produced as a 
by-product of a consumption activity. Due to the first characterization, its 
positive spillovers should be internalized for its level of production to be 
optimal. Due to the second and third, the allocation of entitlements defines 
such internalization, and DPL can establish production incentives and 
foster its generation by allocating those entitlements. Due to the fourth, 
DPL is not the only tool that can do this: the market can induce a certain 
level of information even in the absence of data protection, although this 
level is likely to be suboptimal. 
This leads one to consider that the interdependence between 
privacy and access to information in the context of new technologies is not 
a negative relationship, but a positive concave relationship: data protection 
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and information are often not at a tradeoff. Zero data protection means the 
persistence of the deficit problem and hence a low level of information 
production (dynamic effect of DPL), while absolute data protection means a 
high level information production but without information flow (static 
effect of DPL).  
The three classical canonical protections of entitlements in their 
pure form (liability rules, property rules and inalienability rules) generate 
problems that would undermine the utility of DPL if they were 
implemented in their pure forms. For liability rules, this would take place 
due to a causal uncertainty problem that is not resolvable with the 
traditional means used in other areas of law. For property rules, this 
would be due to the introduction of a moral hazard problem. For 
inalienability rules, the benefits of information production would be 
nullified by a reduction in information flow—at this high level of 
protection, privacy and information turn to be at a tradeoff. 
Following the premise of the positive concave relationship between 
data protection and information flow, a mid-way between the first two 
rules can maximize both privacy and access to information for data 
subjects. This provides a direction for DPL: some level of exclusion is 
desirable, and such level can be set in a non-centralized way (in the style of 
property rights) with a level of exclusion in between property rules and 
liability rules. 
This idea coincides with the general characteristics of European 
DPL. To provide data subjects with enhanced privacy, DPL generates 
entitlements over personal information. Moreover, the rationale of DPL is 
not based on an idea of ownership over data—it would be false to assert 
that the rights given to data subjects within it constitute a property right. 
The incentives to generate information matter as long as data 
subjects are likely to respond to them. It is important to add, therefore, 
that data subject behavior can be interpreted within rational choice theory. 
The responses that data subjects have regarding the disclosure of their 
personal information are consistent with those of rational agents that 
discount in the context of an uncertain hazard rate. Moreover, data 
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subjects are responsive to context and when levels of data protection are 
visible they alter their levels of disclosure. This means that data subjects 
take incentives into account when deciding whether to disclose. 
This is especially relevant in a context where people ignore most of 
what happens with their personal information, and they try to take control 
with self-protection mechanisms such as PETs, which are socially costly. 
For data subjects, taking control means knowing what happens with their 
information, and being able to make choices about it, if possible more than 
once. 
These considerations lead to three theoretical conclusions. First, 
privacy and access to information are not countervailing rights; the social 
costs of lacking an adequate data protection are not only those 
corresponding to chilling effects, but also to underproduction of 
information. Second, an optimal level of exclusion to incentivize personal 
information is lower than a property rule, and lower than copyright, but 
higher than a liability rule. Third, European DPL addresses this fact, and 
from this point of view it is generally efficient. 
By focusing on DPL as a mechanism to promote the generation of 
information, two gaps so far present in the literature regarding proposals 
to protect privacy are closed. First, the question of why the allocation of 
the entitlement is relevant in a scenario of low transaction costs is 
answered by seeing that distributional effects matter to incentivize 
production. Second, the question regarding how property elements over 
intangible goods can be justified in the face of a mismatch between the 
reasons to protect personal information and the reasons to protect 
intellectual property is addressed by noting that both branches of law 
foster the generation of information. 
6.2.  Policy Implications 
A common conception of policymakers and academics is that the right to 
privacy presents tradeoffs with the amount of information available and 
the right to access information. However, since some level of data 
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protection increases the amount of available information, these tradeoffs 
are not as linear as one would initially think.  
The theoretical considerations that were made are relevant for 
policymaking inasmuch as they have an impact on the way in which the 
rights to privacy and to access information interact, which has 
consequences on how they should be balanced. More specifically, they 
provide us with an economic framework that can serve as a basis for 
explanatory and for normative evaluations of DPL. It can be used to 
evaluate whether policymakers designing central changes in DPL have 
acted as if privacy and information are to some extent complementary—as 
we have seen that they did in Europe. Moreover, it leads to general policy 
recommendations for this evolving branch of law. 
From an economic perspective, the level of data protection given to 
a certain piece of information should depend on three factors. First, it 
should depend on who incurred in costs to generate the piece of 
information which is being protected. If a data subject has to invest to 
generate the information, this justifies a higher level of protection than the 
one in place for those cases in which an entity that collects or processes 
data invests in it, since the agent that needs to be incentivized to produce 
the information is different. Second, the level of protection should also 
depend on the social benefits that stem from the use of that information. 
When there are large social benefits from the information, for example 
because it is useful for research that can improve public health or help in 
the prevention of crime, a lower level of protection is justified compared to 
information that is only used for marketing purposes. For information with 
large social benefits, access turns to be more important within the tradeoff 
inherent in providing entitlements between incentives for production and 
access by others. Lastly, the level of protection should depend on the size of 
the externalities that its use would imply for the data subject since, in 
order to keep incentives to invest stable, one must grant a higher level of 
protection to information that can potentially be more harmful, keeping 
the social use and source of the information stable. This relates 
particularly to sensitive information, justifying its special protection. 
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Moreover, given the characteristics of the context in which data 
subjects engage in disclosure, DPL should focus, when possible, on 
increasing flexibility for data subjects in their choices regarding whether to 
disclose. When increasing flexibility is not possible, or it is too costly, DPL 
should focus on increasing transparency in order to reduce the uncertainty 
about the probability of a data leak with requirements such as digestible 
privacy policies and informed consent. 
Focusing on concrete policy issues that are relevant for the EU, this 
framework can also be applied to two recent legal developments that are 
undergoing regulatory debates and had high media exposure in European 
DPL: the right to be forgotten and online tracking. Analyzing these data 
protection regulations from the theoretical considerations made can help to 
determine whether they are justified from a law & economics perspective, 
and if they are, whether it is possible that they went too far or that they 
have not gone far enough. 
Any comment on the general principles of European DPL would be 
incomplete without addressing the right to be forgotten, both due to the 
prominence that its debate had inside and outside of academic circles, and 
due to the significance that it would have for all agents dealing with data 
protection. The right to be forgotten, in fact, is a good example of 
policymakers augmenting the level of exclusion in data protection by 
creating an entitlement. This entitlement increases data subjects’ 
flexibility, but also presents large social costs. 
A well-functioning right to be forgotten virtually poses an 
inalienability rule over personal information. This rule reduces 
information flows, and in such way it affects the right to access 
information of the same data subjects that it protects. Moreover, the rule 
has additional societal costs in the form of large implementation costs for 
data processers and a reduction in freedom of expression for data subjects. 
In turn, the imperfect right to be forgotten that the EU can 
implement presents a risk compensation problem (Peltzman effect). This 
leads to an unfortunate CJEU decision in the Google v. Spain case, which 
materializes into an equally problematic implementation of the right, 
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modified to fit within current DPL to a point in which it is questionable 
whether the decision pertains the right to be forgotten at all. 
The GDRP, in this way, by establishing the right in its article 17 
goes beyond the scope of data protection that this framework justifies. In 
the best case scenario, it would create an inalienability rule that reduces 
information flow. In the worst case scenario, which is the most likely due 
to the jurisdictional limitations of the EU, it would create a Peltzman 
effect that leaves data subjects more vulnerable than before. An 
alternative version of the right to be forgotten can be formulated to 
maintain its central positive feature (increasing data subjects’ flexibility) 
while avoiding the main problems of access to information, freedom of 
expression, and implementation costs. However, this version would not 
avoid the risk compensation problem that the jurisdictional limitations 
imply. 
Another visible example of this exclusion mechanism are online 
tracking regulations, particularly pertaining cookies. Changing the default 
system for tracking from an opt-out to an opt-in system, where previous 
consent is needed to install cookies, is a way to create entitlements that 
enhance protection without creating property rights. 
A relevant difference between this legal development and the last is 
that the theoretical background of the change in the default system for 
online tracking regulations goes beyond the rational choice framework; it 
bases itself on behavioral considerations. Accordingly, one must apply 
behavioral economics within the neoclassical framework described in order 
to evaluate the policy.  
Online tracking regulations do fall within the scope of data 
protection that the framework explained in favor of DPL can justify. Still, 
some adjustments are recommendable from the perspective of behavioral 
economics and the technological characteristics of online tracking. The 
DNT laws set exclusionary power by establishing an opt-in mechanism 
but, in doing so, they apply policy defaults outside of their scope. The same 
level of exclusionary power can be set by presenting an active choice 
mechanism. Independently of the level of exclusionary power set, it is 
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recommendable to give the design of the choice system to agents who have 
the least possible counteracting interests to the policy. In the context of 
online tracking, this means targeting web browsers instead of websites. 
Finally, a stronger differentiation between session cookies and permanent 
cookies can be recommended, since the former carry lower privacy risks 
and are more important for the functioning of websites than the latter. 
A visible common element of the two regulations is that they 
overtly seek to augment the level of control that people have over their 
own personal information by giving them the possibility to exclude others 
from it, giving data subjects an entitlement, but not a property right. 
These two central developments in DPL cannot be predicted or explained 
from an economic perspective without seeing DPL as a mechanism to 
allocate rights of exclusion to incentivize information, as the framework 
set here proposes.  
6.3.  Future Research 
Some extensions can be made from the lessons learned to other related 
topics within DPL. Namely, to the relationship between data protection 
and freedom of expression, to which is likely to be the future of DPL, and 
to the differences between the American and the European model of data 
protection. 
What societies previously called liberty (the freedom to not have our 
information and actions controlled) they moved to call privacy, and in 
doing so they moved to worry not only about the freedom to not have our 
information and actions controlled by the government, but also by our 
peers. In this context, to disregard privacy is to allow for people to lose 
autonomy. Such right is more important from a consequentialist 
perspective than a mere ability to conceal information in order to deceive 
others; it is about allowing for a zone for thoughts, weaknesses and 
decision-making processes which is protected from the general public, and 
which by such protection eliminates fear of disclosure. 
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This opens the possibility to extend the conclusions made for the 
relationship between data protection and access to information to the 
relationship between data protection and freedom of speech. By the 
elimination of the fear of disclosure, privacy and freedom of speech, 
although sometimes at a tradeoff at the margin, are largely 
complementary: a lack of privacy imposes a chilling effect on freedom of 
speech. This idea is key to determining the optimal scope of balancing of 
both rights; independently of the weight a society might place in either of 
them, it is useful to make explicit what society is foregoing by placing itself 
on each part of the spectrum of such choice. 
Regarding what one can expect of DPL, there seems to be a trend in 
data protection to grant more entitlements with increasing levels of 
exclusion to data subjects, while maintaining itself in the mid-way 
described between property and liability rules.  
Although DPL augments levels of exclusion for data subjects, the 
Data Protection Directive does not border on the establishment of a 
property regime for personal data. The GDRP, while in the same line, 
presents more property elements than the Data Protection Directive; it 
broadens the requirement of data subjects’ consent,685 it strengthens 
property-rule-based remedies such as data subjects’ possibilities to request 
an injunction from a court,686 and it introduces the right to be forgotten 
giving it an in rem characteristic.687 There seems to be a tendency in DPL 
to provide increasing levels of exclusion, where the newest developments 
such as the right to be forgotten provide a stronger exclusion power than 
the more traditional rights. 
This increasing level of exclusion is to be expected from the point of 
view of the framework that was set. In copyright—the branch of law that 
was seen as the most analogous to DPL—the easier it is to copy a work, 
                                                
685 See article 7 of the GDRP. 
686 See articles 75(1) and 76(5) of the GDRP. 
687 See article 17 of the GDRP; Jacob Victor, “The EU General Data Protection 
Regulation: Toward a Property Regime for Protecting Data Privacy,” Yale Law 
Journal 123 (2013): 513. 
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the higher the level of protection must be to maintain stable incentives.688 
If the same is to be said about DPL, one should expect increasing levels of 
protection as long as technology keeps facilitating the collection, storage 
and dissemination of personal information. 
The optimal level of exclusion to be given to privacy entitlements in 
cyberspace is difficult to define precisely, and largely depends on value 
judgments. In order to provide a precise answer, it is necessary for a 
society to decide the weight with which it values each of the elements in 
the tradeoffs involved, and such weights are likely to vary from one society 
to the other. The choice among the different options that lie in the 
spectrum between the absolute disclosure extreme and the no disclosure 
extreme ultimately depends, largely, on the shape of societal preferences. 
While one cannot, for this reason, resolve these tradeoffs optimally from a 
purely theoretical point of view, one can be made aware of which tradeoffs 
one is dealing with, and one can make the problems inherent in them more 
visible.  
It has been argued that, for data protection, American 
commentators favor market-based solutions over comprehensive 
regulations, which are in turn preferred in Europe.689 DPL in the EU is 
relatively property-oriented, containing several instances in which consent 
is needed for information to be transferred. On the other hand, the fair 
information practices, which are the main tool to protect informational 
privacy in the US, are harm-based and in such way more liability-oriented 
than DPL.690 This has alarmed some European commentators.691 This 
                                                
688 See William Landes and Richard Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 325. 
689 See Pamela Samuelson, “Privacy as Intellectual Property?,” Stanford Law 
Review 52, no. 5 (1999): 1125. 
690 See Paul Schwartz, “Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace 
Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices,” Wisconsin Law Review 1 
(2000): 743. See also Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, “To Track or ‘Do Not 
Track’: Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral 
Advertising,” Minnessota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 13, no. 1 (2012): 
281.  
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difference, however, is a result that can be expected from a framework that 
presents tradeoffs whose outcome ultimately depends on societal values 
and in such way considers that the choices within them does not have one 
single optimal outcome. 
Simultaneously, it has been stated that a regime change towards 
property rights in the US would increase the control that data subjects 
have over an already existing market for their personal information, and 
in such way the change would not be radical.692 This is especially 
applicable to establishing general privacy entitlements within American 
information technology law, since this is a previous step to defining the 
level of protection within the spectrum for which the creation of an 
entitlement allows. 
In this way, one can give a reasonable account of the persistent 
regulatory differences between the EU and the US while not abandoning 
the idea that there are consequences from such differences that can be 
evaluated from an economic perspective. Once the economic rationale for 
protecting privacy is clear, one can see which the existing tradeoffs are, 
and one can see that the two regulatory schemes might just be giving 
priority to different values within them. 
6.4.  Closing Remarks 
Concluding the preceding analysis, one can state after the considerations 
made that it is possible from a law & economics perspective to explain 
DPL—accounting for the recent trends within it—and to provide policy 
recommendations for it. Regarding the former, the right to be forgotten 
and the limits on online tracking are examples on how the law evolves to 
further exclude others from one’s personal information in the context of 
                                                                                                                            
691 See Lokke Moerel, Big Data Protection. How to Make the Draft EU Regulation 
on Data Protection Future Proof (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 2014). 
Chapter 2. 
692 See Pamela Samuelson, “A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal 
Data in the Global Information Economy,” California Law Review 87, no. 3 (1999): 
751. 
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new technologies; this is, to create entitlements for data subjects that did 
not exist so far. Regarding the latter, one can see that the right to be 
forgotten should at least be limited to those situations in which 
informational privacy diverts from traditional privacy problems, and that 
online tracking regulations should take into account the costs of different 
types of cookies and be weary with the design of policy defaults.  
One should keep in mind, when reading the conclusions set here, 
that this analysis shows “one side of the Cathedral” of DPL.693 What is 
more, this might even not be the most important side. Still, showing this 
side of the law can produce significant advancements. First, its other sides 
(deontic, human rights based) have been extensively explored already, and 
seeing this side is important to have a complete picture of the problems 
that it involves. Second, seeing this side makes it difficult for scholars who 
base their results on methodological individualism to say that privacy does 
not matter—that the cathedral is not there at all. Third, even if a 
policymaker chooses whether to protect privacy based solely on principled 
reasons, and abstracting from consequences, this analysis is useful to 
highlight the secondary effects of such decisions, preventing unintended 
consequences. 
In a much quoted phrase, Sun CEO Scott Mcnealy told us that we 
have no privacy anyway, and that we should get over it.694 This analysis 
has shown that the statement is not only untrue, but that there are good 
reasons why it is so. Failure to protect privacy would lead to an 
underproduction of information, and that is a scenario that all agents in 
the interaction would rather avoid. 
                                                
693 See generally Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law 
Review 85, no. 6 (1972): 1089. 
694 “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.” First cited in Stephen Manes, 
“Private Lives? Not Ours!,” PC World, April 18, 2000. 
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Summary 
Technological changes, particularly in the context of big data, have made 
surveillance by public and private parties easier than ever before: they have 
reduced the costs of gathering, storing and disseminating information. This has 
been coupled with a decentralization in internet content creation. Together, 
these changes modify the interactions involving privacy and personal information 
exchanges and, to that extent, they force us to reconsider the scope of protection 
that we grant them. This reconsideration has been done from the perspective of 
human rights, while the economic incentives involved remain underexplored. 
In the process of doing this, the thesis evaluates whether data protection law can 
be justified from an economic perspective. Given that people face privacy costs 
by disclosing personal information, entitlements created by data protection affect 
the incentives for generating information in the context of decentralized content 
creation; hence, these entitlements can lead to greater information production in 
the long run. Due to this, privacy and access to information are often 
complementary rights. Determining the efficient protection level for these 
entitlements, however, becomes complex, as both property rules and liability 
rules introduce additional problems. An intermediate protection level is hence 
suggested. 
Following this, the thesis gives an explanation of why people sometimes disclose 
their personal information for low compensations despite the high value that 
they attach to their privacy, based on the uncertain probability of privacy 
breaches. This explanation can account for user behavior within a rational-choice 
framework in a way that fits intuitively with both consumers’ demands for 
transparency and contemporary policy debates on privacy. It also reverses the 
prevalent behavioral model’s policy conclusions and accounts for current trends 
in data protection law—particularly the right to be forgotten. 
The right to be forgotten is then analyzed focusing on its formulation in the 
General Data Regulation Proposal. The right creates large social costs, mainly by 
reducing freedom of expression and access to information. Due to its 
implementation difficulties, it could also introduce a risk-compensation 
mechanism in which people engage in more risky behavior than before. From 
this perspective, Google v. Spain does not rule on the right to be forgotten but 
on the liability of search engines; and in doing so, it fails to offer a consistent 
balance between privacy and freedom of expression. 
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The second major policy debate analyzed is the limitations placed on online 
tracking by the Electronic Communications Framework Directive, which changes 
the default system for tracking to an opt-in. A comparative study of the directive’s 
implementation across member states is presented, with special attention to The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Drawing from the behavioral economics 
literature on default rules, policy changes that would avoid the incentive 
problems present in these regulations are suggested. 
The thesis makes the dynamics of the tradeoffs involving privacy more visible; 
both theoretically and in two of the main policy debates in European data 
protection law. It offers an explanation for data protection law from an economic 
perspective and, in doing so, provides a new basis for the evaluation of further 
data protection measures.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Dankzij technologische veranderingen, met name in het kader van big data, is het 
voor publieke en particuliere partijen eenvoudiger dan ooit om toezicht uit te 
oefenen doordat de kosten voor het verzamelen, opslaan en delen van informatie 
zijn gedaald. Dit ging gepaard met decentralisatie bij de creatie van internetcontent. 
Deze combinatie van veranderingen leidt tot een gewijzigde wisselwerking tussen 
privacy en de uitwisseling van persoonlijke informatie en dwingt ons als zodanig 
de geboden mate van bescherming inzake deze punten te heroverwegen. Deze 
heroverweging heeft plaatsgevonden vanuit het perspectief van de mensenrechten, 
terwijl de economische prikkels die hierbij een rol spelen onderbelicht blijven. 
Daarbij wordt in het proefschrift geëvalueerd of de wetgeving inzake 
gegevensbescherming vanuit een economisch perspectief kan worden 
gerechtvaardigd. Aangezien mensen privacy inleveren wanneer ze persoonlijke 
informatie verstrekken, zijn aanspraken voortvloeiend uit het recht op 
gegevensbescherming van invloed op de prikkels bedoeld om binnen de context 
van een gedecentraliseerde creatie van content informatie te genereren; mogelijk 
leiden deze aanspraken op lange termijn dan ook tot een hogere 
informatieproductie. Hierdoor zijn privacy en toegang tot informatie vaak 
complementaire rechten. Het wordt evenwel een complexe aangelegenheid om 
een efficiënt beschermingsniveau voor deze aanspraken te bepalen, aangezien 
zowel eigendomsregels als aansprakelijkheidsregels bijkomende problemen 
veroorzaken. Om die reden wordt een gemiddeld beschermingsniveau 
voorgesteld. 
Hierna wordt in het proefschrift een verklaring gegeven voor het feit dat mensen 
soms in ruil voor een lage tegenprestatie persoonlijke informatie verstrekken 
hoewel ze veel waarde aan hun privacy hechten, uitgaande van de onzekere 
waarschijnlijkheid dat er inbreuken op de privacy zullen worden gepleegd. Hierbij 
wordt het gedrag van gebruikers in het kader van de rational choice benadering 
verklaard op een wijze die intuïtief aansluit bij de roep om transparantie door 
consumenten en de huidige beleidsdebatten over privacy. Hiermee worden ook 
de heersende beleidsconclusies over het gedragsmodel onderuitgehaald en de 
huidige trends op het gebied van wetgeving inzake gegevensbescherming verklaard 
— met name het recht om te worden  vergeten. Vervolgens wordt  het recht om te 
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worden vergeten geanalyseerd, waarbij de formulering van dit recht in het voorstel 
voor een algemene verordening gegevensbescherming centraal staat. Dit recht 
brengt hoge maatschappelijke kosten met zich mee, vooral doordat de vrijheid van 
meningsuiting en de toegang tot informatie worden beperkt. Vanwege de 
moeilijkheden bij de tenuitvoerlegging ervan kan de verordening ook leiden tot 
een risico-compensatiemechanisme waarbij mensen riskanter gedrag gaan 
vertonen dan daarvoor. Vanuit dit perspectief blijkt dat in de zaak Google v. 
Spanje geen uitspraak wordt gedaan over het recht om te worden vergeten maar 
over de aansprakelijkheid van zoekmachines; dit betekent dat er geen consistent 
evenwicht wordt geboden tussen privacy en de vrijheid van meningsuiting. 
Het tweede belangrijke beleidsdebat dat wordt geanalyseerd, betreft de 
beperkingen inzake online tracing zoals voorzien in de kaderrichtlijn inzake 
elektronische communicatie, als gevolg waarvan de standaardinstelling voor 
tracering wordt gewijzigd in een keuze-instelling. Er wordt een vergelijkend 
onderzoek naar de tenuitvoerlegging van de richtlijn in de lidstaten gepresenteerd, 
met bijzondere aandacht voor Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Uitgaande 
van wat in de literatuur over gedragseconomie wordt geschreven over 
standaardregels, worden beleidsveranderingen voorgesteld om de problemen 
inzake prikkels waarvan in deze verordeningen sprake is, te vermijden. 
Het proefschrift maakt de dynamiek van de privacy-afwegingen zichtbaarder, 
zowel vanuit een theoretisch oogpunt als in twee van de belangrijkste 
beleidsdebatten over de Europese wetgeving inzake gegevensbescherming. Het 
biedt een verklaring voor wetgeving inzake gegevensbescherming vanuit een 
economisch perspectief en biedt daarmee een nieuwe basis voor de evaluatie van 
verdere maatregelen inzake gegevensbescherming.  
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